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MAPPING INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE  
INSA THEESFELD, FRAUKE PIRSCHER 
 
This editorial provides a wider theoretical foundation for the selection of papers 
in this book and links them with the current debate on institutional change. We 
develop a conceptual classification to show the similarities and differences of the 
case studies presented in the remainder of this book. 
The basic functions of institutions are defined in accordance with the prevailing 
understanding of institutions in institutional economics and most areas of social 
sciences. Institutions are the rules of a society or organisation that facilitate 
coordination among people by helping them form expectations, which each person 
can reasonably hold in dealing with others (BLAAS, 1982; NORTH, 1990). They 
reflect the conventions that have evolved in different societies regarding the beha-
viour of individuals and groups relative to their own behaviour and that of others. 
Institutions are made up of formal constraints (e.g., rules, laws, and constitutions), 
informal constraints (e.g., norms of behaviour, conventions, and self-imposed codes 
of conduct), and their enforcement characteristics. Consequently they give structure 
to incentives in human exchange, whether political, social, or economic (NORTH, 
1990).  
Institutions are not static, but dynamic; i.e., they evolve and change over time. 
All natural resource management regimes described in this book have seen various 
periods of fundamental institutional change. Institutional change can occur inten-
tionnally, as with a decentralisation process, or spontaneously (HAYEK, 1964; 
NORTH, 1990; VATN, 2005). In cases in which institutions are not "designed", and 
even when they are, their operation may be different from the original intentions. 
Therefore, we also must concentrate on the de-facto institutions rather than simply 
the de-jure institutions (CASSON et al., 2010). North’s "moral and ethical behavioural 
norms" are often embodied in informal institutions such as religion and caste, which 
determine the quality and sustainability of formal institutions and thus often 
regulate socio-economic life (CASSON et al., 2010). 
Natural resource regimes, including the water sector, are always changing. Recently 
there has been a particular need to cope with climate change, which manifests itself 
in global warming and an increased number of extreme environmental events, and is 
a major driver for institutional change. In addition, the evidence of irreversible 
groundwater depletion and contamination triggers actions. Socio-economic drivers 
Bogen4-AInsa Theesfeld, Frauke Pirscher 
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that gain importance include new EU agri-environmental or rural policies, migration, 
and depopulation. In order to deal with complex ecological problems that are linked 
with socio-economic drivers, ex-ante, anticipatory, planned adaptation strategies 
in natural resource governance are required. 
Each perspective and conceptualization of adaptation emphasises a different type of 
policy response (HORSTMANN, 2008). The understanding of adaptation as precaution-
nary and strategic, e.g., as required by the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change, emphasises intentional, designed institutional change in contrast to 
autonomous adaptation.  
The contributions in this book illustrate institutional changes in Europe’s water 
sector in a variety of contexts. With our examples we are able to consider the 
following questions: 
•  Under what circumstances is institutional change best viewed as a spon-
taneous, evolutionary process, and when is it the outcome of a deliberate 
design?  
•  What leads to intended and unintended effects? 
Institutional economics comprises a variety of theoretical approaches to explain 
institutional change. They differ in the considered causes, processes, and charac-
teristics of outcomes of institutional change. In line with KINGSTON and CABALLERO 
(2009), we identify two broad categories of processes of institutional change: a) the 
deliberate creation of institutions through the political process, and b) the spontaneous 
emergence of institutions (either random or through deliberate design) through 
evolutionary decentralised selection processes. We follow this classification in this 
book and map out our cases accordingly. 
Purposefully designed institutions might be implemented in a centralised way, 
either by a single individual or by many individuals or groups. Those groups interact 
through some type of collective choice or political process in which they lobby, 
bargain, vote, or otherwise compete to try to implement institutional changes which 
they perceive as beneficial to themselves, or to block those they view as undesirable. 
The implementation of the European Water Framework Directive in Portugal 
(THIEL & EGERTON) or a new water law in the Ukraine (UNNERSTALL & HAGEMANN) 
are examples of purposefully designed institutions. A prerequisite to designing new 
institutions is the ex-ante analysis of underlying models, e.g., price calculation 
regimes, as exemplified by comparative country data of European countries and 
former Soviet Republics (GAWEL & BRETSCHNEIDER).  
In the process of evolutionary institutional change, new institutional forms periodi-
cally emerge either at random or through deliberate design and undergo some type 
of decentralised selection process as they compete against alternative institutions. 
Thus, the institutional change occurs spontaneously through the uncoordinated 
choices of many agents, rather than a centralised and coordinated manner, described 




water disposal in Germany (RÖHRING et al.). Unintended effects occur when under-
utilisation of supply and treatment infrastructure systems occurs in shrinking 
regions (particularly in Eastern Germany). This may threaten the functionality of 
the systems and the adherence to quality standards.  
Like KINGSTON and CABALLERO (2009), we admit that in real-world settings both 
unintentional, evolutionary processes and intentional processes of design are at 
work. Further, the Distributional Theory of Institutional Change by Jack Knight 
explains institutions, and their development, as "not best explained as a pareto-
superior response to collective goals or benefits but, rather, as a by-product of 
conflicts over distributional gains" (KNIGHT, 1992). Thus, as with the elite capture 
problem in Albania’s fishery sector (THEESFELD & SCHMIDT), sub-optimal outcomes 
occur and unintended outcomes are the result. In line with (CASSON et al., 2010), 
the study of Albania’s fishery sector highlights the de-facto rules-in-use and 
explains unintended outcomes by studying those informal rule systems. 
The following table shows the clustering of contributions according to the theoretical 
outline of institutional change given above. The covering of these different aspects of 
institutional change is the additional value of putting the contributions together. 
There are several links and commonalities among the contributions gathered in 
this book.  
Table 1:  Mapping institutional change 






Household water supply, Eastern Europe and 
former Soviet republics (Gawel & 
Bretschneider) 
Urban waste water sector, Ukraine 
(Unnerstall & Hagemann) 
Waste water sector, Germany (Röhring et al.)  





Fishery sector, Albania (Theesfeld & 
Schmidt) 
Waste water infrastructure, 
Germany (Röhring et al.) 
 
The book presents a selection of cases of institutional change in the water sector, 
ranging from intentional decentralisation reforms in Ukraine, Portugal, and 
Albania, to a spontaneous institutional change in the infrastructure governance system 
of wastewater management in Germany, analysed by RÖHRING et al. (this volume).  
A decentralisation and devolution process is described for Ukraine and Portugal, 
each of which has a regional level that remains weak in its political decision-
making power. THIEL & EGERTON (this volume) analyse reform in the entire 
water sector of Portugal, namely the implementation of the water law and its main 
effect: the rescaling from administrative units to hydro-geological units. In 
Bogen5-AInsa Theesfeld, Frauke Pirscher 
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contrast to the Ukraine case, in which UNNERSTALL & HAGEMANN (this volume) 
elaborate ex-ante determinants for successful institutional change, in Portugal, an 
ex-post study analyses drivers that led to the current outcome of the reform. The 
study focuses on the formal implementation of the law rather than how it is de-facto 
implemented. The latter aspect is therefore studied in the ex-post analysis and 
the impact study of the decentralisation in the fishery sector of Albania by 
THEESFELD & SCHMIDT (this volume). 
In comparison to the papers dealing with water provision infrastructure 
(UNNERSTALL & HAGEMANN, this volume; GAWEL & BRETSCHNEIDER, this volume), 
there are certain particularities in the German water supply case (RÖHRING et al., 
this volume). RÖHRING et al. (this volume) show that changes in the household 
water supply and wastewater treatment infrastructure in Germany are rather 
spontaneous. Whereas considering the management of the resource water as the 
unit of analysis, and not its infrastructure, we would speak of intended institutional 
change not least due to the impact of the EU Water Framework Directive, as 
discussed in the Portugal case (THIEL & EGERTON, this volume). RÖHRING et al.'s 
work (this volume) offers an outlook on other resources besides water, providing 
an insight that intended institutional change with cultural landscape management 
would be even more difficult due to the particular characteristics of a resource 
system.  
The contributors of this book are members of the NIÖ
1 Network, comprising a group 
of scientists engaged in natural resource management issues from a new institutional 
economics perspective. The last two annual meetings of the group where held in 
Halle (Saale) at the Martin-Luther University (2008) and the Leibniz Institute of 
Agricultural Development in Central and Eastern Europe (IAMO) (2009). This book 
is comprised of papers presented at both workshops and additional contributions 
from members of the NIÖ Network after a revision in a double-review process.  
CONTRIBUTIONS IN THIS VOLUME 
GAWEL’s & BRETSCHNEIDER’s paper is titled "Affordability as an institutional obstacle 
to water-related price reforms". Until recently, the main goal of price reforms 
used for intentional institutional change was to establish efficient prices to cover 
the full costs of the environment-related service, thus inducing a sustainable 
resource. However, the distributive aspects of such a price reform have been 
neglected. The design of a water pricing system represents intended institutional 
change, with the intent of reaching a socially acceptable pricing system. The 
authors question is how significantly can institutions (in this case water pricing 
systems) be intentionally designed to provide affordable water prices, i.e., 
ensuring affordable access to services for everyone, including the poorest? The 
                                                            
1  NIÖ = New institutional economists (Neue Institutionenökonomen) is the name of this informal 




lack of affordability for some of the population can impede the establishment of 
sustainable price reforms for all. Therefore, GAWEL & BRETSCHNEIDER argue that 
affordability as well as efficiency should be considered in political decision 
making. They show that the indicator currently used by international organisations 
and governments to measure affordability is misleading, And oversubsidisation 
can be expected. After discussing the traditional "affordability ratio" measure 
within the microeconomic household model, the authors propose some 
theoretical enhancements. 
UNNERSTALL & HAGEMANN provide "Analysing the shortcomings of the Ukrainian 
Urban Waste Water Sector – Institutional Options for Modernization." This contri-
bution analyses the key institutional factors of fiscal federalism that affect the 
urban waste water sector in Ukraine and are therefore the starting points for an 
intentional institutional change. First, a description of the physical infrastructure of 
the waste water sectors is given. Second, key factors for determining an intentional 
institutional change are identified, based on the decentralisation that has already 
occured within the sector. The analysis is based on the Theory of Federalism and 
the European Charter of Local Self-Government. Very valuable in that respect is 
the description of the legal situation for the Ukrainian waste water sector and its 
shortcomings. The contribution concludes with implications for successful intentio-
nal institutional reforms.  
RÖHRING et al. focus on public goods and public interests in the context of institu-
tional change. Their contribution discusses necessary intended institutional changes, 
namely the fact that the prevailing forms of providing public goods and defining 
public interests must be adapted to various drivers. The integration of the concept 
of public interest and its comparison to the concept of public goods is addressed in 
the chapter "Public Goods and Public Interest: Theoretical Reflections and Practical 
Relevance for Regional Development – the Examples of Water Infrastructures 
and Cultural Landscapes". The paper concludes by summarising the lessons learned 
from applying the concepts of public goods and public interest to water infrastruc-
tures and cultural landscapes. There is a constant institutional change in public 
interests, as they are defined in a public democratic discourse, and are only valid 
for a certain time and region. As regards the water sector, the paper also exemplifies 
the important distinction between a resource (water) and its resource system (infra-
structure). RÖHRING et al. show that changes in the water infrastructure system 
evolve rather spontaneously. A conflict emerges between using water efficiently – 
using less of it – and using the water infrastructure efficiently, which requires using it 
to near-maximum capacity.  
In their paper titled "Explaining top-down institutional design: the introduction 
of River Basin Management in Portugal", THIEL & EGERTON analyse the reform of 
the water governance in Portugal that was necessary to implement the Water 
Framework Directive (WFD). Here, the decision makers opted for a radical 
restructuring of the water governance, shifting the governance role from administrative 
Bogen6-AInsa Theesfeld, Frauke Pirscher 
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districts to hydrographic regions. This rescaling is considered intentional formal 
institutional change. It led to a loss of competencies of the central water authorities 
and multi-sectoral deconcentrated administration in favour of a newly constituted 
water administration. The authors use the Distributional Theory of Institutional 
Change to explain the timing and content of the reform.  
THEESFELD & SCHMIDT’s text on "Decentralization Failures in Post-Socialist Fishery 
Management" focuses on the outcomes of institutional change and provides a repre-
sentative case by analysing the widespread negative side effects of decentralisation. 
Recently, institutional change in local natural resource governance has been 
triggered by decentralisation, resulting in a transfer of property rights from the 
central government to local resource users. However, despite the many successes of 
such intentional institutional changes, there are risks of unintended effects, inclu-
ding the phenomenon of elite capture. THEESFELD  &  SCHMIDT  investigate elite 
capture in Albania’s Lake Ohrid fishing region and contribute details about 
decentralisation failures by identifying determinants for and effects of elite capture. 
The Albanian case shows how blueprint approaches for decentralised management, 
which ignore the de-facto informal rules, as well as top-down implementation 
led to further empowerment of privileged locals, who realised personal gains at 
the expense of distributional inequity within the community. Specific insights 
are derived from the analysis of implications from the post-socialist context. 
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AFFORDABILITY AS AN INSTITUTIONAL OBSTACLE  





Economists argue that prices for environment-related services should reflect full-
cost recovery and therefore provide incentives for sustainable use. Efficient pricing, 
however, is likely to conflict with other competing objectives, amongst others 
ensuring affordable access to services for all sections of the population, including the 
poorest (affordability). Welfare economics literature suggests to neglect affordability 
aspects by separating allocative from distributive impacts of pricing. In practice, this 
approach runs the risk of rendering impossible any sustainability-oriented institutional 
change by means of price reforms. An Institutional Economics approach takes com-
peting objectives into account. Hence, the question arises how can water prices be so 
arranged that they provide the desired incentives and at the same time are socially 
acceptable, especially affordable? Or more general, in how far can institutions, 
here water pricing systems, be intentionally designed to provide affordable water 
prices?  
Over the last years the mostly empirical research related to the concept of affor-
dability has accelerated remarkably. However, theoretical contributions are still 
rare. This article analyzes the question, how the category of affordability might be a 
general orientation for political decisions in a world where allocation and distri-
bution are not strictly separated. After an illustration of empirical efforts we discuss 
the traditional "affordability ratio"-measure within the microeconomic household 
model and some theoretical enhancements. Finally policy-oriented conclusions 
are drawn for retaining both efficiency and affordability in practical price reforms 
for environment-related services. 
1  AFFORDABILITY, PRICING, AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 
Water-related services are key prerequisites for human and economic development, 
and sustainable management of these resources is also important for maintaining 
ecosystems. Poor governance and inadequate investment, however, are worldwide 
                                                            
∗  Helmholtz Centre for Environmental Research, Department of Economics, and University of 
Leipzig, Institute for Infrastructure and Resources Management. 
**  University of Leipzig, Institute for Infrastructure and Resources Management. 
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resulting in large populations not having access to the services or the respective 
service quality they need. Failure to manage resources effectively is also resulting 
in increased pressure on these resources, mounting competition for their use among 
different economic activities, and, in some regions, even conflict. For the case of 
water, the increased demand is linked with a variety of factors: population increase, 
pressures for food production, rapid urbanisation, degradation of water quality, and 
increasing uncertainties about water availability and precipitation regimes, especially 
due to climate change. 
Hence, major economic benefits potentially accrue from improved water resource 
management and services. The water and sanitation sector is seriously under-
financed in many countries. Additional financial resources are a necessary, but not 
sufficient, condition for meeting the sustainability challenges and for achieving 
internationally agreed policy objectives. There is also considerable scope to improve 
the cost-effectiveness of expenditures on services. Efficient pricing plays an impor-
tant role in this context. In addition, the implementation of effective water policies is 
often hindered by political and public opposition to increasing the price of resources, 
which impinges on the establishment of effective financing arrangements and effi-
cient system performance. Thus realising the benefits of improved service policies 
requires not only more finance, but also improved governance of the sector, as 
well as effective strategies that can overcome the vested interests and opposition 
that often block reform.  
Therefore, one should consider ways of mobilising more financial resources, finan-
cing a sufficient and safe service provision ("cost recovery"), reducing excessive 
demand and improving the cost-effective use of resources and at the same time 
being affordable to public budgets, private households and industry sectors. Effective 
resource management requires finding the right mix of revenues from the so-called 
"3Ts": tariffs, taxes and transfers (including official development assistance grants) 
(OECD, 2009). Full cost recovery from tariffs which may theoretically be the 
ideal solution, in practice remains a distant objective in many countries. Very poor 
countries can hardly reach moderate cost-recovery targets such as cost recovery 
for operation and maintenance (O&M). Increasing revenue from tariffs requires 
a comprehensive approach, which includes reforming tariff levels and structures 
and increasing bill collection rates, but also increasing levels of service and putting 
in place social protection measures with respect to affordability. 
Over the past years political efforts have been prevailing increasingly that aim at 
prices for natural resources which display the true social value of the service. One 
of the most prominent efforts in OECD countries might be the Water Framework 
Directive of the European Union. Article no. 9 announces that "Member States shall 
take account of the principle of recovery of the costs of water services, including 
environmental and resource costs." Being in a process of implementation this direc-
tive is a sign of increasing water prices in the future. Recent trends for water-related 
tariff policies worldwide reveal inter alia (OECD, 2009): 
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•  continued real price increases – at times, substantial – for household 
service, both in OECD and non-OECD countries, 
•  continued attention to social concerns, addressed through innovative tariff 
structures or parallel income-support mechanisms. 
Thus, institutional change for protecting scarce resources and enhancing safe and 
sufficient access to them, especially by means of price reforms, usually faces serious 
obstacles in practice (see AZEVEDO/BALTAR, 2005; DINAR, 2000; DINAR/SALETH, 
2006; FREUND/WALLICH, 1997). The affordability issue might be one of the most 
important stumbling blocks for efficient pricing. Welfare economics literature 
suggests to neglect affordability aspects by separating allocative from distributive 
impacts of pricing. In practice, this approach runs the risk of rendering impossible 
any sustainability-oriented price reform. A theory-oriented tariff design would only 
provide for the efficiency of prices and would leave social and distributive aspects 
to seperate measures of welfare policy. However, policy-making is always obliged to 
take into account allocative and distributive effects of pricing reforms simul-
taneously.  
Therfore, an Institutional Economics approach takes competing objectives into 
account (section 2). Hence, the question arises how can water prices be so arranged 
that they provide the desired incentives and at the same time are socially acceptable, 
especially affordable? The arranging or design of a water pricing system represents 
an intended institutional change here, with the intended effect to reach a socially 
acceptable pricing system. 
Affordable consumption is a term used to describe consumption patterns for essential 
goods whose total cost are deemed "affordable" even to those that have a low 
income. Affordability strives to provide essential goods with a market price for every 
human being regardless of personal income. The most common approach is to 
consider the percentage of income that a household is spending on consumption 
expenditure. Hence, a commonly accepted guideline for affordability of utility services 
is a service cost that does not exceed a certain percentage of a household's gross 
income. It is obvious that for a given income and given human needs (flexible) 
pricing of these services plays an important role for affordability issues. 
In order to take affordability of services into account for concrete policy measures 
(such as tariff constructions or attendant welfare programs) we need to know 
empirically when and to what extent affordability might be at risk (section 3). In turn, 
this requires a sound theoretical definition of the concept. Therfore, we discuss the 
traditional "affordability ratio"-measure and some improvements within the micro-
economic household model (section 4). Against this background, the interrelation of 
pricing and affordability is dwelled on in section 5. Some policy-oriented 
conclusions are drawn for retaining both efficiency and affordability in practical 
price reforms for environment-related services (section 6). 
Bogen8-AErik Gawel, Wolfgang Bretschneider 
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Over the last years mostly empirical research with respect affordability issues 
has been done. Up to now, theoretical considerations however are still rare. In this 
paper we intend to describe shortly the meaning, a theoretically founded definition 
and possible empirical applications of the affordability concept. The article analyzes 
the question, how the category of affordability might be a general orientation for 
political decisions in a world where allocation and distribution are not strictly 
separated.  
2  TARGETS FOR WATER PRICING AND THE CURRENT INTEREST  
IN THE AFFORDABILITY ISSUE 
From an economic point of view pricing should first of all make sure that resources 
are used in an efficient way. However, even in allocation theory we have to face 
complications by externalities and sustainability requirements as well as conflicts 
between efficient marginal pricing and full cost recovery for the producer. In 
practice, at least social concerns and other institutional restraints play an important 
role for the effective performance of pricing approaches. 
Thus, tariffs have to meet diverging financial, economic, environmental and social 
objectives (Fig. 1), some of which may be conflicting. A major challenge for this 
institutional change therefore is designing tariffs in a way that strikes an appropriate 
balance among conflicting goals that can be structured around four dimensions 
(OECD, 2009; LEFLAIVE, 2009): 
•  Ecological sustainability: As scarce and vulnerable natural resource, water 
should be used so as to protect the basic ecological functions of natural capital 
and preserve it for future generations. Savings are part of this objective, which 
requires avoiding wasteful uses that put unnecessary pressure on the resource 
(use efficiency).  
•  Economic efficiency: As a valuable economic good, resources should be allocated 
to the uses that maximise overall benefits to society (allocation efficiency). This 
means that unnecessary investment should be avoided if the value of the services 
or functions they provide is lower than their cost. 
•  Financial sustainability: As activities requiring investment in costly infra-
structures, service provision should be kept viable over time and should be able 
to attract capital, skills and technology by adequately compensating them.  
•  Social concerns: As a public interest good, acceptable levels of services should 
be accessible and affordable to all, including to lower-income groups. When 
dealing with social concerns, the focus is primarily on how to protect vulnerable 
groups and ensure that they have access to services that remain affordable 
over time. Two questions need to be addressed. The first concerns the portion 
of the costs that should be covered by revenues; and the second, the share 
that should be covered by different income groups, family types, or different 
Bogen8-BAffordability as an institutional obstacle to water-related price reforms 
 
13
geographical units. The way in which costs are allocated provides the basis 
for considering cross-subsidisation across regions’ user groups. 
Figure 1:  Trade-offs affecting tariff levels and structures for water services 
 
Source: LEFLAIVE, 2009. 
According to their respective design increasing tariffs may support efficiency 
and both ecological and financial sustainability but social concerns might be at 
risk. Hence, affordability limits have to be assessed before designing service pricing 
policies. Information is needed on low-income households’ current spending on 
services, ability and willingness to pay (WTP) for improved services (for a current 
study in Mongolia see SIGEL, 2010). In the absence of this information, the risk 
is that decisions about tariff levels and structures will be based on exaggerated 
assessments of affordability constraints that underestimate willingness to pay. In 
such cases, the result is a vicious circle of underfinanced services, lower than needed 
investment and maintenance, and lack of access to water services. This hurts the poor 
most, as they are the first to suffer from low quality services. Moreover, keeping 
tariffs artificially low prevents the extension of services to the currently unserved and 
is not an effective measure to help the poor. 
We will have a closer look first on the efforts to measure affordability problems 
(section 3), then we will reconsider the subject theoretically (section 4).  
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3  APPROACHING AFFORDABILITY ISSUES EMPIRICALLY:  
ON MEASUREMENT AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
In the past, the empirical measurement has been the main topic of affordability 
investigations. Since the late 70ies of the 20
th century empirical aspects have been 
increasingly investigated (FEINS/LANE, 1981). The major domain of affordability 
research concerns housing economics (see CHAPLIN/FREEMAN, 1999; COLEMAN, A., 
2008; FISHER et al., 2009; HANCOCK, 1993; LAMONT, 2008; MARKS/SEDGWICK, 2008; 
MATLACK/VIGDOR, 2006; MEEN/ANDREW, 2008; SEDGWICK, 2008; STONE, 2006; 
THALMANN, 2003; WHITEHEAD, 1991; YATES, J., 2008). Another block is the affor-
dability investigation affecting utility services (DODONOV et al., 2004; FANKHAUSER/ 
TEPIC, 2007; FANKHAUSER et al., 2008; KESSIDES et al., 2009; MINIACI et al., 2008; 
MINIACI et al., 2007; OECD, 2003; REYNAUD, 2006). Compared to the amount of 
papers concerning housing affordability one can agree with FANKHAUSER/TEPIC 
that the affordability of energy and water (i.e. utility services) is yet "under-
researched" (see FANKHAUSER/TEPIC, 2007: 1039).
1 
We now consider some efforts in measuring affordability for utility services. A very 
traditional measure for an affordability diagnosis is the ratio of utility-outlays 
and income (total expenditure). The affordability ratio has got its plausibility from a 
certain empirical connectivity; shown e. g. in OECD (2003). For a couple of countries 
they divided the population in divisions of income distribution. Accordingly the 
burden ratios for water expenses are presented. The result is that in most countries 
the ratio declines with a higher income, just like in England/Wales in 1999/2000 
(see Figure 3). 
This applies not only for England/Wales but also for other OECD countries: "In 
nearly every data set, the percentage water charge burden on households […] 
declines noticeably with each move from a lower to a higher income group." 
(OECD, 2003: 40).
2 As far as utility services are inferior goods with low income 
elasticity these findings are far from being surprising. But this is true only, if the 
consumption level remains about constant. "This is as would be expected for a 
utility service that is still dominated by "basic uses" and for which the array of 
possible luxury uses remains relatively narrow […]." (ibid.) With such a mind set it 
is plausible to recommend a social policy that tries to "cut off" the curve at some 
maximum ratio level so to limit the maximum burden ratio to 3 or 4 %. But doubts 
regarding this approach are coming up if we take a look at figures for transition 
countries. 
                                                            
1  Other domains apparently play even more a minor role in the literature, like health care 
(GLIED, 2009), education (MURAKAMI/BLOM, 2008), saving (COLEMAN, 2008), and public 
urban transport (SEREBRISKY et al., 2009). 
2  In our model (see section 4) this affects the logic that the ray’s slope declines with a higher 
budget. 
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Based on OECD (2003: 38). 
FANKHAUSER and TEPIC (2007) intend to investigate the affordability situation 
for utility services for transition countries, namely Central Eastern Europe and 
the Baltic States, South-eastern Europe, and the Commonwealth of Independent 
States. They apply the ratio measure with factual payments in the traditional way, 
and perfectly pursuing the inverse relation between income and burden ratio as in 
OECD (2003). Thus, they chose some target ratios: 10 % for electricity as well 
as for heating, 5 % for water and waste water. Basing on these target terms they try 
to identify problems and hardships regarding expectable price reforms for utility 
services in those regions.  
But the simple ratio concept is devaluated by inconsistent results. Let us pick some 
findings from FANKHAUSER/TEPIC (2007), in which they identify the household’s 
burden by using the burden ratio with factual expenditures as numerator. They 
do this for 27 countries and three different utility services: Electricity, heating, 
and water. Fig. 3 shows the burden ratios for average households (left column) 
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and for the bottom decile income group (right column in each case).
3 Having the 
inverse relation between income and burden ratio in back of mind, it is expectable, 
that the ratios in the bottom decile are higher than for the average households. 
But in a considerable number of cases the burden ratio of the bottom decile is 
lower than the burden ratio of the average household (the shaded cells in Figure 3). 
This means that in these cases poorer households are less burdened with service 
expenditures than the wealthier households are! 
Figure 3:  Affordability of utility services, average and bottom decile 
household (outlays in per cent of total household expenditure) 
 







Czech Republic  4,2  5,5  3,4  3,3  1,2 1,5 
Estonia  3,2 8,2 5,4  15,4  1,0 2,4 
Hungary 5,3  6,3  1,9  1,3  4,1  4,0 
Latvia 2,2  2,2  3,2  2,8  0,8 0,9 
Lithuania 2,8  3,1  3,7  0,7  1,1  0,7 
Poland 4,5  5,7  2,7  1,2  2,0  1,8 
Slovak  Republic 3,5 11,4 7,9 18,6 1,3  4,3 
Slovenia  4,5 9,4 1,2 1,9 1,3 2,6 
Source: FANKHAUSER/TEPIC (2007: 1041, 1043). 
                                                            
3  It is to be highlighted that this is a bottom decile in transition countries. This might be a 
quite different quality of poverty than in industrialized OECD economies. How these figures 
end up in development countries is currently in research, e.g. for Mongolia (see SIGEL, 2010). 
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Figure 4:  Burden ratios of water expenses for households (average and 

































Based on:   FANKHAUSER/TEPIC (2007, 1041, 1043). 
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Especially for the case of water there are 9 out of 27 countries where the burden 
ratio is lower in the bottom decile (see Figure 4) than in average; namely in Hungary, 
Lithuania, Poland, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Romania, Armenia, Kazakhstan, 
Moldova, and Ukraine. In the heating sector there are even 15 out of 27 countries, 
where the burden share of the bottom decile is lower than the average. Such a 
cumulation of an "anomaly" forces to step back for a while in order to rethink the 
measure that is used. We think of five possible reasons: 
a)  Low quality of data
4; 
b) A high level of non-payment that is a lack of enforcement in pricing (lack 
of excludability) (FANKHAUSER/TEPIC, 2007: 1041, 1043f.); 
c)  Some informal ways of consumption (using a standpost to get water); 
d) A low (social) tariff for low-income-households; 
e)  Particular consumption patterns (high income elasticity, low level of con-
sumption of the poor). 
Aside from the quality problem of empirical data (case a) we realize some 
institutional factors (b to d) and finally economic consumption patterns in e) as 
potential determinants. Formally the individual burden ratio r depends on the 
expenditure which is composed by price p and demand quantity q as well as the 
individual income (budget) b: 
(1)     r  = p ⋅ q / b 
What can then be said about the function r(b) in order to determine an income-
related burden? The demand depends on the respective price and the given budget 
q(p,b). According to the given tariff structure the price itself may, on the other 
hand, be dependent on the consumption quantity: p(q). Hence, it is not very clear 
what happens with burden share when income increases: 
(2)      r = p(q[p,b]) ⋅ q(p,b) / b 
Obviously the total effect of ∂r/∂b depends on tariff and income elasticity of the 
considered good. It can be shown that ∂r/∂b < 0 is true for the following conditions: 
(3a)     ε < 1      if dp/dq = 0 (linear tariff) 
(3b)     ε < 1 / (e+1)   if dp/dq > 0 (progressive tariff), 
where ε denotes income elasticity and e tariff rate elasticity. 
Thus, the poor might or might not be more burdened by water consumption than 
average households. A more detailed economic analysis is needed in this field. 
                                                            
4  "The quality of data is generally best for electricity and worst for district heating." 
(FANKHAUSER/TEPIC, 2007: 1040). 
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Moreover, the absolute level of burden ratio is doubtful: If the burden ratio depends, 
inter alia, on the consumption patterns and income elasticities what exactly does 
a ratio of e. g. 5 or 10 % indicate? Is water service really not "affordable" in 
these cases? In other words: What kind of water poverty do we want to prevent? 
Does excessive water consumption of high income households (swimming pools, 
lawn sprinklers) give cause for the assumption of high burden and therefore 
lowering tariffs? 
It becomes apparent that the simple ratio measure might be seriously dysfunctional. 
Any pricing policy based on such an information tool could be misdirected consi-
derably. Hence we need to go into more theoretical investigations on the measure 
in section 4. 
4  THEORETICAL INSIGHTS IN AFFORDABILITY ISSUES 
4.1  On the theoretical performance of a burden ratio 
Let us start again with the burden ratio r as traditional measure for examining 
affordability. For a certain utility good u (e. g. water services) it might be defined 
as the share of a household’s expenditure for this good (p
uq
u) in total income 
(equals total expenditure, budget b): 
(3)       r  = p
uq
u/b . 
If the budget can be spent on either the utility good u or a representative second 
good c, the ratio r can be graphically described as a ray from the origin in a 
microeconomic household model (Figure 6). In such a (q
c,q
u) diagram the ray of 
constant burden ratio follows the equation: 










For a given price vector p
c/p
u the ray indicates all consumption combinations of 
utility and other goods that result in a certain but constant burden share in budget 
for the utility good. 
According to the theorems on intersecting lines the amount of the burden ratio r 
can be described graphically as follows (Fig. 6): The affordability ray intersects 
the budget line (e. g. in S) and thus divide it in two parts. The burden share is 







uuu r  , 
that is lower part of intersected budget line divided through its total length. The 
higher the ray the larger the burden share r. 
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Usually r is set normatively. Authors and institutions such as World Bank and 
OECD that work with this kind of affordability concept define a certain target 
burden ratio, also called "burden threshold" (see KESSEDY et al., 2009: 11). In Figure 5 
we find a couple of target ratios for utility services applied by different institutions. 
Figure 5:  Benchmarks used in measuring affordability (in per cent of total 
household income/ expenditure) 
Source  Electricity  Heating  Water  All utility bills 
World Bank 
(2002) 
10-15 %    3-5   
WHO (2004)  10 %       
IPA Energy 
(2003) 
10 %  20 %     
UN/ECE   15  %     
UK 
government 
  10 %  3 %   




   5  %   
Ukraine  
government 
    20  % 
Source: FANKHAUSER/TEPIC, 2007, p. 1040. 
In the household model this normative definition can be seen as based on two 
normatively defined quantities (see again Fig. 6): First, a sort of minimum 
quantity of the index good u, "necessary to reach a decent standard of living" 
(KESSIDES et al., 2009: 11), represented by q
u* in the diagram. Second, a minimum 
quantity of all goods except the index good, represented by q
c*.
5 This forms a 
point S, the so-called subsistence bundle and the intersection point of the two 
minimum quantities q
u* and q
c*. To meet exactly this subsistence bundle we 
obtain a target ratio r* that shows us, for a given price vector, the "basic" burden to 
be born by the poorest. Therefore, the ray of target burden ratio r* intersects point S. 
Pursuing the simple logic of the burden ratio, the diagram says: If a household 
realizes a consumption bundle above r*, it is facing affordability problems conside-
ring good u. The other way around, if a household realizes a consumption bundle 
below r*, it is not facing affordability problems in this respect. 
                                                            
5  Needing two normative terms, that are in a opportunity cost relation, one could call this a 
"normative opportunity cost-clip", which leads to a certain target burden ratio r*. Thus, we 
think it is not appropriate to argue (see HANCOCK, 1993: 133) that the concept of burden 
ratio ignores the phenomenon of opportunity costs (GAWEL/BRETSCHNEIDER, 2010: 6 f.). 
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Figure 6:  Household model of affordability: Case differentiation of 
indigence 
 
A fourth line intersecting point S is also a very important one: It is the target 
budget b*. Like r* it is actually a secondary normative term, derived from the 
minimum quantities (multiplied with the given price vector). It is the budget 
necessary at least to reach the subsistence bundle S. All consumption points to 
the right (left) of the target budget line b* calls for a higher (smaller) budget in 
order to achieve this respective consumption structure. 
We now can consider the household’s situation depending on in which area they 
factually end up in. We want to distinguish twice: firstly, under-consumption vs. 
non-underconsumption; and secondly, reasons for under-consumption, namely 
ability deficiency (due to budget constraints) vs. willingness deficiency (due to 
differing preferences). This distinction between ability and willingness is what 
the microeconomic theory is built on. As a result there are four areas (see 
Figure 6): 
(1) Non-underconsumption (grided area 1): Households therein are not facing 
any underconsumption problem. This is caused by two conditions: First, the 
household has a budget in his disposal which is greater than the target budget 
b*. Second, on his budget line the household chooses a consumption bundle 
which avoids an underconsumption for both index good u and representative 
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other good c. One might argue that there is no problem for social policy.
6 But 
affordability ratio r tells us that in area 1a unaffordability is incurred – wealthy 
households spend more than the target share on consumption of the index good. 
This misleading indication could be seen as "wasting-related unaffordability". 
(2) Willingness deficiency-related underconsumption (striped area 2): One of the 
goods is underconsumed but not due to budget constraints but following 
accordant preferences. Households in this area possess a sufficient income enabling 
them to reach an appropriate consumption level for both goods. However, they 
just do not choose accordingly. HANCOCK (1993: 131) calls it the case of "perversity 
of preferences". Though affordability ratio r tells us that for consumption points 
in area 2a again we face unaffordability: One might argue that this pseudo problem 
turns out to be a preference-driven (that is: voluntary) "unaffordability". 
(3) Underconsumption due to deficiency of willingness and of ability (light grey 
area 3): Here the households have an income available smaller than the target 
budget b*. So the households in this light grey area cannot reach the subsistence 
bundle, but they are somehow making a wrong decision anyway: They are under-
consuming one good but, at the same time already consuming more than is 
necessary from the other. Here we are facing a deficiency of both ability and 
willingness. Accordingly, a meritoric and a distributional problem arise at the 
same time. Considered graphically the paternalistic third party would like the 
household to shift on his budget line at least until the dark grey area starts. That 
is to say, to reduce the consumption of the "overconsumed" good in favour of 
the underconsumed one; to underconsume the latter less intense. Systematically 
after this motion – that is the difference to the same scenario in the striped area – 
the problem of ability could be tackled. Regarding the affordability ratio r in this 
field we get a diagnosis of "unaffordability" for the top left area 3a ignoring the 
mixed-conditioned underconsumption. On the other hand the "affordable"-
diagnosis for households down left (area 3b) ignores the deficiency of ability, 
they have to deal with. 
(4) Pure ability deficiency-related underconsumption (dark grey area 4): Those 
households ending up in area 4 consume insufficient quantities of both goods 
due to a pure distributional problem with an actual deficiency of ability. This area 
includes those who "do not even have the opportunity to make [an] inappropriate 
decision." (GLIED, 2008: 15).
7 According to the affordability ratio r poor 
households in area 4b do not face any affordability problems: Since they are 
consuming a very/too small quantity of the good they are considered having no 
affordability problem. But it is not a convincing solution to overcome affordability 
                                                            
6  On the contrary there may arise the problem of overconsumption with respect to scarce 
resources like water. In this article we have to leave this unconsidered. 
7  In Figure 6 these are households with a budget equal or smaller than the budget that intersects 
the ordinate at q
u*. 
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problems by underconsumption. Rather the critical shortage given in area 4b 
depicts a severe case of unaffordability. 
Hence, the traditional ratio r lacks discriminatory power to indicate properly 
unaffordability cases. Instead it ignores relevant settings (area 4b) and on the 
other hand it turns unproblematic consumption patterns into pretended problem 
cases (area 1a).  
It becomes apparent here that there are different concepts of water-related 
indigence underlying the analysis (Fig. 7): Traditional unaffordability alleges a 
problem if a household spends more on utility good consumption than the target 
ratio allows (areas 1a+2a+3a+4a in Fig. 6). In contrast income-related indigence 
suggests that areas 3 and 4 are problematic that is households earn less than needed 
to afford the subsistence bundle. And from the meritoric perspective of under-
consumption public policy is requested to prevent consumption in areas 2+3+4. 
Comparing these concepts the traditional affordability ratio appears to be 
particularly unqualified for indicating potential need for public action. 
Figure 7:  Three concepts of indigence  
Concept of Indigence  Areas in Fig. 6  Problem 
Burden Share  
= (Traditional)  
Unaffordability 
1a+2a+3a+4a Household  spends more on utility good 
consumption than the target ratio. 
Budget Restraints  3+4  Household earns less than needed to afford 
the subsistence bundle.  
Underconsumption 2+3+4  Household  consumes less than required. 
 
Figure 8 outlines these different assessments graphically. All households ending 
up with a consumption bundle above the target ray r* are considered having 
affordability problems according to the ratio measure (Fig. 8-1). This is contradictory 
to the other (plausible) assessments of indigence of Fig. 7: All households with 
consumption points left of the target budget line b* suffer from unaffordability 
due to budget constraints (Fig. 8-2). Finally, Fig. 8-3 shows us all cases of 
effective quantitative underconsumption. 
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Up to now our analysis assumed a given and fixed minimum standard for the 
index good u for all types of households. In practice however q
u* may vary 
among households due to different levels of necessity (CHAPLIN/FREEMAN, 1999: 
1950). KESSIDES et al. (2009: 15) mention the following aspects: 
•  different amounts of household members (size), 
•  different climatic/regional conditions,  
•  and different technological endowments. 
Figure 9 shows the consequences of these different "non-income constraints" 
(HANCOCK, 1993: 130) for our theoretical affordability analysis: With variations 
in the level q
u* based on the mentioned reasons, several subsistence bundles are 
realized. This is illustrated in Fig. 9 with a second, a higher minimum level for 
the index good u, q
u*2, which may be conceded for certain households. Point R 
can be reached now with the given budget b*, yet R indicates underconsumption. 
So what is the new subsistence bundle now? We obtain S2 according to the 
normative consumption standard q
c*, but a ratio based approach would suggest 
the point T instead. In order to maintain the fixed ratio r* we ought to provide an 
additional (proportional) quantity of good c as well (distance RT instead of RS2). 
To guarantee this an additional income transfer up to b*’ would be necessary! 
There would be neither effectiveness nor efficiency in that social policy. Instead it 
is more plausible to accept different burden ratios according to certain non-income 
constraints in order to avoid over-subsidization or overprovision (by realizing 
point S2 in Fig. 9). This is due to the fact that the maximum amount of tolerated 
8‐1  8‐2 
8‐3 
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burden share can normatively only be justified by enabling the respective 
minimum standard in consumption. 
Figure 9:  Variation of q
u* and two different new subsistence bundles 
 
 
Since there is in general no linear function q
c*(q
u*) (that is any proportional 
increase for the basic needs in other goods for increasing index good needs
8) a 
fixed burden ratio for all households might be misleading once again. 
Wrapping up the objections against (fixed) affordability ratios we may state the 
following: 
1.  There is no correlation to a certain minimum consumption level of the index 
good. Poor households consuming a very/too small quantity of the good are 
considered having no affordability problem (area 4b). 
2.  Similarly there is no correlation to a maximum consumption level of the index 
good. Wealthy households "wasting" the index good are possibly considered 
having an affordability problem (area 1a). 
3.  There might be cases of under-consumption which are caused by "perversity 
of preferences", not by budget restrictions (area 2a). 
4.  Households are characterized by different amounts of members (household size), 
different climatic/regional conditions, and different technological endowments. 
These non-income conditions lead to a different necessity a fixed ratio measure 
cannot answer to properly. 
5.  The ratio also depends on the price and income elasticity of demand (that is 
q(p,b)) as well as on the tariff function p(q). In practice neither p(q) nor q are 
constant and therefore have to be taken into account explicitly.  
                                                            
8   Of course one could think of certain cases where this is plausible, e.g. the variation reason  













 S2  T 
R 
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4.2  Improving affordability measurement by new approaches? 
In academic literature improvements for the affordability concept have been 
suggested. The so-called Potential Affordability Approach (PAA) (KESSIDES et al., 
2009: 13 ff.; LERMAN/REEDER, 1987) and the Residual Income Approach (RIA) 
(MENIACI et al., 2008: 206; KESSIDES et al., 2009: 15; STONE, 2006) try to overcome 
some of the mentioned shortcomings of the traditional approach. 
4.2.1  The Potential Affordability Approach 
One of the main flaws of simple burden ratios can be seen in confusing willingness- 
and ability-driven underconsumption. In order to eliminate the deficiencies of 
willingness in the analysis the Potential Affordability Approach does not assess 
the factual consumption but rather a potential one that is made possible by the 
given budget with respect to the minimum standard of the index good (Fig. 10).  
Figure 10:  Potential Affordability – Motion from the factual to the fictional 
consumption bundle 
 
There is one simple and crucial artifice in the PAA compared to the traditional 
affordability ratio: In the equation for the burden ratio the normatively defined 
(minimum) quantity of the utility service q
u* is used, instead of the factual 
quantity q
u the household consumes (Fig. 12): 
(7) r P = p
uq
u*/b . 
In the graphic model (Fig. 10) fictitiously a motion on the household’s budget 
line (parallel to the target budget line b*) is to be made, until the point where the 
q
u*-line is intersected. On that q
u*-line all households are stringed according to 
their affordability problems. All households which end up to the left of point S 
are facing affordability problems. These are exactly households in areas 3 and 4 
(see again Fig. 6). The more left they end up, the heavier the affordability 
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standard minimum quantity of the index good u, they cannot afford a certain 
minimum amount q
c* of all other goods. 
With the PAA households in the areas 3 and 4 (Fig. 6) are categorized as having 
affordability problems, and households in the areas 1 and 2 are considered having 
no affordability problems. This is consistent with the concept of budget constraints 
(Fig. 8-2): Affordability is a matter of "poor" households. Hence, the objections 
1. to 4. (section 4.1) are solved somehow and objection 5. does not play any role 
here because the concept is compatible with all kinds of tariffs or demand functions. 
The only question left is does the budget can suffice potentially for both minimum 
quantity of the index good and of the other good? 
We have to notice though that affordability in this concept is simply reduced to 
the problem of low income. In practice however we face affordability problems and 
resistance to increasing prices for environment-related goods particularly in the 
middle class. Thus, PAA departs from the actual challenge to be met in water 
resources policy. 
4.2.2  The residual income approach 
For the so-called "residual income approach" (RIA) the crucial criterion is a 
certain residual income, that a household should have available after having paid 
the index good u. This normatively given residual income is represented by b*Res 
indicating the expenditures that are to be taken to reach q
c*: 
(8) b *Res = p
cq
c* . 
Unaffordability of the good u is given for households where the following can 
be observed:  
(9)  b – p
uq
u* < b*Res 
Using the theorems on intersecting lines (see section 4.1) we alternatively obtain 






uuu r   and    RT-ST RS =
uuu ru u r u u u r
 . 
If we consider households with a smaller budget than b* (that is a budget line 
R'T'
uuuu r
) one can imagine that the distance RS
uuur
 cannot be reached, once the 
corresponding distance ST
uur
 on the the budget line is subtracted. These are the 








Analogically, considering households with a larger budget that b*, the upper part of 
the budget line is longer than the distance RS
uuur
, if the distance ST
uur
 is subtracted. 
Within this approach another relative expression is possible: 
(12) rRes = (b – p
uq
u*) / b*Res 
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For households where rRes > 1, the index good u is affordable. Accordingly, for 
those households where rRes < 1, unaffordability for the good u is diagnosed. 
Fig. 12 gives a concluding overview concerning the different approaches. 





































Burden Share  Budget Constraints 
Policy Target  Maximum 
Income Share  Minimum Standard in Consumption 
 
Thus, the RIA exactly describes the same as the PAA: Does the given budget 
enable the household for a certain price vector to afford both minimum standard 
consumption of good u as well as good c? RIA and PAA are theoretically 
equivalent. So the same criticism applies here.  
Equivalence can be seen formally by transforming the unaffordability conditions 
of the respective approaches (Fig. 12): 




uu uu pq pq
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bb
>⇔ <  (13) 








bp q p q bb
pq
−
<⇔− < ⇔<  (14) 
Hence, the PAA and RIA approaches can be identically reduced to a simple 
income condition b > b*. According to this theoretical framework utility policy 
should strive towards household budgets beyond b* and all of the affordability 
issues seem to be tackled satisfactorily. As a consequence, price reforms with 
respect to full-cost recovery might be undertaken without any affordability objection 
if only income disparity was conquered successfully. This turns out to be the well-
known welfare economics solution for the distributional problem of pricing. 
4.3  Theoretical conclusions  
To sum up, a fixed burden ratio measure with factual expenses is misleading 
because it does not separate deficiencies of willing and of ability, fails to interpret 
appropriately underconsumption and waste of resources and does not take into 
account non-income restraints. These consistency problems are solved by the 
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"potential affordability approach" which formally does not need a ratio. In this 
concept however the affordability issue is simplified to the problem of low income. 
Thus, the approach departs from the challenge to be actually met that is keeping 
utilities affordable even beyond absolute poverty. The so-called "residual income 
approach", working not with a ratio, but with an income difference is theoretically 
identical with the PAA and therefore does not provide any improvement in this 
field. Thus, the pricing challenge to be met in water resources management remains: 
How can we reconcile the conflict between efficiency and affordability requirements 
that is, how to design efficient water prices while keeping water uses affordable 
for everyone? 
4.4  Monetary burden and pricing – A positive analysis 
Since a general measure for "unaffordability" is either theoretically inconsistent 
or just describes a low-income situation one might leave the normative analysis 
here and turn towards a positive burden analysis instead – the normative conclusions 
of which might be drawn from case to case and politically. Instead of seeking out 
households suffering from "unaffordability" economic analysis can just ascertain a 
household’s given (monetary) burden. According to equation (2) this burden is 
determined by a plurality of factors among which the price of the resource is the 
most interesting one for our analysis: 
(15)  





We assume that for sustainability reasons a water price increase towards full-cost 
recovery is needed. Increasing prices though enforce resistance to political efforts 
for price reforms. Theoretically, the loss of consumer surplus induced by price 
increase indicates the burden the consumers sustain in this case. As a monetary 
substitute that can be measured easily in practice the change in expenditures and 
thus the change in our ratio r might be drawn on. Then we can analyze the 
expression ∂r/∂p that is the change in r when price increases. 
(16) 
11 rd pq q
qb pb
pd qp p
− − ∂∂ ∂
=⋅⋅ +⋅
∂∂ ∂  
It can be easily shown that ∂r/∂p > 0 if the demand function q(p) is inelastic 
what can be expected for most water uses. 
The effective monetary burden is determined by three strategic variables: budget, 
price and demand quantity. Turning towards a more political definition of unaffor-
dable water use we can state that it is in practice the price that makes a commodity 
unaffordable. The consumer’s economic responsibility for the quantity q is often 
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suppressed – due to normative aspects such as human rights for water.
9 In that 
sense, affordability means a certain institutional setting that guarantees an 
autonomously choosen consumption pattern. Adjustments of q are merely tabooed 
due to the losses in utility that are attended by price- or budget-driven demand 
adaptations. An adjustment in q though is crucial for obtaining economic efficiency 
and sustainability. 
If unaffordability politically just means "reduction in demand" and thus describes a 
situation in which consumers cannot afford their former consumption optimum, we 
get caught in a blocking trap for any price reforms that essentially aims at reducing 
and restructuring demand. From this perspective, the budget b needs to be sufficient 
to provide the same consumption bundle regardless changing conditions. If this is 
not the case government is expected either to adjust income or (water) prices.  
Thus, the implicit normative concept of "affordability" may turn out to be an 
important stumbling block for sustainability-oriented price reforms. Regrettably the 
attempt to dissolve the conceptualization problem of "affordability" theoretically has 
not succeeded up to now.  
5  CONCLUSION: POLITICAL AND RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS FOR 
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE THROUGH PRICING REFORMS 
In empirical studies as well as in the just rare academic literature on affordability 
issues with respect to environment-related services such as water the traditional 
affordability ratio is rampant. Unfortunately, this measure is theoretically defective 
and hence practically misleading. Consequently, there appears to be some move 
in the literature to alternative approaches for measuring affordability, especially a 
tendency towards the so-called "residual income approach" that try to overcome the 
weaknesses of a simple ratio measurement.  
At least these improvements can be considered theoretically consistent but they 
go back to the recommendations of academic welfare economics just to separate 
allocative and distributive problems: Once social policy succeeds in easing relevant 
income restrictions resource prices can be set in an efficient way. In practice, this 
Nirvana condition cannot be fulfilled even less by authorities or firms that decide 
on utility tariffs. For practical water resources management the problem of affor-
dability of water prices cannot be solved this way. 
For empirical purposes, the traditional ratio measure with its relatively little data 
requirements may still be applied as an indicator of initial suspicion. But at least 
for concrete social policy interventions it appears to give potentially misleading 
information. The risks of such a misguidance are substantial: If a certain standard 
                                                            
9  Just recently the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution recognizing access to clean 
water and sanitation as human right and claiming "affordable drinking water and sanitation for 
all" – see www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/64/L.63/Rev.1&Lang=E [9.9.2010]. 
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level of consumption is ignored it is impossible to identify the problem (of absent 
ability) in general. And if the ratio is applied with (various) standard consumption 
levels, an oversubsidization can be expected if affordability should be ensured 
by price limitations or income transfers. 
From an economic viewpoint it is necessary to notice that there are different 
targets policies have to take into account regarding utility prices. This in mind 
further theoretical affordability examinations should deal with effectiveness and 
efficiency of social policy: 
•  Effectiveness: This is about identifying those households who are actually 
disadvantaged. It is important not to miss this group. But is also important not 
aiming at not-disadvantaged groups by mistake. In other words: the measure has 
to be pinpoint. Unfortunately, we do not have available a theoretically sound 
definition of what is really meant by "affordability" up to now, that is, in whose 
favor and by what means policy especially pricing policy should intervene.  
•  Efficiency is meant twofold: On the one hand we have the scarcity of public 
finance, which of course plays a major role also in the affordability field. Subsidies 
are widely discussed uno actu with the issue of affordability. Thus scarcity here 
refers especially also to poverty somewhere else, where subsidization is needed 
as well. It is no antagonism that social concerns should be pursued by taking 
aspects of efficiency into account. On the other hand we have the scarcity of 
natural resources. This aspect is about ecological sustainability, and as such a 
competing concern compared to the socially motivated provision of utility 
goods.  
In the meantime economic research is requested to deal with affordability claims 
analyzing both the effectiveness of affordability measures and the trade-offs 
between efficiency and social concerns. Thus, inconsistent objections and irrational 
resistance to water price reforms might be laid open. This can be seen as a certain 
contribution to remove institutional barriers to sustainable water pricing. Futhermore, 
potential pricing and tariff instruments have to be developed in order to take 
affordability requirements into account while minimizing welfare losses.
10 
As discussed above future prices of environment-related utility services are expected 
to increase for several reasons. In order to enable an efficient institutional design of 
pricing strategies and thus institutional change for sustainability affordability 
issues and their trade-offs with competing objectives have to be taken into account 
by decision-makers. Particularly, implicit normative concepts of "political unaffor-
dability" and their economic impacts have to be uncovered in order to avoid blocking 
reforms. For that further research is needed to give an appropriate measuring of 
the phenomenon in practice and to find pricing instruments that refer properly to 
                                                            
10   See e. g. the ongoing debate on increasing block tariffs as a means for involving social concerns  
 in pricing (MERAN/VON HIRSCHHAUSEN, 2009). 
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the identified affordability gaps. It remains the difficult task for social sciences 
to provide helpful and prudent orientation in this field.  
REFERENCES 
AZEVEDO, L. G. T. DE, BALTAR, A. M. (2005): Water pricing reforms: Issues and challenges of 
implementation, in: BISWAS, A. K., TORTAJADA, C., BRAGA, B. P. F., RODRÍGUEZ, D. (eds.): 
Water pricing and public-private partnership, London. 
BRETSCHNEIDER,  W.  (2011):  Ensuring  affordablity for the provision of energy and water 
utility services, Diss. Thesis, Leipzig. 
CHAPLIN, R., FREEMAN, A. (1999): Towards an accurate description of affordability, Urban 
Studies, 36(11): 1949-1957. 
COLEMAN, A. (2008): Inflation and the measurement of saving and housing affordability, 
Motu Workung Paper 08-09. 
DARMANIN, J. (2008): The computation of a housing affordability index for Malta, Bank of 
Vallette Review, 37: 25-34. 
DINAR, A. (ed.) (2000): The Political Economy of Water Pricing Reforms, Oxford. 
DINAR, A., SALETH, R. M. (2006): Issues in water pricing reforms: From getting correct prices 
to setting appropriate institutions, The international yearbook of environmental and resource 
economics 2005/2006: 1-51. 
DODONOV, B., OPITZ, P., PFAFFENBERGER, W. (2004): How much do electricity tariff increases in 
Ukraine hurt the poor?, Energy policy, 32(2): 855-863. 
FANKHAUSER, S., TEPIC,  S.  (2005): Can poor consumers pay for energy and water? An 
affordability analysis for transition countries, Energy Policy, 32(2): 1038-1049. 
FANKHAUSER, S., RODIONOVA, Y., FALCETTI, E. (2008): Utility payments in Ukraine: Affordability, 
subsidies and arrears, Energy Policy, 36(11): 4168-4177. 
FEINS, J. D., LANE, T. S. (1981): How much for housing? New Perspectives on Affordability 
and Risk, Cambridge, Mass.: Abt Books. 
FISHER, L. M., POLLAKOWSKI, H. O., ZABEL, J. E. (2009): Amenity-based housing affordability 
indexes, Real Estate Economics, 37(4): 705-746. 
FREUND, C., WALLICH, CHR. (1997): Public-sector price reforms in transition economies: Who 
gains? Who loses? The case of household energy prices in Poland, Economic development 
and cultural change, 46(1): 35-59. 
GAWEL, E., BRETSCHNEIDER, W. (2010): Investigating the affordability of utility services – 
From the ratio measure to the residual income approach, Paper presented at the 14
th Annual 
Conference of The International Society for New Institutional Economics, 17-19 June 2010 
in Stirling, Scotland. 
GLIED, S. A. (2008): Mandates and the affordability of health care, NBER Working Paper 
No. 14545, Cambridge, Mass., National Bureau of Economic Research, <http://papers. nber.org/ 
papers/w14545.pdf> (21 January 2010). 
HANCOCK, K. E. (1993): "Can pay? Won’t pay?" or Economic principles of "affordability", 
Urban Studies, 30(1): 127-145. 
Bogen18-BAffordability as an institutional obstacle to water-related price reforms 
 
33
KESSIDES, I., MINIACI, R., SCARPA, C., VALBONESI, P. (2009): Toward defining and measuring 
the affordability of public utility services, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4915, 
The World Bank/Development Research Group/Environment and Energy Team, <http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/ 2009/04/28/000158349_ 
20090428083002/Rendered/PDF/WPS4915.pdf> (21 January 2010). 
LAMONT, CH. (2008), Policy Forum: Housing Affordability: What are the Policy Issues – 
Housing affordability crisis: Fact or fiction?, The Australian Economic Review, 41(2): 194-
199. 
LEFLAIVE, X. (2009): Experience of OECD countries in water pricing, Presentation at ONEMA-
conference, 9
th of December 2009. 
LERMAN, D. L., REEDER., W. J. (1987): The affordability of adequate housing, ARUEA Journal, 
15(4): 389-404. 
MARKS, G. N., SEDGWICK, S. T. (2008): Policy Forum: Housing Affordability: What are the 
Policy Issues – Is there a housing crisis? The incidence and persistence of housing stress 
2001-2006, The Australian Economic Review, 41(2): 215-221. 
MATLACK, J. L., VIGDOR, J. L. (2006): Do rising tides lift prices? Income inequality and housing 
affordability, NBER Working Paper Series, No. 12331. 
MERAN, G., HIRSCHHAUSEN, CHR. VON (2009): Increasing block tariffs in the water sector: A semi-
welfarist approach. Discussion Papers, German Institute for Economic Research; Vol. 902, 
Berlin: DIW. 
MEEN, G., ANDREW, M. (2008): Planning for housing in the post-Barker era: Affordability, 
household formation, and tenure choice, Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 24(1): 79-98. 
MINIACI, R., SCARPA, C., VALBONESI, P. (2008): Measuring the affordability of basic public 
utility services in Italy, Giornale degli Economisti e Annali di Economica, 67(2): 185-230. 
MINIACI, R., SCARPA, C., VALBONESI, P. (2007): Distributional effects of price reforms in the 
Italian utility markets, "Marco Fanno" Working Paper 50. 
MORAKAMI,  Y., BLOM,  A. (2008): Accessibility and affordability of tertiary education in 
Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru within a global context, The World Bank, Policy Research 
Working Paper 4517. 
OECD (2003): Social issues in the provision and pricing of water services, Paris, Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development. 
OECD (2009): Managing water for all: An OECD Perspective on Pricing and Financing, Paris, 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. 
REYNAUD, A. (2006): Assessing the impact of public regulation and private participation on water 
affordability for poor households: An empirical investigation of the French case, Working 
Paper University of Toulouse, Toulouse. 
SEDGWICK, S. T. (2008): Policy forum: Housing Affordability: What are the Policy Issues – 
Editor’s Introduction, The Australian Economic Review, 41(2): 187-193. 
SEREBRISKY, T., GÓMEZ-LOBO, A., ESTUPIÑÁN, N., MUÑOZ-RASKIN, R. (2009): Affordability 
and subsidies in public urban transport: What do we mean, what can be done? Transport 
reviews, 29(6): 715-739. 
SIGEL, K. (2010): Environmental sanitation services in peri-urban ger arears in Darkhan 
(Mongolia): A description of current status, practices, and perceptions, UFZ Report 02/2010. 
Bogen19-AErik Gawel, Wolfgang Bretschneider 
 
34 
STONE,  M.  E. (2006): What is housing affordability? The case for the Residual Income 
Approach, Housing Policy Debate, 17: 151-184. 
THALMANN, PH. (2003): "House poor" or simply "poor"?, Journal of Housing Economics, 12: 
291-317. 
WHITEHEAD, C. M. E. (1991): From need to affordability: An analysis of UK housing Objectives, 
Urban Studies, 28(6): 871-887. 
YATES, J. (2008): Policy forum: Housing Affordability: What are the Policy Issues – Australia’s 





ANALYSING THE SHORTCOMINGS OF THE UKRAINIAN URBAN 







This paper analyses the key institutional factors of fiscal federalism that 
determine the functioning of urban wastewater sector in Ukraine and that are 
therefore the starting points for an intentional institutional change. After describing 
the situation in Ukraine waste water sector with reference to requirements set by 
the Millennium Development Goals and the requirements of the EC-Urban 
Waste Water Treatment directive, five general institutional requirements for 
effective local self-government (fiscal federalism) are identified. They are based on 
the Theory of Federalism and the European Charter of Local Self-Government. 
Third, along the line of these requirements, the institutional and legal situation for 
the Ukrainian urban waste water sector will be described and the critical short-
comings in institutional development will be identified. Forth, the contribution 
suggests necessary preconditions and intentional institutional changes for a successful 
reform in Ukraine’s wastewater sector. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Water services infrastructure management is a central area of public service 
provision due to specific characteristics. Access to clean drinking water and 
sanitation is a basic need communities need to provide for their citizens and is 
generally bound to a physical infrastructure. Ukraine is still a transition country, a 
fact that makes governance more difficult than in established rule of law governed 
democracies and market economies. The transformation process towards democracy 
and market economy has been quite rocky: In some cases new laws and regulations 
had to be established, in others rules had to be revised. But most important are 
informal rules as a heritage from Soviet times: Changing laws and regulations 
alone does not make a transformation work, but mentality has to be changed for rules 
to become rules in use. In the case of urban wastewater infrastructure operation and 
maintenance the financial aspect is crucial. The lack of awareness of environmental 
problems and preservation of natural resources is another obstacle for sustainable 
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development in the sector. Citizens have only a weak basis for public participation in 
decision making on public service provision. The contribution analyses the key 
institutional factors that determine the functioning of urban wastewater sector in 
Ukraine and that are therefore the starting points for institutional reforms. The 
analysis is based on the theoretical approach of Fiscal Federalism identifying 
conditions for an efficient decentralisation approach. The non-compliance with 
these conditions results in a (gradual) loss of efficiency in federal performance. 
The aim of the paper is to analyse the current state of local governance in Ukraine 
against the background of these conditions and derive the implications for the 
wastewater sector and for realistic attempts for rehabilitation and modernisation. 
Section 3 provides a description of the situation in the Ukrainian wastewater sector 
with reference to the standards set out in section 2 and identifies modernization 
needs. In section 4, five general institutional requirements for effective local self-
government are identified, taking into account the decentralization that exists in 
the sector and drawing on the theory of federalism and on the European Charter of 
Local Self-Government. Against this background, section 5 analyses the institutional 
and legal situation in Ukraine and identifies critical shortcomings in the country’s 
institutional development. This forms the basis for a brief discussion of options 
for institutional reform in section 6.  
2 INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN STANDARDS FOR THE WASTE 
WATER SECTOR  
On international level the relevance of the sanitation and waste water treatment 
has been acknowledged for several years, like in the Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs) of 2002, where the aim to "halve, by 2015, the proportion of the 
population without sustainable access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation" 
was constituted.
1 However, the requirements regarding wastewater relate only to 
sanitation and are generally limited to issues of hygiene and health. The aim 
"access to basic sanitation" has been substantiated within the WHO/ UNICEF Joint 
Monitoring Program (JMP) as access to improved sanitation facility meeting one of 
different technical options.
2 The underlying aim is to ensure hygienic separation of 
human excreta from human contact.
3 Preserving the ecologic quality of aquatic 
ecosystems and larger range of their services are not within the scope of this MDG.  
More demanding than the MDGs are the aims of the European Community’s 
Urban Waste Water Treatment Directive (UWWTD).
4 The UWWTD requires
                                                            
1  MDG Goal 7, Target 3 (http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/environ.shtml). 
2  Flush/pour flush to piped sewer system or to septic tank or to pit latrine, ventilated improved  
pit latrine, pit latrine with slab and composting toilet2, http://www.wssinfo.org/definitions-
methods/watsan-ladder/. 
3 JMP  (n.d.). 
4  Council Directive of 21 May 1991 concerning urban waste water treatment (91/271/EEC), 
OJ L 135, 30.5.1991, p. 40. 
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that larger settlements or agglomerations are provided with collecting systems for 
urban wastewater, specifically:  
•  at the latest by 31 December 1998 for agglomerations of more than 10,000 
population equivalent (p.e.) for urban wastewater discharging into receiving 
waters which are considered "sensitive areas" as defined under Article 5, 
•  at the latest by 31 December 2000 for agglomerations with a p.e. of more 
than 15,000, that discharge in "normal areas", 
•  at the latest by 31 December 2005 for those with a p.e. of between 2,000 and 
15,000. 
With regard to cleaning standards, the Directive distinguishes between sensitive 
areas and normal areas according to the sensitivity of the area into which waste-
water is discharged. General standards are set for biological and chemical oxygen 
demand and for total suspended solids, which represent the requirements of 
"secondary treatment" that have to be met by all agglomerations with more than 
2,000 p.e. unless they discharge into coastal waters. More demanding and more 
specific emission limit values are established for agglomerations in sensitive areas 
with more than 10,000 and 100.000 p.e. respectively. This constitutes the "more 
stringent treatment" required in Art. 5 para. 2 UWWTD. For smaller agglomerations 
(< 2,000 p.e.) "appropriate treatment" is required which, post-discharge, allows 
the receiving waters to meet the relevant quality objectives and the relevant 
provisions of the UWWTD and other Community directives. The requirements 
relating to collecting systems are formulated only in broad terms (Art. 3 para. 2 
with Annex I A):  
"Collecting systems shall take into account waste water treatment requirements. 
The design, construction and maintenance of collecting systems shall be undertaken 
in accordance with the best technical knowledge not entailing excessive costs, 
notably regarding: 
–  volume and characteristics of urban waste water, 
–  prevention of leaks, 
–  limitation of pollution of receiving waters due to storm water overflows."  
Given that formal Ukrainian national standards are (in some respects) higher 
than EU standards, the question of the harmonization of national with EU 
legislation, as agreed in Art. 51 Para. 1, 2 and in Art. 63 Para. 3 Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreement of 1998, should not prove to be critical. The more serious 
problem is that of effective implementation, i.e. whether the institution in charge 
of maintaining the wastewater system has the capacity to perform this task – 
including the capacity to raise the necessary funds for it.  
Water service provision in urban areas displays an number of characteristics. Due 
to the fact that for infrastructure the amount of sunk costs is quite high water 
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infrastructure systems are in most cases natural monopolies. For example, the 
sewer system cannot simply be removed and rebuilt somewhere else. Because of 
high investment costs for a sewerage system in most cases to erect a second 
system is usually economically absurd. However, the existence of a monopoly 
does call for certain state intervention such as tariff regulation, the definition and 
control of standards for wastewater treatment and discharges because insufficient 
waste treatment endangers water resources and ecological quality of waters.  
3 WASTEWATER SECTOR IN UKRAINE 
It should be noted from the outset that the requirements of the MDGs regarding 
sanitation have been met in Ukraine. In 2004 96 % of the population had access 
to improved sanitation facilities; by 2007 this had increased to 99 %. This is 
almost certainly the reason why the MDGs adapted to the national Ukrainian 
context contain no goals relating to the urban wastewater sector and only ones 
relating to drinking water supply. With regard to the different disposal pathways 
and, in particular, the requirements of the UWWTD regarding the establishment 
of collecting systems, the data available from different institutions are somewhat 
divergent. The figures for central sewerage systems in urban areas range from 
70 % to 96 % and in rural areas between 7 % and 20 %. The most detailed data 
available (from the EAP TASK FORCE/OECD) confirm the lower number for 
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Figure 1:  Own figure based on data of EAP TASK FORCE/OECD, 2007, p. 13. 
No comprehensive, nationwide data are available for the cleaning capacity of the 
wastewater treatment plants. The de facto standard of these plants is often described 
as mechanical-biological; this can generally be regarded as being similar to 
"secondary treatment" in the terms of the UWWTD. The lack of any more advanced 
Bogen21-BAnalysing the shortcomings of the Ukrainian urban waste water sector 
 
39
treatment is confirmed in a number of reports dealing with the water sector in 
Ukraine. This is in open contradiction to the national legal requirements, which 
are more demanding than the UWWTD for "normal areas". In addition, these 
reports describe the state of the physical infrastructure (i.e. the sewerage system 
and treatment facilities) as being "at the brink of collapse" because its equipment 
is often antiquated and the requisite maintenance has been neglected for years
5. The 
main indicator for the quality of the collection system is the number of blockages per 
year per km of sewers. The numbers in Ukraine range from 0.92 to 20.2 and from 
0.876 to 23.28 depending on the data source. Compared to the numbers in advanced 
industrialized countries such as Australia, where the range is between 0.6 and 1.06, 
these figures are quite high, reflecting the age of the network. Thus, the prospects 
for achieving the MDGs appear shaky. The amount of investment needed to achieve 
the MDGs in Ukraine in relation to the sanitation sector, with a focus on renovation 
(85 %), have been estimated at € 770 million. This figure was based on the 
assumption that the rate of deterioration is about 20-50 % on average across the 
EECCA region and that there is a need for rehabilitation for 10 % of the infra-
structure only at a later stage. However, to meet European wastewater treatment 
standards (described as full biological treatment for all settlements >2000 inhabi-
tants) the investment needs are much higher. The Danish Environmental Protection 
Agency (DEPA) and the Danish Cooperation for Environment in Eastern Europe 
(DANCEE) have put the costs of new investment at about € 2.4bn and for 
renovation at about € 2.6bn within the period 2004-2011
6.  
Formal responsibility for the wastewater sector lies at the level of local communities, 
which were given formal ownership of the infrastructure for water supply, sanitation 
and wastewater treatment by presidential decree in 1994. Local self-governance 
was also guaranteed in the constitution of 1996 and is still in the constitution of 
2004. The way these basic rules are elaborated will be discussed in section 5 against 
the background of the theory of decentralization. This will be complemented first by 
a comparative legal perspective on local self-governance to be outlined in section 4. 
4 THEORY OF (FISCAL) FEDERALISM AND LOCAL  
SELF-GOVERNMENT IN THE SHAPE OF THE EUROPEAN  
CHARTER OF LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT 
Water service provision in urban areas displays a number of characteristics. Due 
to the fact that for infrastructure the amount of sunk costs is quite high water 
infrastructure systems are in most cases natural monopolies. For example, the 
sewer system cannot simply be removed and rebuilt somewhere else. Because of 
high investment costs for a sewerage system in most cases to erect a second 
system is usually economically absurd. However, the existence of a monopoly 
                                                            
5  DEPA/DANCEE (2003), p. 23. 
6 DEPA/DANCEE  (2003). 
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does call for certain state intervention such as tariff regulation, the definition and 
control of standards for wastewater treatment and discharges because insufficient 
wastewater treatment endangers water resources and ecological quality of waters.  
The theory of fiscal federalism postulates a set of conditions for the efficient 
provision of public goods and services by local jurisdictions. It can be regarded as 
the main theoretical foundation of the European Charter of Local Self-Government 
(ECLSG)
7 which also is an expression of the centuries-long tradition and 
experience of local self-administration in Western Europe. Starting from the 
assumption of generally decentralized water supply and sanitation services achieved 
through the transfer of property rights to local jurisdictions as in Ukraine, the 
question arises how the regulatory framework for the local entities responsible 
should be designed in order to enable them to perform their tasks effectively.  
The theoretical approach of fiscal federalism is well known in economics for a 
long time. It has been defined as "the process of transferring functions, powers, 
competencies and responsibilities from the central Government to local governments. 
Such a transfer of powers and functions must be accompanied with a transfer of 
the necessary financial resources to exercise these powers by introducing local 
taxes to local budgets that have been granted new powers."
7 Federalism is based on 
the assumption that federalism "provides a sustainable system of political decentre-
lization" and enhances development.
8 OLSEN
9 established the term fiscal equivalence 
which means that the unit where a service is provided should also be with the unit 
that has the decision making power and the financial responsibility. The underlying 
argument is that of the efficiency criteria because economic efficiency increases when 
the decision-making actors are hold financially responsible to reduce incentives for 
spending beyond their means. Decentralization becomes important when it comes 
to the governance of e.g. public services that are focused on small units such as 
water provision and sanitation. One reason for decentralisation is that of transaction 
costs concerning access to information decrease: At local level information about 
specific information and knowledge are available. However, the approach requires 
that either no external costs exist or they are low, otherwise a broader approach is 
necessary.  
The crucial question is: How a system of federalism provides for its own survival, 
i.e. the survival of sub-national governmental levels that cannot be overruled by 
national governments intervention. This approach makes it possible to compare 
different federal systems and describe why some of them are successful and 
others are not.  
Two directions of this theory can be differentiated. The classical, more idealistic 
approach (also called First Generation Fiscal Federalism – FGFF) regards the actors 
                                                            
 
7 I NTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR POLICY STUDIES (2006), p. 7. 
8 W EINGAST (2007), p. 275. 
9 O LSEN (1969). 
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as benevolent who aim at maximizing citizens´ welfare and looks at the (optimal) 
allocation of tasks among different governmental levels and the corresponding 
organization of fiscal instruments to increase overall welfare. The more empirical 
approach (also called Second Generation Fiscal Federalism – SGFF) focuses on 
the incentives actors have at different governmental levels in a given institutional 
setting.
10 For example political actors may have their re-election in mind and 
this might not comply with solely benevolent action. This means that SGFF 
takes a closer look at the existing institutions: formal as well as informal, with the 
respective incentives for public decision makers.
11 Oates mentioned another 
aspect that is important for transition economies that are often characterized by a 
past of a highly centralized governmental system: "(...) the potential of fiscal 
decentralization for improving economic and political performance must be 
evaluated in terms of the specific circumstances that characterize the current state 
of a developing nation"
12. Fiscal federalism is therefore not a "one-size-fits-all" 
approach but the degree of decentralization as well as the organization has to be 
proven individually for each public good. The second approach is especially important 
for countries in transition such as Ukraine where the political system is not 
consolidated and the institutional basis is quite weak and informal rules are of 
crucial importance in intergovernmental relations. 
WEINGAST lists five conditions for effective federal systems and emphasize 
incentives political actors face therein
13. It should "provide a first step towards 
understanding some of the institutions necessary to support decentralization that 
provides political officials with incentives to improve social welfare".
14  
4.1 Hierarchy   
The necessary condition for fiscal federalism is that there is a kind of hierarchy 
of government levels. This is not only in federal states the case, but also often in 
generally centralized states where at least some competencies are delegated to 
lower level authorities (e.g. France). How the assignment and distribution of 
power and competencies varies across systems can be described by reference to 
four more conditions. 
4.2  Regulatory autonomy  
All government levels have to have the respective regulative autonomy in their 
jurisdiction in order to be able to fulfil their duties that given by the central level 
                                                            
10 W EINGAST (2008).  
11 O LSEN (1990). 
12 O ATES (1999), p. 1143. 
13 W EINGAST (2006). 
14 W EINGAST (2006), p. 5. 
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according to the needs of the jurisdiction.
15 Historical experience in Europe with 
the development of municipal self governance,
16 that has left its mark in the ECLSG, 
allows to specify regulatory autonomy by aspects of autonomous legislation (cf. 
Art 4 §2 and §4 ECSLG), territorial sovereignty,
17 autonomy in local personnel 
management (cf. Art. 6 §2 ECLSG), organisational sovereignty (cf. Art. 6 §2 
ECLSG), financial autonomy/fiscal sovereignty (cf. Art. 9 ECSLG), territorial 
planning sovereignty, and effective legal protection (cf. Art. 11 ECLSG).
18 These 
aspects often are gradual, i.e. they can be fulfilled i n  m o r e  o r  l e s s  m a n n e r .  A  
comparison of western models of local self-government demonstrates that a number 
of different designs may be possible for each of these aspects and in combination. 
If jurisdictions are not granted these a coherent set of competencies from an 
economic point of view this arrangement is inefficient and (transaction) cost rise in 
many aspects. This is also crucial for a more factual aspect of local self-governance 
that concerns the size of the local communities. Some of the differences in local 
government structures throughout Europe may be explained with the averaged 
size of communities. They vary from 1,722 inhabitants in France up to 31,379 in 
Sweden.
19 The size is a crucial factor for the realisation of economies of scales at the 
provision of communal services, e.g. at the provision of water supply and sanitation. 
But the size of a community is not by itself determining the option to take advantage 
of economies of scale. They can also be realised and hence the lack of critical 
size
20 can be compensated by inter-communal/inter-municipal cooperation. This 
has been acknowledged in the ECLSG in Art. 10 §1.  
4.3  Common market condition  
Each jurisdiction must be able to free trade with other jurisdiction within a 
nation state otherwise the competition with other jurisdictions will be undermined 
and hinders economies of scale. Even though in the case of water services infra-
structure we are not concerned with competition in a pure economics sense this 
aspect has to be taken into account because "voting-by-feet"
21 can be an important 
factor to increase competition between jurisdictions as an incentive for governments 
to provide local public goods to meet the needs of consumers. This aspect can be 
expanded for cases where municipalities would like to cooperate and bundle their 
                                                            
15 In Terms of the ECLSG (Art. 3 §1): "Local self-government denotes the right and the 
ability of local authorities, within the limits of the law, to regulate and manage a substantial 
share of public affairs under their own responsibility and in the interests of the local population." 
16  For an overview on models of local self-government in Western Europe, see MARTINEZ SORIA 
(2007). 
17  It describes the geographical scope of the autonomous rights of the local government, not 
the protection against revision of boundaries of the territory.  
18 M ARTINEZ SORIA (2007), p. 1036. 
19  Calculated on data provided by CEMR (2007). 
20  There is a long discussion whether there is a minimum size that will not be taken up here. 
21  The concept of voting by feet has become famous by TIEBOUT (1956). 
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resources and for cases where they would like to outsource certain parts of public 
service provision in order to realize efficiency gains.  
4.4 Budget  restrictions 
Subordinated governments are responsible for their actions especially when it 
comes to financial tasks. Local governments should not spend money beyond 
their means and occurring deficits should not be compensated through horizontal 
or vertical inter-jurisdictional transfer payments. The idea behind this condition 
is that inter alia the subsidization of inefficient enterprises will decrease. However, 
this condition requires reciprocally that condition one is fulfilled and that jurisdic-
tions have at least a certain degree of regulatory autonomy as regards budgetary 
issues, inter alia control over their expenses, e.g. by some degree of discretion on 
the magnitude of public services, control over local charges and taxes (cf. Art. 9 §3 
ECLSG), adequate financial resource (cf. Art. 9 §1 ECLSG), sufficiently diversified 
and buoyant sources of revenues. This condition does not necessarily require 
that communal budget are always balanced. Especially the rehabilitation of and 
investment in expansion of public infrastructure can often not be financed out of 
current receipts and may call for the option to lend money (at least) at national 
capital markets. This option has also been recognized in Art. 9 §8 ECLSG. How 
to finance local communities is the most intricate question. In cases where the 
budget is composed of state funds without any orientation on economic power of 
the jurisdiction the incentives for actors to attract investors are quite low. Instead 
WEINGAST
22 favors a non-linear approach where a certain percentage of the transfer 
payments from the federal government depend on the economics performance of 
the jurisdiction. This is supposed to increase incentives to foster economic growth 
in the jurisdictions. WEINGAST argues that "subnational governments that raise a 
substantial portion of their own revenue tend to be more accountable to citizens, to 
provide the services people want, to provide market-enhancing public goods and 
to be less corrupt".
23 On the other hand obligatory tasks of local communities require 
sufficient financial resource in order to fulfil them independent from overall 
performance of the local economy (cf. Art. 9 §2 ECLSG). These necessary funds 
may also be provided by a system of horizontal intergovernmental fiscal transfers 
(cf. Art. 9 §5 ECLSG). Finally, experience show that the only orientation towards 
raising revenues through attracting economic activities in local communities may 
enter in an inefficient competition between them and may also be to the detriment 
of the environment, e.g. in the case of (in terms of revenues unproductive) nature 
conservation. However, the stronger the financial independence of a local community 
through autonomous controlled sources the more it is accountable vis-à-vis its 
citizens who have an interest in efficient use of their dues. As a side effect lower 
                                                            
22 W EINGAST (2006), p. 19. 
23 W EINGAST (2006), p. 14.  
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levels gain power vis-a-vis higher levels because more financial independence 
results in more political independence.  
4.5 Institutionalized  authority 
Political independence is an indispensable requirement for an effective decentralized 
assignment of responsibilities. Institutions are needed that prevent national govern-
ments from interfering in local competencies or take back competencies that have 
been granted to local governments. Especially in cases where local communities 
want to make investments institutional stability is an important aspect. Otherwise, 
there is a risk of losing money. One option for securing this kind of stability is to 
safeguard local self-governance by constitutional provisions (cf. Art. 4 §1 ECLSG) 
as it is done in a number of European states (e.g. Germany and Switzerland). A 
clear definition and delineation may also provide stability in competencies. This 
can be reached e.g. by providing full and exclusive competencies for the local 
communities (cf. Art. 4 §4 ECLSG), by restricting state supervision of activities of 
local authorities to the aim to ensure compliance with law and with constitutional 
principles (cf. Art. 8 §2 ECLSG) and finally by providing the right of recourse 
to a judicial remedy in case of conflicts in order to secure free exercise of powers 
(cf. Art. 11 ECLSG). When the "institutionalisation" condition is not fulfilled 
subordinated governments cannot be sure that their decisions will not be overruled 
by higher level authorities. In such a case the incentives to act independently without 
national political backing is quite low because the outcome might not be maintained.  
5 LOCAL GOVERNANCE IN UKRAINE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR 
THE WASTEWATER SECTOR  
How can local governance in Ukraine be described against the background of 
the conditions discussed in section 4 and what are the implications for the wastewater 
sector in Ukraine and its necessary rehabilitation and modernisation? This approach 
for the analysis of the current situation of the wastewater infrastructure in 
Ukraine gives crucial hints for institutional reforms, even though this analysis will 
not be able to cover all aspects regarding economic and legal criteria sufficiently. 
5.1 Hierarchy 
The Ukrainian state structure consists of four different administrative levels: The 
national level and 24 oblasti
24 (regions) which are further divided into 490 raions 
(districts). At the lowest administrative level are municipalities, i.e. 458 cities, 886 
towns/villages and 28,540 settlements.
25 One major difference between the oblast/ 
raion level and the municipal level is that in the case of the former executive power 
is performed by state administrations limiting the operating range of the respective 
                                                            
24  Plus the Crimea autonomous republic of Ukraine. 
25  OECD (2009), p. 70 based on data of the Ministry for housing and communal economy of 
Ukraine. 
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governments. Oblasts and rayons are essentially part of the state administration 
with some kind of democratically legitimized organs/boards (radas) that have only 
very limited powers. Only the municipalities have their own administration for 
executing power. This means that the actual freedom of decision-making is limited 
and dependence on state authority in financial respects is high. In the end incentives 
for efficient governance are limited at the Oblast and Rada level.  
5.2  Regulatory autonomy over economies 
The condition regulatory autonomy over economies can be divided into two different 
aspects that will be further discussed in this paragraph: The delineation of competen-
cies as well as the size of the communities and interjurisdictional cooperation. 
5.2.1  Delineation of competencies 
The Ukrainian state has a long tradition of centralization going back to soviet 
times and continuing after declaring independency in 1991. Before 1991 water and 
energy management was provided by the state and even though it was economically 
inefficient, services where provided satisfactorily given the fact that the state 
budget provided funds respectively, energy was cheap and environmental specifi-
cations were low
26.  
However in 1994 the ownership of infrastructure for water supply, sanitation and 
waste water treatment was transferred from state ownership to local governments
27. 
This went hand in hand with a cutback in state support for energy and water services 
and an increase in energy prices
28. The constitution of 1996 took up the principle 
of local self-governance
29 including a right for local governments to invest in the 
communal property and to ensure its management. The principle was renewed in the 
constitutions of 2004 that still in force at the moment. The constitutional provisions 
have been substantiated in the Law on Local Self-Government (ULSG) from 
May 21, 1997.
30 Ukraine has also signed the ECSLG in 1996 and ratified it in 1997.
31 
The constitution does not contain a blanket clause that gives the local communities 
exclusive right to deal with all issues of local character (omnicompetence), but 
only according to the ordinary law.
32 The most important law is the ULSG.  
                                                            
26 W ORLD BANK (2006). 
27  Decree of the President on Strengthening the Economic Fundamentals of Self-Governance 
in Ukrainian Cities No. 84 of 12 March 1994. 
28 W ORLD BANK (2006). 
29  Constitution of Ukraine 1996, Section XI, Local Self-Government. 
30  Law of Ukraine of 21.05.1997 № 280/97-ВР. 
31 Law of Ukraine of 15.07.1997 No.452/97-BP on the Ratification of the European Charter 
of Local Self-Government. Unlike many other countries the Ukraine has not excluded any 
of the provision of the ECLSG from application (cf. http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ 
ListeDeclarations.asp?NT=122&CV=1&NA=&PO=999&CN=999&VL=1&CM=9&CL=ENG). 
32  This is not really deviating from European traditions. Constitutional rooting is found in many 
constitutions; however, whether there is a domain of issues completely detracted from state 
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The allocation of responsibilities of local authorities and between several different 
authorities is in many cases unclear. The power of local governments is often 
vaguely formulated: Responsibilities and competencies are based in different laws, 
formulation of duties and competencies are ambiguous. Competencies are often 
regulated not only in legislation on the institutions (e.g. local self-government) but 
also in legislation on subject matters (e.g. water management) without explicitly 
changing the other piece of legislation respectively.
33 However, even with the same 
piece of legislation delineation of competencies between state administration and 
local administration is difficult or somewhat unreasonable. This can be illustrated 
at the provision regarding inter alia consumer services. The ULSG knows two 
types of competencies exclusive (self-governing) powers and delegated ones, that 
are (Art. 1 ULSG): 
"powers of executive bodies, vested by law in the local self-government bodies, 
as well as powers of local self-government bodies which are delegated to the 
corresponding local state administrations, on the decision of raion and oblast 
councils". 
As regards the consumer services (Art. 30 ULSG) the powers are divided as 
follows:  
"a) exclusive (self-governing) powers: to manage objects of … consumer … 
services, …, which are the communal property of the corresponding territorial 
communities, to ensure their proper maintenance and efficient use, and to provide 
residents with the necessary level and quality of services; 
…. 
b) delegated powers: 
to fulfill measures of expansion and improvement of … public utility services, …." 
According to these provisions there is the option that the competence/authority 
for maintaining the sewage systems and the competence to expand a given system 
may be separated from each other. Firstly, there is the difficulty to delineate these 
competencies given the rehabilitation needs in Ukraine (cf. section 3). Secondly, it is 
very questionable to separate these issues, especially if one looks at the financing: 
should two authorities impose charges. Thirdly, given that there is only the option for 
separation: there are no conditions given, that have to be fulfilled for the decision of 
the raion or oblast councils to transfer (or retransfer) the competence; it is just 
(arbitrary) political will of the council. Finally, it is seems curios that the democra-
tically elected and legitimized (city, village, settlement) council has no say in the 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
intervention cannot be derived from the constitutional text but only identified by reviewing 
the constitutional praxis (cf. MARTINEZ SORIA, 2007, p. 1024 f.). "Omnicompetence" is found 
only at a minority of states (cf. MARTINEZ SORIA, 2007, p. 1036 ff.) 
33 This lack of coherence in legislative activity seems to be typical for post soviet countries 
(cf. CAPONERA/NANNI, 2007, p. 83). 
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decision of the transfer of executive power but the elected raion or oblast councils. 
Even within the local community the delineation of competencies between the 
actors (council v. executive body of the council)
34 is not easy. "According to 
Article 26 §1 no. 26 ULSG the council may exclusively "establish local taxes 
and fees, and their amounts, within the limit determined by law". Article 28 lit. a 
no. 2 ULSG adds that the executive body of the council may exclusively (self-
governing) "establish, in the procedure and within the limits determined by legisla-
tion, fees for household, communal, transportation and other services provided 
by enterprises and organizations which are the communal property of the correspon-
ding territorial community". 
The problems to delineate competencies would be of minor importance if there was a 
functioning system of administrative courts to solve disputes over competencies. 
However currently available sources tells that the system of administrative courts is 
still in the phase of establishment and not reliable.
35 Any dispute carried to court 
will therefore have large transaction costs.  
The additional factor, that general material and financial resources are distributed in 
the same uncoordinated and unreliable way,
36 provides another reason why it is 
difficult to distribute responsibilities for the provision of public services.  
The World Bank
37 sums up, that the ULSG does not efficiently define the response-
bilities of the municipalities as owners of the enterprises and that a law that clearly 
defines the relationship is missing. To provide municipalities with high quality 
services the management of the enterprises is not efficient enough regarding the 
problem-solving competence of economic questions and too dependent on the 
political will of local governments. The relationship between enterprises and local 
authorities is not efficiently organized and the legal framework does not provide a 
sufficient basis. This makes the enterprises highly dependent on political decisions. 
In practice intervention concerning human resources decisions and on tariffs are 
major areas of conflict between municipalities and enterprises.
38  
5.2.2  Size of communities and interjurisdictional cooperation 
Another problem for the efficient provision of public services in Ukraine by 
local communities has to be seen in the size of the communities. From the numbers 
above can be drawn that the average size of a local community in Ukraine is around 
~1,500 inhabitants. This is at the lower end of the range that is found in Europe 
and is similar to the situation in France
39. In the French model historically grown 
communities are preserved – no matter how small they are. There is no fusion of 
                                                            
34   The community itself seems not to have the status of a legal entity. 
35   SIGMA, 2006, p. 37 ff. and BLUE RIBBON (2009), p. 99. 
36   NAVRUZOV (2002). 
37   W ORLD BANK (2006). 
38   To the problem of tariff calculation see section 5.3. 
39   Cf. OECD (2009), p. 88 and CEMR (2007).  
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communities that allows for economies of scale in public administration as in 
Germany in a number of waves over the last decades. The results of this approach 
to local self-government can be summarized as follows:  
"This leads to nonviable communities that in practice cannot administer 
local self-government. … The central state reacts usually by restricting the 
assignment of tasks and duties for local communities to those that can be 
performed by all communities, …".
40 
In Ukraine "small communities (primarily rural municipalities) have limited 
capability with regard to fulfilling a number of functional duties in relation to 
the management and provision of water services. These problems result from the 
lack of capacity and expertise in village councils with regard to legal interpretation, 
contractual arrangements, interactions between utility providers, tariff procedures, 
regulatory impact assessment as well as raising external financing for infrastructure 
development."
41 
The lack of critical size for the efficient provision of public services could be 
compensated by inter-communal/inter-jurisdictional cooperation. However, several 
provisions in Ukrainian legislation effectively frustrate this opportunity. Firstly, 
there is no mechanism for such a cooperation defined in the ULSG.
42 Secondly, 
with respect to water supply, sanitation and waste water treatment local self-govern-
ments are not allowed to transfer their responsibilities as owner of the infrastructure 
to any other entity,
43 as privatisation of water infrastructure in any form is prohibited 
by the Law of Ukraine "On the Privatization of State Property" (No2163-XII of 
4 March 1992). 
5.3 Common  market  condition 
This condition is not so important in the case of the management of water 
services infrastructure because the enterprises are closely connected with the 
municipalities, and services are therefore limited to the respective jurisdictions. 
But the exclusive (self-governing) powers, e.g. bargaining powers, are in some 
cases restricted to the area of the local community, which might have an adverse 
impact on the efficient provision of public services, e.g. Art. 30 a) No. 12 ULSG:  
"to involve, on a contractual basis, non-communal enterprises, institutions and 
organizations of the corresponding territorial community, in providing transportation 
and communication services to the population..."
44 
                                                            
40   MARTINEZ SORIA (2007), p. 1021. 
41   OECD (2009), p. 72. 
42   OECD (2009), p. 78.  
43   OECD (2009), p. 85. 
44   Emphasis added by authors. 
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5.4 Budget  restrictions 
Budgetary aspects contain different aspects: The distribution of the state budget 
to lower level authorities and the right to raise taxes, especially concerning tariff 
setting for water services.  
5.4.1  Local budgets in general 
Theoretically, the power of control regarding the local budget lies with the local 
governments. However, there are several bodies that control the income and the 
application of the funds that are allocated from the state budget. 
The budget allocation is one of the major challenges for managing public service 
provision such as water supply and sanitation. Even though the municipalities 
are vested with a budget by the state problems occur in this respect because the 
accountability of the local government vis-à-vis the citizens is less effective as 
in cases where municipalities' direct income would be higher. "If the degree of 
freedom depends on the length of one’s leash, the leash in this instance refers to 
the financial resources left at the council’s disposal."
45 Currently, local taxes and 
fees do not exceed three percent of local budget revenues.
46 Over ninety percent 
of local budget expenditures are allocated to compulsory, socially protected 
expenditures,
47 e.g. by a constitutional provision that obliges the state and the local 
communities – not to reduce the existing network of state and communal health 
institutions (Art. 49 Para. 3 Constitution of Ukraine 2004). So local governments 
are bound to financially maintain an overseized network of health facilities.
48 As 
socially protected expenditures almost completely depend on transfers from the 
national budget, the executive bodies make decisions de facto, while the role of 
council is merely to establish these decisions de jure. In practice, therefore, local 
council leadership in determining community development strategies is limited 
due to the lack of financial and economic independence.
49 
The Canadian Urban Institute specified several problems that result from the 
current Ukrainian system: "(…) the wide use of transfers prevents the stimulus 
of economic development activity and the increase in budget receipts; the volume 
of transfers can at any time become subject to changes in accordance with the 
decisions of central power bodies."
50  
                                                            
45   NAVRUZOV (2001), p. 124. 
46   W ORLD BANK (2008), p. vi. 
47   NAVRUZOV (2001), p. 124. 
48   W ORLD BANK (2008), p. xiii. 
49   NAVRUZOV (2001), p. 124. 
50   CANADIAN URBAN INSTITUTE (2005), p. 15. 
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5.4.2  Tariff-setting for communal water services 
At the procedure for tariff-setting for communal water services question of 
regulatory autonomy and budgetary restrictions overlap. Tariffs are the most 
important financial basis for the (communal owned) enterprises, but here they 
face major structural difficulties. It is not only a problem between enterprises and 
municipalities but also between municipalities and higher level authorities: The 
formula on which tariffs are calculated is defined by the cabinet of ministers which is 
quite static and far from reality.
51 The factors are set and cannot be altered either by 
local governments or enterprises. Enterprises therefore complain about discrimination 
because they are unable to react to e.g. an increase in energy prices.
52 In addition 
experts mentioned that several other factors such as the amount of water loss that is 
allowed to be calculated far below the actual amount. The whole process makes it 
difficult or even impossible for enterprises to adjust to changing circumstances and 
to consider specific local conditions. However, municipalities are vested with the 
authority to decide on actual tariffs and might allow for lower tariffs as economic 
efficient, but in such a case they are supposed to add the sum from the local budget.  
In cases where tariffs for consumers are lower than economically justified tariffs 
calculated by the enterprises the municipality has to remunerate this difference. 
Even though this is the law the municipalities do not observe it, because they do not 
have the funds. On the other hand regulations exist according to which the state is 
responsible to step in where municipalities are not able to cover the costs for 
providing public services. But this is not the case either. The insufficient legal situation 
(especially the distribution of competencies) results in interventions of national 
actors in cases where they are not satisfied with local government decisions.  
Therefore they face two difficulties in the respect that tariffs not even cover the 
operating cost: The actual basis for tariff calculation is far from reality and does 
not enable enterprises to cover their costs and in addition the municipalities do 
not comply with the legal framework and worsen the overall financial situation 
of the enterprises.  
5.5 Institutionalized  authority 
Before independence the responsibilities for water provision and other services 
such as energy lie with the central government and were exercised by a command 
and control regime.
53 Efficiency was not reached due to this kind of governance, 
low energy prices and "huge state capital grants"
54. Having this in mind it is easy 
to understand that municipalities where given the responsibility for the enterprises 
                                                            
51   Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, Ordinance of 12 July 2006, No. 959 on the Determination of  
 the regime of tariff-setting in the area of water supply and sewerage service.  
52   Cf. OECD (2009), p. 75. 
53   WORLD BANK (2006). 
54   W ORLD BANK (2006), p. 35. 
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could not keep that standard without having the political power and financial means 
and with increasing energy prices.
55  
Institutional instability caused by insufficient legal structures as well as the 
dominant role of informal institutions is probably the most important factors that 
hinder the rehabilitation of the sector. In addition the centralized character of Ukraine 
is a reason for instability especially at the local level: In federal states such as 
Germany competences of lower level authorities are defined by the constitution 
whereas in Ukraine the constitution only vaguely defines local government compe-
tencies and leaves the concrete definition to respective laws. But these laws are 
often also vaguely defined and in addition they are subject to change. Especially in 
an environment of frequently changing national governments this becomes problema-
tic. Furthermore overlapping responsibilities or non-existent regulations result in 
intervention of national government actors in municipal issues.  
One of the main reasons why it is extremely difficult to develop a solid basis for 
local self-government is the power application of central political bodies that 
interfere in local and regional issues.
56 Several attempts have been carried out to 
avoid and overcome overlapping responsibilities as well as concurrent legislation. 
In many other cases laws and regulations are not explicitly defined and therefore 
not efficiently applicable. The weak legal basis is probably the most important 
obstacle for enterprises and administrative actors, because actors are unable to find 
reliable scope of action in formal institutions they fall back in old habits using 
informal structures to provide stability for their actions.
57 
VAN ZON also criticizes the missing societal grounding of decisions: "No polity 
has been created that is a reflection of society and that could adapt political structures 
to changing social needs, creating preconditions for evolutionary institutional change. 
The continuing deep divide between the state and society can be considered as one 
of the major causes of failed modernization attempts".
58 He sees similarities between 
Ukraine and third world countries, but acknowledges that Ukraine faces the problem 
that in comparison to them in Ukraine the state has more regulating power than 
developing countries.
59 
7 SUMMARY AND OUTLOOK 
The current state of local self-governance in Ukraine does neither comply with the 
requirements of the European Charter of Local Self-Government (ECLSG) – as the 
administrative and financial power remains with the (local) state administrations –
60 
                                                            
55   W ORLD BANK (2006), p. 35. 
56   CANADIAN URBAN INSTITUTE (2005). 
57   MERKEL/CROISSANT (2000), p. 17. 
58   VAN ZON (2002), p. 404. 
59   VAN ZON (2002). 
60   See as well BLUE RIBBON COMMISSION, 2009. 
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nor with the theoretically derived condition for effective federalism. Having this 
result in mind the poor performance of the wastewater sector in Ukraine is not 
surprising and it is not realistic to expect that the necessary rehabilitation program 
will be carried out without previous institutional changes. However, just adapting 
to the requirements by the ECLSG alone would probably not solve all problems, 
as local communities in Ukraine are often simply too small to able to perform 
the task of modernising the wastewater sector. One option would be to change 
the territorial administrative division of Ukraine by consolidating small local commu-
nities into larger entities and moving away from the French model of self-government. 
Another option, expanding the options for inter-communal cooperation would still 
need a minimum of administrative capacities unless the law provide well defined, 
easy to handle models for it. Finally a re-centralisation at the next administrative 
level of raion would be an option from the economic point, but this level at the 
moment is part of the state administration and requirements of local self-govern-
ment are not at all fulfilled by them.  
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THEORETISCHER ERKENNTNISGEHALT UND PRAKTISCHE 
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AND PRACTICAL RELEVANCE FOR REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT –  
THE EXAMPLES OF WATER INFRASTRUCTURES AND CULTURAL 
LANDSCAPES 
ABSTRACT 
This paper argues the importance of concepts of public goods and public interest 
for regional development from an institutionalist perspective. It analyses the 
strengths and limitations of each of the concepts by comparing their disciplinary 
roots, purpose, thematic foci, spatial scope and recent trends in the literature. 
The paper then applies this understanding of both concepts to the public good 
problems and public interests commonly associated with water infrastructures 
on the one hand and cultural landscapes on the other – selected as public goods 
of particular importance to regional development. An empirical study of 
institutional arrangements and governance mechanisms in Berlin-Brandenburg 
then illustrates how characteristic public goods problems can be addressed. For 
instance, the paper exemplifies the important distinction between a resource 
(water) and its resource system (infrastructure). In the highly institutionalized 
field of water management a dilemma emerges between using water efficiently 
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by using less of it and using the water infrastructure efficiently, which requires 
using it to near-maximum capacity. In conditions of sharply declining water use – 
as experienced by so-called shrinking regions – the response is often to encourage 
water consumption. As regards cultural landscapes, the challenge is, rather, about 
how to encourage cross-sectoral thinking and acting between the various policy 
fields which generate cultural landscapes in the absence of formalized institutional 
arrangements. The paper concludes by summarizing the lessons learned from 
applying the concepts of public goods and public interest to water infrastructures 
and cultural landscapes.  
1 DEBATTEN UM GEMEINSCHAFTSGÜTER UND 
GEMEINWOHLZIELSTELLUNGEN IM KONTEXT  
INSTITUTIONELLEN WANDELS  
Das Gemeinwohl wird oft dann thematisiert, wenn öffentliche Güter und Dienst-
leistungen durch politische Weichenstellungen und neue Herausforderungen als 
bedroht empfunden werden. Aktuelle Beispiele sind die auf einen Institutionen-
wandel gerichteten Debatten über die Privatisierung von infrastrukturellen Leistungen 
wie der Trinkwasserversorgung oder über institutionelle Anpassungserfordernisse 
an gesellschaftliche Herausforderungen wie den Klimawandel oder den Wandel 
der Kulturlandschaft, die nach gemeinschaftlichem Handeln verlangen.  
Im Zentrum der Diskussion steht dabei nicht nur die oft kontrovers diskutierte 
Frage, "was" zum Gemeinwohl gehört, sondern auch, "wie" es angesichts der 
spezifischen Eigenschaften der zum Gemeinwohl beitragenden Gemeinschaftsgüter 
und den daraus resultierenden institutionellen Anforderungen gesichert werden soll. 
Deshalb sind Gemeinwohldebatten immer zugleich Diskurse über Institutionen
2 
und Governance, die einerseits die Inhalte des Gemeinwohls, andererseits aber 
auch das Verhältnis zwischen privaten und öffentlichen Gütern neu bestimmen. 
Damit verbunden ist ein Wandel in der Rolle des Staates (vgl. SCHUPPERT, 2004), 
der traditionell als Sachwalter des Gemeinwohls dargestellt und verstanden wird. 
Gleichzeitig wachsen die Ansprüche zivilgesellschaftlicher Organisationen an die 
Sicherung des Gemeinwohls vor dem Hintergrund der Interessen mächtiger global 
organisierter wirtschaftlicher Akteure.  
Obwohl die Begriffe Gemeinwohl und Gemeinschaftsgüter auf den ersten Blick 
viel gemeinsam haben, sind sie als theoretische Konzepte in der Literatur bisher 
kaum in Beziehung gesetzt worden (vgl. MOSS et al., 2009). "Gemeinwohl" und 
                                                            
2  Institutionen sind – nach dem erweiterten sozialwissenschaftlichen Verständnis – allgemein 
anerkannte und somit auch relativ stabile Regelsysteme, welche die Basis von verlässlichen 
Verhaltensmustern einzelner oder korporativer Akteure bilden. Sie umfassen gesellschaftliche 
Normen, rechtliche Regelungen und Verteilungssysteme (für Macht und/oder Ressourcen), 
etablierte Verfahren sowie Handlungs- und Beziehungsmuster. Siehe GÖHLER, "Wie verändern 




"Gemeinschaftsgüter" sind auch zentrale Kategorien der Raumentwicklungspolitik, 
allerdings oft nur implizit. Die Abwägung privater und öffentlicher Belange im 
Dienst des Wohls der Allgemeinheit gehört zur Kernaufgabe der Raumplanung. 
So zeugt etwa das Leitbild des regionalen Ausgleichs in der Europäischen Union 
wie auch in der deutschen Raumordnung von einem Gemeinwohlverständnis, dass 
sich am Wohlfahrtsgedanken orientiert. Das Konzept der Gemeinschaftsgüter bildet 
hingegen den Grundpfeiler der traditionellen Infrastrukturtheorie aus den 1960er 
Jahren. Die Sicherung von Gemeinwohlzielen und die Bereitstellung von Gemein-
schaftsgütern galten so lange als selbstverständliches Fundament und Anspruch 
raumplanerischer Praxis und Theorie, dass sie in den vergangenen Jahrzehnten 
selten explizit thematisiert wurden. Seit den 1990er Jahren haben sich allerdings die 
Rahmenbedingungen wesentlich verändert. Bisherige Formen der Bereitstellung 
von Gemeinschaftsgütern und der Bestimmung von Gemeinwohlzielen müssen an 
den Verlust traditioneller staatlicher Steuerungsmöglichkeiten, den demographischen 
Wandel, die raumstrukturellen Auswirkungen von Globalisierung und Liberalisierung 
sowie die Entstehung neuer Akteurskonstellationen und Kräfteverhältnisse und 
die damit verbundene Ausdifferenzierung der öffentlichen und privaten Interessen 
angepasst werden. 
Für das in den vergangenen Jahren gewachsene raumwissenschaftliche Interesse an 
der Erforschung von Gemeinschaftsgütern und Gemeinwohlvorstellungen können 
folgende Ursachen gesehen werden:  
Erstens wächst in Politik und Forschung die Kritik an der Dominanz regional-
ökonomischer und wirtschaftspolitischer Ansätze mit einer einseitigen Orientierung 
an der Stärkung der ökonomischen Wettbewerbsfähigkeit von Regionen. Verlangt 
wird eine stärkere Berücksichtigung von Gütern und Dienstleistungen, die von allge-
meinem öffentlichen Interesse und damit für die Regionalentwicklung von hoher 
strategischer Bedeutung sind (vgl. HARVEY, 2000). Diese international geführte 
Debatte spiegelt sich in Deutschland etwa in den gegenwärtigen Diskussionen um 
den Stellenwert der drei Leitbilder der Raumordnung (BMVBS, 2006) wider. Dabei 
stellt sich die Frage, inwieweit die beiden Leitbilder mit klarem Gemeinschaftsgut-
bezug ("Daseinsvorsorge sichern" und "Ressourcen bewahren, Kulturlandschaften 
gestalten ") faktisch – wenn nicht auch politisch – im Schatten des ersten, wachstums-
orientierten Leitbilds ("Wachstum und Innovation") stehen. 
Zweitens wird heute im Zuge der Debatten über die veränderte Rolle des Staates 
sowie den Wandel von Lebensbedürfnissen die Bedeutung räumlich relevanter 
Gemeinschaftsgüter für regional- und stadtentwicklungspolitische Ziele wieder-
entdeckt. Liberalisierungs- und Privatisierungstendenzen, neue Versorgungsengpässe 
(und -überkapazitäten), höhere Umweltstandards und neue Ansprüche an die 
Qualität der Kulturlandschaft als Lebensraum und Standortfaktor betreffen in erster 
Linie Gemeinschaftsgüter und werfen Fragen über die Neuausrichtung öffentlicher 
Ziele sowie veränderter Formen der Bereitstellung auf. Allerdings werden ent-
sprechende Diskussionen oft unter dem Druck tagespolitischer Themen oder 
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finanzieller Handlungszwänge auf Kosten einer systematischen und fundierten 
Auseinandersetzung geführt.  
Drittens verändert sich parallel zum institutionellen Wandel in der Bereitstellung 
vieler Gemeinschaftsgüter auch der Raumbezug ihrer Steuerung. Unter den heutigen 
Bedingungen der Europäisierung des rechtlichen Rahmens, der Internationalisierung 
wirtschaftsräumlicher Verflechtungen und – nicht zuletzt – des demographischen 
und raumstrukturellen Wandels ändern sich die Versorgungs-, Nutzungs- und 
Steuerungsräume vieler Gemeinschaftsgüter. So lässt sich im Falle der Infrastruktur-
systeme ein Bedeutungsgewinn der europäischen Ebene beobachten, zum Beispiel 
durch Richtlinien zur Institutionalisierung des Flussgebietsmanagements. Starke 
Veränderungen im Verbrauch (infolge des Strukturwandels) verschärfen räumliche 
Differenzierungen zwischen cold-spots und hot-spots der Ressourcennutzung noch 
(vgl. LIBBE/MOSS, 2007 und MOSS, 2008a). Diesen Herausforderungen der 
Europäisierung müssen sich auch regionale Akteure bei der Inwertsetzung von 
Kulturlandschaften stellen.  
Viertens werfen neuere Vorstöße zur Europäisierung des Gemeinwohls – wie im 
Weißbuch zu Dienstleistungen von allgemeinem Interesse (EUROPÄISCHE 
KOMMISSION, 2004) – die Frage nach der räumlichen Bestimmungsebene von 
Gemeinwohlbelangen auf. Das Bestreben der EU, hier einheitliche Standards durch-
zusetzen, steht im Widerspruch zu regionalspezifischen, oft historisch geprägten 
Vorstellungen von Gemeinwohl, etwa in der Gestaltung der Daseinsvorsorge (vgl. 
AMBROSIUS/SCHMITT-EGNER, 2006) und in der Entwicklung von Kulturlandschaften.
 
Die Vielfalt europäischer Werte- und Regelsysteme im Umgang mit Gemeinschafts-
gütern nicht (nur) als Hindernis im Prozess der Harmonisierung zu verstehen 
sondern als Potential zu nutzen, ist eine besondere Herausforderung für die Politik. 
Die Operationalisierung neuer institutioneller EU-Regelungen in den Mitgliedsstaaten 
ist nicht nur von der inneren Kohärenz des Regelwerks, sondern vor allem von der 
Anpassungsfähigkeit bestehender Institutionen auf lokaler, regionaler und nationaler 
Ebenen abhängig.  
Fünftens gewinnen insbesondere auf regionaler Ebene – teilweise quer zu den 
politisch-administrativen Räumen von Gebietskörperschaften – vielfältige 
Funktions- und Handlungsräume sowie deren soziale Konstruktion an Bedeutung. 
Die raumkonstituierende Wirkung von Kulturlandschaften wird beispielsweise 
sichtbar, wenn Akteure an ihre identitätsstiftenden und imagebildenden Potentiale 
anknüpfen, sich vernetzen und gemeinsame Projekte entwickeln (vgl. GAILING/ 
RÖHRING, 2008b). Diese Prozesse werden teilweise auch von Förderansätzen der 
Europäischen Union, zum Beispiel zur integrierten Entwicklung ländlicher Räume, 
getragen. 
Um den Erkenntnisgehalt und die Grenzen von Gemeinwohl- und Gemeinschafts-
gutkonzepten aus raumwissenschaftlicher Perspektive zu untersuchen, werden im 




Daran anknüpfend werden Gemeinwohlvorstellungen und Gemeinschaftsgut-
probleme im Umgang mit Wasserinfrastruktursystemen und Kulturlandschaften 
als raumgebundene Gemeinschaftsgüter herausgearbeitet und empirisch am Beispiel 
von Steuerungsansätzen in Berlin-Brandenburg untersetzt (3). Abschließend werden 
zusammenfassende Erkenntnissen über die Anwendung von Gemeinschaftsgüter- 
und Gemeinwohlkonzepten auf Wasserinfrastrukturen und Kulturlandschaften 
abgeleitet (4).  
2 GEMEINSCHAFTSGÜTER UND GEMEINWOHL – ERKENNTNISGEHALT 
UND GRENZEN DER THEORETISCHEN ANSÄTZE 
Gemeinschaftsgüter und Gemeinwohl haben unterschiedliche theoretische Wurzeln. 
Daraus ergeben sich unterschiedliche Perspektiven auf Problemstellungen des 
institutionellen Wandels. Während die Gemeinschaftsgutforschung stark von der 
ökonomischen Gütertheorie geprägt und auf Probleme der Allokationsmechanismen 
für kollektiv genutzte Güter ausgerichtet ist, die über Marktmechanismen allein 
nur schwer bereitzustellen sind, ist die Gemeinwohlforschung in den Rechts-, 
Politik- und Geschichtswissenschaften verankert und orientiert sich damit eher 
an Inhalten und Prozessen der Bestimmung und Sicherung von Interessen einer 
Gemeinschaft (vgl. MOSS et al., 2009). Erkenntnisgehalt und Grenzen beider Ansätze 
sollen im Folgenden vorgestellt werden.  
2.1 Gemeinschaftsgüter 
Die volkswirtschaftliche Literatur differenziert zwischen verschiedenen Typen 
öffentlicher (und privater) Güter, klassischerweise anhand der Kriterien Rivalität 
in der Nutzung und Ausschließbarkeit. Demzufolge bestehen bei privaten Gütern – 
wie zum Beispiel privaten Wohnhäusern – zwar Rivalität in der Nutzung, aber die 
Möglichkeit, andere Nutzer davon auszuschließen. Trifft mindestens eines dieser 
Kriterien nicht zu, so handelt es sich um Gemeinschaftsgüter, die analytisch in 
reine öffentliche Güter, common pool resources beziehungsweise Allmendegüter 
sowie Club- beziehungsweise Zollgüter unterteilt werden. Diese Kategorisierung 
sagt allerdings nichts über die Eigentumsverhältnisse der verschiedenen Formen von 
Gemeinschaftsgütern aus. Allmendegüter ohne Eigentümer werden als "open access-
Güter" bezeichnet (vgl. OSTROM, 1990). Beispiele für reine öffentliche Güter – bei 
denen Nichtrivalität und Nichtausschließbarkeit zusammentreffen, sind Umweltgüter 
wie das Klima oder saubere Luft. Das trifft jedoch nur dann zu, wenn keine Rivalität 
in der Nutzung durch Ressourcenknappheit vorliegt. Die Kombination von Nutzungs-
rivalität und freiem Zugang kann ohne Vorherrschen von effektiven Regeln zur 
Übernutzung der Ressource aufgrund der sogenannten Trittbrettfahrerproblematik 
führen (vgl. HARDIN, 1968).  
Hinzu kommt das Problem, dass Gemeinschaftsgüter oft als nichtintendierte Effekte, 
quasi als "by-product" verschiedener ökonomischer Aktivitäten entstehen. Diese 
Effekte können negative (zum Beispiel Wasserverschmutzung) – wie auch positive 
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Wirkungen (etwa kulturlandschaftliche Qualitäten) entfalten. Solche Prozesse der 
Generierung von Gemeinschaftsgütern sind schwer zu steuern oder in eine marktwirt-
schaftliche Kostenkalkulation zu internalisieren. Nach der klassischen ökonomischen 
Lehre führt insbesondere der Umstand, dass niemand von der Nutzung von Gemein-
schaftsgütern ohne weiteres ausgeschlossen werden kann, zu Problemen der 
Bereitstellung von Gemeinschaftsgütern über den Markt (SAMUELSON, 1954). Aus 
diesen Sachverhalten leitet die klassische ökonomische Lehre das Gebot staatlicher 
Intervention zur Korrektur von Marktversagen ab. Diese Interventionen erfolgen in 
Form gesetzlicher Regelungen, finanzieller Anreize beziehungsweise Subventionen 
und durch die direkte Bereitstellung der Gemeinschaftsgüter durch die öffentliche 
Hand. Als weitere Kategoriesind sogenannte Clubgüter zu nennen. So werden Güter 
bezeichnet, zu denen nur bestimmte Akteure Zugang haben und andere, etwa 
über finanzielle oder technische Hürden, von einer Nutzung ausgeschlossen 
werden (BUCHANAN, 1965). Für die Nutzer dieser Clubgüter – wie beispielsweise 
stadttechnische Infrastruktursysteme oder Golfplätze – herrscht keine Rivalität, 
solange Kapazitätsgrenzen nicht überschritten werden. 
Die Kritik an den klassischen Theorieansätzen zu Gemeinschaftsgütern richtet sich 
auf eine Reihe unterschiedlicher Schwächen: 
Erstens lassen sich viele Güter oder Leistungen in der Praxis nicht eindeutig der 
einen oder anderen Kategorie zuordnen. In der Realität liegen zumeist Mischformen 
vor. Beispielsweise weist Wasser als Niederschlag, in Grundwasserleitern und in 
Versorgungsleitungen jeweils unterschiedliche Ausmaße von Rivalität und Aus-
schließbarkeit auf. Gemeinschaftsguteigenschaften hängen damit nicht zwangsläufig 
mit einer bestimmten Ressource zusammen, sondern müssen nach deren Erschei-
nungsform differenziert werden.  
Zweitens sagen die Eigenschaften von Rivalität und Ausschließbarkeit nichts über 
die mit der Multifunktionalität dieser Güter verbundenen privat nutzbaren bzw. 
gemeinschaftlichen Funktionen aus, das heißt über deren eigentliche gesellschaft-
liche Bedeutung. Landwirtschaftliche Flächen, obwohl meist als private Güter zu 
klassifizieren, erfüllen oft vielfältige gemeinwohlorientierte Funktionen, zum Beispiel 
für das Landschaftsbild, den Landschaftswasserhaushalt oder den Naturschutz. 
Drittens liegen Gemeinschaftsgutprobleme oft weniger im gemeinsamen Nutzen 
als im ungeregelten Nutzen (vgl. BROMLEY, 1992). Dies gilt nicht nur für Güter 
ohne klare Besitzverhältnisse, wie den Meeresboden oder die Luft sondern aufgrund 
der Wirkung von externen Effekten auch für einzelne Funktionen von auf den 
ersten Blick "geregelten" Ressourcen und Gütern wie Boden, Landschaft und 
Infrastruktur.  
Viertens wird die klassische Gütertheorie vor allem in der Institutionenökonomik 
und Politikwissenschaft für die Annahme kritisiert, dass mit den Eigenschaften 
eines Gemeinschaftsguts zwangsweise bestimmte institutionelle Regelungsformen 




der Motive menschlichen Handelns auf das Prinzip der Nutzenmaximierung durch 
rationales Handeln. Dies übersehe die Vielzahl von handlungsrelevanten Kontext-
bedingungen und individuellen Handlungsmotiven sowie die Existenz vielfältiger 
institutioneller Lösungen für Allmendeprobleme in der Praxis, die über die 
klassischen Lösungsvarianten von Hierarchie (staatliche Interventionen) und 
Markt (Privateigentum) weit hinausgehen (vgl. OSTROM, 2005).  
Fünftens wird von Politik-, Rechts- und auch Wirtschaftswissenschaftlern darauf 
hingewiesen, dass Gemeinschaftsgüter nicht nur über ihre physischen Eigenschaften 
definiert, sondern vielmehr politisch durch institutionelle Regelungen bestimmt 
werden und Wandlungen unterliegen. Eine wesentliche Grundlage für die Realisier-
barkeit institutioneller Regelungen ist der technische Fortschritt, der eine Zugangs-
regulierung oder eine leistungsabhängige Kostenbeteiligung bei der Nutzung von 
Gemeinschaftsgütern überhaupt erst ermöglichen kann. Aus diesem Grund plädieren 
Historiker für eine Unterscheidung zwischen theoretischen und historischen 
Kategorien von Gemeinschaftsgütern. Was ein Gemeinschaftsgut ausmacht, hängt 
von dem besonderen zeiträumlichen Kontext seiner Bereitstellung und Nutzung 
ab. Die unterschiedlichen institutionellen Arrangements für die Wasserversorgung 
in Deutschland, Frankreich und Großbritannien mögen hierfür als Beispiel dienen.  
Daraus folgt, dass die Bestimmung, Bereitstellung und Sicherung von Gemein-
schaftsgütern nicht wertneutral, sondern hochgradig politisch ist. Walzer geht in 
seiner Theorie der Güter davon aus, dass alle Güter soziale Güter sind und eine 
gemeinschaftliche Bedeutung haben, weil "ihre Konzeption und Erzeugung soziale 
Prozesse sind" (WALZER, 1992: 32). Die "Distributionskriterien und -arrangements 
stecken nicht im Gut selbst beziehungsweise im Gut an sich, sondern im sozialen, 
das heißt im gesellschaftlichen Gut" (ebd.: 34). Dabei tragen soziale Bedeutungen 
von Gütern (nach WALZER) "historischen Charakter, und so wandeln sich die 
Verteilungspraktiken, die gerechten wie die ungerechten, im Lauf der Zeit" (ebd.: 35). 
Was privat oder öffentlich ist oder sein soll, ist somit immer Ergebnis eines 
Prozesses sozialer Meinungsbildung und politischer Entscheidungsfindung. Das 
Konzept der Gemeinschaftsgüter wird damit " aus der ökonomischen, quasi-
objektiven Definition herausgelöst und in einem politischen Diskurs geführt" 
(ALTVATER, 2003: 178). KAUL et al. (1999) verweisen auf drei Dimensionen für die 
Bestimmung dessen, was "öffentlich" an global public goods ist: die Öffentlichkeit 
des Konsums, der Verteilung und der Entscheidung über Güter. In Anspielung 
auf die Doppelbedeutung von "Gut" und den Begründungszusammenhang mit 
öffentlichen Interessen wird die Normativität von Gemeinschaftsgütern in den 
Vordergrund gestellt. Die Begriffe goods und bads werden als Kategorien aufgeführt, 
nicht um eine normative Bewertung vorzunehmen, sondern um auf die Normativität 
der Güterbestimmung und -regulierung aufmerksam zu machen (ALTVATER, 2003: 
178). Aus diesen sozialwissenschaftlichen Erweiterungen ergibt sich eine Annähe-
rung des Gemeinschaftsgutansatzes an das theoretische Konzept des Gemeinwohls. 
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2.2 Gemeinwohl   
Im Gegensatz zu dem wissenschaftlich relativ klar umrissenen Begriff des Gemein-
schaftsgutes stellt das Gemeinwohl ein normatives Konstrukt dar, denn das Wohl 
der Allgemeinheit gilt idealerweise als zentrales Leitbild politischen Handelns. 
Das Begriffsverständnis reicht allerdings von einer abstrakten Leerformel bis hin zu 
einer juristischen Kategorie (zum Beispiel im Grundgesetz oder Enteignungsrecht). 
Als kleinster gemeinsamer Nenner lässt sich das Gemeinwohl als Interesse aller 
beziehungsweise der Allgemeinheit definieren. Es steht damit im Gegensatz zum 
Interesse Einzelner oder zu Gruppeninteressen. Bereits mit dieser einfachen Defini-
tion werden Probleme der tautologischen Verwendung (Gemeinwohl als das 
Wohl der Allgemeinheit) sowie der verwandten Begrifflichkeiten (zum Beispiel 
"öffentliches Interesse") sichtbar. Oft wird das Gemeinwohl auch durch Gegen-
begriffe (Eigennutz, Egoismus, Profitinteresse et cetera) definiert. Nicht selten 
wird es ferner unausgesprochen und implizit mitgedacht, zum Beispiel bei der 
Verwendung der Begriffe Gerechtigkeit, Solidarität, Sozialverträglichkeit oder 
Nachhaltigkeit. Welche Personen und sozialen Gruppen zur Allgemeinheit zu 
rechnen sind, wird ebenfalls unterschiedlich bestimmt. Dies gilt auch für den 
Raum, auf den sich der Begriff bezieht: Das Gemeinwesen kann so unterschiedlich 
strukturierte Einheiten wie die einzelne Gemeinde, eine Region, eine Nation oder 
auch eine Staatengemeinschaft, etwa die Europäische Union, umfassen (vgl. 
ANDERHEIDEN, 2006). Durch die Bindung von Gemeinwohlvorstellungen an 
bestimmte politische Systeme haben Verwaltungsgrenzen eine erhebliche Bedeutung 
für die Raumbezüge des Gemeinwohlkonzepts. So stellen gerade Prozesse der 
Europäisierung und Globalisierung national ausgerichtete Gemeinwohlverständnisse 
immer mehr in Frage.  
Gegenwärtig erleben wir in Europa eine Wiederbelebung der Diskussion um das 
Gemeinwohl. Die auslösenden Faktoren sind vor allem die Megatrends ökono-
mischer Globalisierung und politischer Europäisierung sowie die damit einher-
gehenden Liberalisierungen, Kommerzialisierungen und Privatisierungen öffentlicher 
Dienstleistungen (vgl. AMBROSIUS/SCHMITT-EGNER, 2006). Während Nationalstaaten 
ihr Monopol bei der Bestimmung des Gemeinwohls verlieren und liberale Wirt-
schafts- und Finanzpolitiken die Spielräume staatlichen Handelns reduzieren 
beziehungsweise verändern, markiert die heutige Gemeinwohldebatte den Versuch, 
im Sog einer "Ökonomisierung" der Politik übergeordnete gesellschaftliche Ziele 
zu thematisieren, neu zu definieren und zeitgemäße Formen ihrer Umsetzung zu 
finden. In diesem Zusammenhang erlebt auch die Gemeinwohlforschung seit dem 
Ende der 1990er Jahre eine Renaissance (vgl. AMBROSIUS/SCHMITT-EGNER, 2006; 
MÜNKLER/FISCHER, 2002; ANHEIER/THEN, 2004; ANDERHEIDEN, 2006).  
Die Bedeutung offener Gemeinwohldefinitionen wird vor allem von neueren 
rechtswissenschaftlichen Forschungen betont. Nach Ansicht von ENGEL (2001) sind 
Gemeinwohldefinitionen Ausdruck einer modernen Demokratie und notwendig, da 




betont), sondern auch von Ideen (wie die Diskursanalyse betont). In diesem Sinne 
kommt dem fortlaufenden Aushandeln des Gemeinwohls für das Individuum 
(Kognition, Selbstwertgefühl), für die soziale Koordination (bessere Steuerung durch 
Lerneffekte), für den Staat (Kontrolle der Politiker, politische Heuristik und 
zusätzliche Legitimation) und für das Recht (bessere Steuerung durch Recht, 
Anreizwirkung des Rechts) eine hohe Bedeutung zu (ebd.). An die Stelle des 
substantialistischen Gemeinwohlbegriffs trete ein prozeduraler, dessen Substanz erst 
in einem Prozess der beteiligten Akteure ausgehandelt wird. Das dabei auftretende 
Gemeinwohldilemma bestehe darin, dass solch ein offener politischer Prozess eine 
verbindliche Festlegung des Gemeinwohls eigentlich ausschließe (SCHUPPERT, 2002). 
Inhaltlich genauer zu bestimmende Gemeinwohlbelange müssen somit im demokra-
tischen Meinungsbildungsprozess ausgehandelt werden und gelten entsprechend nur 
für bestimmte Raum- oder Zeitkontexte. Mit der Prozeduralisierung der Gemein-
wohlbestimmung ist jedoch auch das Problem der Legitimation staatlicher Autorität 
verbunden: Auch der Staat muss nun, statt Gemeinwohlziele zu bestimmen, einen 
Aushandlungsprozess koordinieren.  
Dieses prozedurale Verständnis von Gemeinwohl hat sich in der Wissenschaft 
immer mehr durchgesetzt, bleibt jedoch vor allem hinsichtlich seiner Operationali-
sierung umstritten. Wenn allgemein akzeptiert wird, dass Gemeinwohlbelange 
für spezifische Gemeinschaften und in bestimmten raumzeitlichen Kontexten als 
Produkt eines gesellschaftlichen Aushandlungsprozesses zu bestimmen sind, dann 
stellt sich die Frage, wie dieser Prozess gestaltet werden kann. Wie kann Gemein-
wohl in öffentliche Debatten zielführend eingebracht werden und welche Machtver-
hältnisse bestimmen diesen Diskurs? Wer übernimmt die Verantwortung für den 
Aushandlungsprozess? Welche Kommunikationsformen eignen sich dafür? Welche 
Maßstäbe zur Beurteilung von Gemeinwohl werden angesetzt? Für einzelne 
Politik- und Aufgabenfelder gibt es erste Ansätze für eine operative Anwendung 
eines prozeduralen Gemeinwohlverständnisses (SACHßE,
 2004). Die Aufgabe, das 
"prozedurale Gemeinwohl" legitim, praxisnah und handlungsanleitend herzuleiten, 
erweist sich jedoch als außerordentlich schwierig.  
2.3  Gegenüberstellung von Gemeinschaftsgütern und Gemeinwohl  
Zwar wird im Zusammenhang mit Gemeinschaftsgütern häufig mit dem Gemeinwohl 
argumentiert, allerdings bestehen grundsätzliche Unterschiede zwischen den 
Erkenntnisinteressen und den Herangehensweisen der Gemeinwohl- und Gemein-
schaftsgüterforschung, die mit unterschiedlichen theoretischen Zugängen verbunden 
und bisher nicht systematisch verknüpft worden sind.  
Der Gemeinschaftsgutansatz ist schwerpunktmäßig auf die Analyse von Problemen 
der Bereitstellung öffentlicher Güter zur Ableitung von institutionellen Lösungs-
ansätzen ausgerichtet. Sein zentrales Merkmal – die Güterkategorisierung nach den 
Kriterien von Rivalität und Ausschließbarkeit – dient der Analyse grundlegender 
Probleme beim Umgang mit kollektiven Gütern. Gemeinschaftsgüter werden nicht 
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anhand von Gemeinwohlvorstellungen, sondern von Allokationsproblemen definiert 
und betrachtet: Es handelt sich also um Bereitstellungs- und Verteilungsfragen sowie 
um Regeln kollektiven Handelns, welche die Verfügbarkeit knapper Ressourcen 
sicherstellen sollen. Ein öffentliches Interesse wird dabei als selbstverständlich 
vorausgesetzt, allerdings werden die soziale oder politische Konstruktion des 
"Öffentlichen" nur unzureichend berücksichtigt.  
Bei den Debatten über das Gemeinwohl hingegen liegt der Schwerpunkt auf der 
Bestimmung seiner Inhalte und deren Operationalisierbarkeit. Die Gemeinwohl-
forschung orientiert sich somit an der Bestimmung gesellschaftlicher Ziele. Hierbei 
werden wiederum die spezifischen Eigenschaften der zum Gemeinwohl beitragenden 
Güter oder Dienstleistungen vernachlässigt. Die geeigneten institutionellen Arrange-
ments, um das Gemeinwohl zu maximieren, stehen ebenfalls nicht im Vordergrund.  
Eine Verknüpfung der weitgehend parallel verlaufenden Debatten um Gemein-
schaftsgüter und Gemeinwohl bietet jedoch mehrere Vorteile: Der von den gesell-
schaftlichen Bedürfnissen und Zielen ausgehende Gemeinwohlansatz ermöglicht, 
Güter in ihrem Zusammenhang und ihren Wechselwirkungen zu betrachten. Debatten 
über das Gemeinwohl können daher eine Orientierung für den heute stärker 
politisch verstandenen Begriff der Gemeinschaftsgüter bieten, indem die hinter 
den Gemeinschaftsgütern stehenden öffentlichen beziehungsweise kollektiven 
Interessen und deren Aushandlung im Mittelpunkt stehen. Im Gegensatz dazu 
kann die Bezugnahme auf Gemeinschaftsguteigenschaften dazu beitragen, der 
Gefahr einer "rhetorischen Leere" bei der Bestimmung des Gemeinwohlbegriffs zu 
begegnen. In dem Maße, wie Gemeinschaftsgüter auch als soziales Konstrukt 
gelten steht die Frage nach der Berücksichtigung von Gemeinwohldimensionen bei 
institutionellen Arrangements zur Regelung der Zugänglichkeit von Gemeinschafts-
gütern. Debatten über das Gemeinwohl könnten also davon profitieren, mit Hilfe 
des Gemeinschaftsgutbegriffs den Bezug zu konkreteren Inhalten und Kontexten 





Abbildung 1:  Gemeinschaftsgut- und Gemeinwohlansatz im Vergleich 
  Gemeinschaftsgutansatz Gemeinwohlansatz 
Erkenntnisinteresse  Problembeschreibung zur 
Optimierung der Bereitstellung 
öffentlicher Güter und zur 
Ableitung geeigneter 
institutioneller Arrangements 
Zielorientierung auf Interessen 








Allmendeforschung und neue 
politikwissenschaftliche Ansätze 
erweitert 






Private Güter, (reine) öffentliche 
Güter, Allmende (common pool 
resources), Club-/Zollgüter 
Allgemeine(s) Wohl bzw. 
Interessen, öffentliche(s) Wohl 
bzw. Interessen 
Gegenstände  Materielle (zum Beispiel 
Wasser) und nichtmaterielle 





Erklärungsgehalt  Analyse der Eigenschaften eines 




prozedurale Analysen von 





Sensibilisierung für die 
Komplexität und Normativität 
der Güterbestimmung; Interesse 
an "global public goods" und 
"common heritage" im Zuge des 
globalen Wandels 






Gemeinwohls; Forschungen zu 
Gemeinwohl in der EU 
Raumbezug  Raumbezüge eher implizit: nach 
räumlicher Reichweite der Güter 
und institutionellen Regelungen 
gerichtet 
Eher vage und situative 
räumliche Verortung des 
"Gemeinwesens": von der 
Gemeinde bis zum Weltall 
Raumpolitische  
Relevanz 
Förderung positiver und 
Minimierung negativer externer 
Effekte als zentrale Ziele von 
Raumentwicklung und -politik 
Rekurs aufs Gemeinwohl als 
zentrale Kategorie der 
Raumplanung und regionalen 
Förderpolitik 
Quelle: Eigene  Darstellung. 
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3 WASSERINFRASTRUKTUREN UND KULTURLANDSCHAFTEN ALS 
RAUMGEBUNDENE GEMEINSCHAFTSGÜTER – GEMEINSCHAFTS-
GUTPROBLEME UND GEMEINWOHLZIELSTELLUNGEN  
In diesem Abschnitt sollen die Zusammenhänge zwischen Gemeinschaftsgut-
problemen und Gemeinwohlzielstellungen am Beispiel von Wasserinfrastrukturen 
und Kulturlandschaften unter Heranziehung von empirischen Forschungsergebnissen 
aus der Region Berlin-Brandenburg thematisiert werden. Wasserinfrastrukturen und 
Kulturlandschaften sind in ihrer Funktion und Wirkungsweise sehr unterschiedliche 
Gemeinschaftsgüter, die für die Raumentwicklung von großer Bedeutung sind. Das 
kommt auch in neueren raumpolitischen Leitbildern auf nationaler und europäischer 
Ebene zum Ausdruck. So zählen zu den drei raumordnerischen Leitbildern der 
Ministerkonferenz für Raumordnung (2006) sowohl "Daseinsvorsorge sichern" 
als auch "Ressourcen bewahren, Kulturlandschaften gestalten" (BMVBS, 2006). 
Als Gemeinschaftsgüter sind Wasserinfrastrukturen und Kulturlandschaften in 
ihrer Wirkungsweise jeweils stark von ihren physisch-materiellen Eigenschaften 
und ihrer Raumgebundenheit geprägt, weisen unterschiedliche Gemeinschaftsgut- 
und Institutionenprobleme auf und sind jeweils mit spezifischen Gemeinwohl-
zielstellungen verbunden. Daher werden im Folgenden beide Gemeinschaftsgüter 
analysiert und vergleichend gegenübergestellt.  
3.1 Wasserinfrastrukturen   
Infrastruktursysteme gelten als klassische Gemeinschaftsgüter, die dem Gemeinwohl 
dienen. So prägte Ernst Forsthoff in den 1930er Jahren das Verständnis von 
Daseinsvorsorge als staatliche Aufgabe zur Bereitstellung der für ein sinnvolles 
menschliches Dasein notwendigen Güter und Leistungen, welches bis heute 
nachwirkt (vgl. FORSTHOFF, 1938; HELLERMANN, 2000; LIBBE/TRAPP, 2005). 
Aber auch die Europäische Union beruft sich auf die besonderen Merkmale 
sogenannter Dienstleistungen von allgemeinem Interesse, die im Weißbuch der 
Europäischen Kommission verankert sind und zu denen auch Infrastruktur-
systeme der Ver- und Entsorgung gehören (EUROPÄISCHE KOMMISSION, 2004). 
Der EG-Vertrag definiert diese als "marktbezogene Tätigkeiten, die im Interesse 
der Allgemeinheit erbracht und daher von den Mitgliedstaaten mit besonderen 
Gemeinwohlverpflichtungen verbunden [sind]" (EUROPÄISCHE KOMMISSION, 2006). 
Diese Leistungen sollen flächendeckend, zuverlässig, umweltverträglich und 
bezahlbar sein. Entsprechend dem Gesetz zur Neufassung des Raumordnungs-
gesetzes (GEROG) ist die "Versorgung mit Dienstleistungen und Infrastrukturen 
der Daseinsvorsorge (…) zur Sicherung von Chancengerechtigkeit in den 
Teilräumen in angemessener Weise zu gewährleisten" (GEROG § 2 Abs. 2 Nr. 3). 
Dadurch erhalten die Gemeinwohlziele nicht nur eine soziale, sondern auch eine 
räumliche Dimension. Über die Art und Weise der Realisierung dieser Zielstellung 




Lebensverhältnisse und die diesbezügliche Rolle von Infrastruktursystemen geführt 
(vgl. STRUBELT, 2006; AKADEMIE FÜR RAUMFORSCHUNG UND LANDESPLANUNG, 
2006). Infrastrukturmaßnahmen sind vielfach "die wichtigsten Instrumente der 
öffentlichen Planung zur Steuerung der räumlichen Entwicklung" (WEGENER, 1980). 
Aus der Vielfalt, aber auch aus dem Konfliktpotential dieser Ziele entstand im 
Rahmen der Debatte um die Daseinsvorsorge eine starke Tradition der staatlichen 
Infrastrukturverantwortung.  
Die Gestaltung der institutionellen Rahmenbedingungen zur Realisierung dieser 
Gemeinwohlzielstellung wird allerdings von Problemstellungen beeinflusst, die sich 
aus den spezifischen Eigenschaften von Infrastrukturen und den damit verbundenen 
gütertheoretischen Zusammenhängen ergeben. Nach JOCHIMSEN (1966) und FREY 
(2005) besitzen technische Infrastruktursysteme physisch-technische Merkmale, 
die ökonomische Besonderheiten aufweisen und die nach der klassischen Güter-
theorie eine Bereitstellung über den Markt erschweren oder unmöglich machen. 
Hierzu gehören die weitgehende Unteilbarkeit beziehungsweise Standortgebunden-
heit der Anlagen, die lange Lebensdauer, der netzartige beziehungsweise leitungs-
gebundene Aufbau und die Infrastrukturleistungen (FREY, 2005; TIETZ, 2007). Für 
die gütertheoretische Einordnung ist zunächst die Möglichkeit der Zugangsregu-
lierung unter dem Aspekt der Ausschließbarkeit von Nutzern von Interesse. Der 
Zugang zu leitungsgebundenen Wasserver- und Entsorgungsanlagen ist durch 
den technischen Anschluss und die Zahlung einer Nutzungsgebühr begrenzt. 
Leitungsgebundene Infrastruktursysteme werden deshalb oft als Club- oder Netz-
werkgüter klassifiziert. Eine Nutzungsrivalität besteht – allein auf die Infrastruktur-
netze bezogen – bis zu einer gewissen Kapazitätsgrenze nicht. Wenn diese 
allerdings überschritten wird, können die negativen Folgen für die Nutzer erheblich 
sein. Solange Ver- und Entsorgungssysteme unterhalb der Kapazitätsgrenze 
funktionieren, können Betreiber und Nutzer davon profitieren: Je mehr Personen 
das Gut nutzen, desto geringer sind die hohen Fixkosten für jeden einzelnen. Der 
Mehrwert dieser sogenannten Netzwerkgüter wird so nicht nur vom Produzenten, 
sondern in hohem Maße auch von den Nutzern bestimmt. Entscheidend für die 
effektive und effiziente Bereitstellung des Gutes ist die Schaffung einer kritischen 
Masse in der Aufbauphase technischer Infrastruktursysteme und (in schrumpfenden 
Regionen heute besonders relevant) die Erhaltung dieser kritischen Masse. Zu 
den ökonomischen Besonderheiten der Wasserinfrastrukturbereitstellung gehören 
neben den sinkenden Durchschnittskosten aber auch die fehlende Rivalität im 
Konsum als Effizienzhemmnis und sogenannte meritorische Güterfunktionen – 
das heißt die Sicherstellung einer flächendeckenden Grundversorgung zu günstigen 
Preisen. Aus dieser Argumentationslogik wird hinsichtlich der institutionellen 
Regelungen oft die Notwendigkeit der staatlichen Planung, Regulierung, 
Finanzierung und – bei Bedarf – Bereitstellung abgeleitet (vgl. FREY, 2005).  
Dass institutionelle Regelungen nicht allein durch den Gütercharakter eines 
Infrastruktursystems determiniert sondern institutionell und historisch geprägt sind, 
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wird angesichts der institutionellen Vielfalt von Wasserversorgungssystemen mit 
den gleichen Merkmalen als Netzwerk- beziehungsweise Clubgüter innerhalb 
Europas deutlich. In Deutschland erscheint die Organisation der Siedlungswasser-
wirtschaft mit ihren traditionellen monopolartigen Strukturen und kommunalen 
Zuständigkeiten auf den ersten Blick stabil. Hieraus allerdings den Schluss zu ziehen, 
dass die Wasserver- und Abwasserentsorgung Deutschlands vom institutionellen 
Wandel technischer Infrastruktursysteme nicht betroffen ist, wäre weit gefehlt. Der 
Prozess der Transformation verläuft einfach anders: eher eigenständig als staatlich 
gesteuert, punktuell statt flächendeckend, eher schleichend als bruchartig und 
vielschichtig statt eindimensional (vgl. LIBBE/MOSS, 2001). Dieser Prozess ist 
durch eine wachsende Bedeutung von Effizienzsteigerung und Kostenminimierung 
als betriebsstrategische Ziele am besten mit dem Begriff der Kommerzialisierung zu 
fassen (vgl. MOSS/NAUMANN, 2007). Dies gilt sowohl für öffentliche wie auch 
privatwirtschaftliche Betriebe, wenngleich Kommerzialisierungstendenzen bei 
privaten und privatrechtlich organisierten Unternehmen stärker ausgeprägt sind.  
Bisher wurden Wasserinfrastrukturen als technisch-organisatorische Einheiten 
betrachtet. Es ist jedoch notwendig, das durch die Leitungen fließende Wasser 
als Umweltgut einzubeziehen. Dadurch wird die Güteranalyse deutlich komplexer. 
Ver- und Entsorgungssysteme für Wasser dienen in erster Linie der Aufbereitung 
und Bereitstellung natürlicher Ressourcen bzw. der Entsorgung nach ihrer Nutzung. 
Diese Umweltgüter besitzen einen anderen Gütercharakter als die Ver- und Ent-
sorgungssysteme, die sie transportieren. Wasser ist in der Regel eine common pool 
resource, die erhebliche Nutzungsrivalitäten aufweist. Deshalb sind institutionelle 
Regelungen wie vor allem die EU-Wasserrahmenrichtlinie (WRRL) aus dem 
Jahr 2000 auf den Schutz dieses Umweltgutes und die Erreichung eines "guten 
Zustands" für Oberflächengewässer und Grundwasserkörper innerhalb von klaren 
Fristen durch eine Ökologisierung des Gewässerschutzes nach ökologischen und 
hydromorphologischen Gütekriterien gerichtet. Dazu dienen Bewirtschaftungspläne 
und Maßnahmenprogramme unter Mitwirkung der Öffentlichkeit durch Anhörung 
und Information nach Art. 14 WRRL und die verstärkte Anwendung wirtschaftlicher 
Steuerungsinstrumente, um die Umweltziele nach Art. 4 WRRL zu erreichen 
(vgl. RUMM et al., 2006). Dieser hybride Steuerungsansatz, den die WRRL verfolgt, 
besteht aus einer Kombination von klassischen, ordnungsrechtlichen Vorgaben 
und Verfahrensregeln mit neuen, eher prozeduralen Steuerungsmodi, die auf die 
sektor- und gebietsübergreifende Koordinierung, die Abwägung konkurrierender 
Interessen und die Sensibilität für räumliche Besonderheiten ausgerichtet sind. 
Dabei wird ein ungewöhnlich hoher Koordinierungsaufwand mit Politikfeldern 
jenseits des Gewässerschutzes erforderlich. Das betrifft in erster Linie die Landwirt-
schaft (vor allem zur Reduzierung diffuser Belastungen), die Raumplanung (für 
eine vorsorgende Flächennutzung und Verbesserung der Gewässerstruktur) und 
den Naturschutz (zur Sicherung bzw. Entwicklung wassergeprägter Ökosysteme und 
Landschaften). Die flussgebietsbezogene Bewirtschaftung von Wasserressourcen hat 




In diesen unterschiedlichen Gütereigenschaften von Netzwerk- und Umweltgütern 
und den daran anknüpfenden institutionellen Regelungen zeigt sich ein grundsätz-
liches Dilemma bei der Bewirtschaftung von Ver- und Entsorgungssystemen, das 
die Gütertheorie offenbart: Es liegt im Interesse der Nachhaltigkeit, den Verbrauch 
von Umweltgütern so weit wie möglich zu minimieren, aber es liegt im Interesse 
der Nutzer und Betreiber eines Infrastruktursystems, die Auslastung dieses 
Netzwerkgutes so weit wie möglich (unterhalb einer Sicherheitsreserve) zu 
maximieren. Daraus ergibt sich aus unterschiedlichen Gemeinwohlzielstellungen ein 
Gemeinschaftsgutproblem zwischen dem Netzwerkgut "Wasserinfrastruktur" und 
dem Umweltgut "Wasser".  
Einen gesellschaftlich akzeptablen Ausgleich zwischen diesen unterschiedlichen 
(Gemeinwohl-)Interessen zu erzielen, ist das Ziel institutioneller Regelungen. In 
Zeiten eines wirtschaftlichen Wachstums – und eines Ausbaus der Infrastruktur – 
wurden diese Regelungen oft zugunsten einer sicheren Wasserversorgung und auf 
Kosten des regionalen Wasserhaushalts ausgelegt. Heute führt der demographische 
und wirtschaftliche Strukturwandel jedoch in vielen Teilen Ostdeutschlands zu 
einem unter Wasserwirtschaftlern zuvor weitgehend unbekannten Problem: 
Überkapazitäten und Unterauslastungen ihrer Ver- und Entsorgungsnetze. Die 
Kombination von Kapazitätsausbau und Verbrauchsrückgang hat jedoch zu einer 
Reihe von Folgeproblemen für die ostdeutsche Siedlungswasserwirtschaft geführt 
(vgl. MOSS/HÜESKER, 2010). Die Unterauslastung der Netze und Anlagen führt 
zu einer Gefährdung der Funktionsfähigkeit und der Einhaltung qualitativer 
Mindeststandards aufgrund längerer Standzeiten des Wassers in den Leitungen 
(vgl. KOZIOL, 2004). Mit dem Rückgang des Wasserverbrauchs sinken auch die 
Einnahmen durch Wasser- und Abwassergebühren. Angesichts des hohen Niveaus 
der Fixkosten sind die Möglichkeiten, Kosten einzusparen, sehr begrenzt. Es 
entsteht die sogenannte Fixkostenfalle. Um die Einbußen wettzumachen, die ihnen 
durch rückläufige Verbrauchswerte entstanden sind, sehen sich die Versorgungs-
betriebe gezwungen, die Gebühren für Wasser und Abwasser deutlich anzuheben 
und ihre Tarifsysteme weniger verbrauchsabhängig zu gestalten (vgl. MOSS, 2008b). 
Das Dilemma von Überkapazitäten und Unterauslastungen wird besonders in 
Situationen extremer Ressourcenknappheit kritisch. Beispielsweise warnten 
Hydrologen, Wasserwirtschaftler und Klimaforscher in einer extremen Trocken-
periode im April 2007 vor einer zunehmenden Wasserknappheit. So forderte 
Gerhard Löper vom Wasser- und Schifffahrtsamt (WSA) Brandenburg: "Ich kann 
die Bürger nur aufrufen, Wasser zu sparen" (Märkische Allgemeine Zeitung vom 
27.  April 2007). Auf der anderen Seite beklagten Vertreter von ostdeutschen 
Wasserversorgungsunternehmen die negativen Folgen von Wassersparmaßnahmen 
für ihre unterausgelasteten Infrastruktursysteme. Ralf Schüler, Geschäftsführer 
der Deutschen Vereinigung für Wasserwirtschaft, Abwasser und Abfall (DWA) 
formulierte zugespitzt: "Es ist letztlich im Interesse des Bürgers selbst, auch 
einmal mehr zu duschen" (Tageszeitung vom 2. April 2007). Diese zugespitzten 
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Positionen spiegeln das Spannungsfeld zwischen der Kommerzialisierung von 
Wasserdienstleistungen und dem Schutz von Wasserressourcen vor dem 
Hintergrund des institutionellen Wandels in Wasserwirtschaft und Umweltschutz 
wider. Hinter diesem Gemeinschaftsgutproblem zwischen Netzwerkgut und 
Umweltgut vollzieht sich eine weitere Ausdifferenzierung der Interessen von 
Akteursgruppen (vgl. WISSEN, 2009). Die regionale Ausprägung des Gemeinschafts-
gutproblems wird durch Wirkungen des Klimawandels verschärft, der den durch 
eine jahrzehntelange Trockenlegung von landwirtschaftlichen Flächen durch 
Melioration beeinflussten Landschaftswasserhaushalt und die zu geringe Grund-
wasserneubildung zusätzlich beeinträchtigen.  
Die gegenseitige Bezugnahme der beiden Debattenstränge über Infrastrukturen 
und Wasserressourcen ist allerdings gering (MOSS, 2008b). Für die Umsetzung 
der Umweltziele der WRRL werden Versorgungsunternehmen durchaus als 
Partner betrachtet und (teilweise) involviert; auf den Wandel ihrer eigenen 
wirtschaftspolitischen Rahmenbedingungen wird aber kaum Bezug genommen. 
Umgekehrt erfolgt die Debatte über Privatisierungen in der Wasserwirtschaft 
weitgehend ohne Rekurs auf die Umsetzung der WRRL, sieht man von der oft 
zitierten Aussage ab, dass Wasser kein ökonomisches Gut sei.  
Auffällig bei der öffentlichen Diskussion über die Zukunft von Infrastruktur-
systemen ist heute die Dominanz der aus dem Gütercharakter abgeleiteten Frage, 
wie infrastrukturelle Leistungen erbracht werden sollen: ob privat- oder kommunal-
wirtschaftlich, ob dezentral oder zentral, ob abgaben- oder steuerfinanziert. Dagegen 
fehlt eine systematische Zieldiskussion. Welche Funktionen Infrastruktursysteme 
unter den veränderten Rahmenbedingungen erfüllen sollten und inwieweit ihre 
traditionellen regionalpolitischen Ziele noch – oder wieder – Gültigkeit haben, 
wird kaum thematisiert. Der Begriff des Gemeinwohls wird am ehesten von den 
Kommunen zur Abwehr von Versuchen verwendet, ihre Einflussnahme über die 
Ver- und Entsorgungsunternehmen einzuschränken, etwa als Argumente gegen die 
Aufhebung des Anschluss- und Benutzungszwanges oder gegen die Einführung 
marktwirtschaftlicher Steuerungsmechanismen wie Kosten-Nutzen-Analysen.  
Das Politikfeld der Ver- und Entsorgung ist diesbezüglich bislang eher für seine 
Persistenz bekannt. Infrastrukturplaner orientieren sich vorzugsweise an etablierten 
Strukturen und Verfahren und entwickeln Vorstellungen über die künftige 
Entwicklung in der Regel ohne Einbeziehung einer breiteren Öffentlichkeit. Tatsache 
ist jedoch, dass sie zunehmend unter Druck geraten, sich den neuen Anforderungen 
zu stellen: der demographische Wandel, die technologische und marktwirtschaftliche 
Reife alternativer Technologien, der Klimawandel, neue Verbrauchsmuster im 
Zusammenhang mit neuen Lebensstilen und wirtschaftsräumlichen Strukturen 
und die Anforderungen des Umwelt- und Gewässerschutzes fordern die relevanten 
Akteure zu einer Neuorientierung der Infrastrukturplanung und -politik heraus. 
Der Zwang zum Handeln kann eine größere Bereitschaft zur gemeinsamen Ziel-




und Gemeinwohlinteressen, die Wasserinfrastrukturen über die originären 
Leistungen der Ver- und Entsorgung hinaus leisten – wie etwa für die Hygiene, 
den Gewässerschutz, den Brandschutz oder den Naturschutz (über Wasserschutz-
gebiete) – sollten künftig bei deren Weiterentwicklung stärker beachtet werden. 
Dadurch könnten wichtige Synergieeffekte erschlossen werden und der hohe 
Finanzbedarf für Wasserinfrastrukturen im politischen Raum besser vermittelt 
werden. Erst dann wird eine gemeinwohlorientierte Zieldiskussion bessere Chancen 
auf Erfolg haben, die den gegenseitigen Abhängigkeiten zwischen der Realisierung 
einer ökologisch orientierten Gewässerschutzpolitik und den Handlungsbedingungen 
und -orientierungen von Wasserver- und Abwasserentsorgungsbetrieben gerecht 
wird. Wenn auch wichtige Schritte in Richtung integrierter Ansätze in den letzten 
Jahren in Deutschland geleistet worden sind, erfolgt die Integrationsleistung bisher 
überwiegend innerhalb eines bestimmten Teilsystems der Wasserwirtschaft und 
viel weniger quer zu unterschiedlichen Handlungsbereichen. 
3.2 Kulturlandschaften   
Seit einigen Jahren werden Kulturlandschaften von Politik und Forschung – 
nicht zuletzt wegen ihrer Bedeutung für die Stabilisierung strukturschwacher 
Räume – als Potential für die Regionalentwicklung thematisiert (vgl. FÜRST et al., 
2008). Dadurch wurde die Kulturlandschaft zu einem Kernbegriff zahlreicher 
politisch-programmatischer Dokumente und erscheint mit Verweis auf die 
identitätsstiftende Wirkung quasi "per se" als Gemeinwohlbegriff. Beispiele sind 
das Europäische Raumentwicklungskonzept von 1999, das die Inwertsetzung von 
Kulturlandschaften im Rahmen integrierter Raumentwicklungskonzepte fordert 
(EUROPÄISCHE KOMMISSION, 1999), oder die 2006 von der Ministerkonferenz für 
Raumordnung verabschiedeten neuen Leitbilder und Handlungsstrategien für die 
Raumentwicklung in Deutschland mit dem Leitbild "Ressourcen bewahren, Kultur-
landschaften gestalten" (BMVBS, 2006). In der Realität ist die Kulturlandschafts-
entwicklung jedoch im Spannungsfeld zwischen politischen Steuerungsansprüchen 
und realen Entwicklungen durch widersprüchliche Prozesse charakterisiert: Einerseits 
werden prägende historische (natürliche und bauliche) Landschaftselemente in 
Wert gesetzt, Traditionen wiederbelebt und breite Debatten über die Erhaltung 
von Kulturlandschaften geführt. Andererseits unterliegen Kulturlandschaften einem 
anhaltenden Wandel, wobei infolge von Globalisierungs-, Transformations- und 
Restrukturierungsprozessen deutliche Nivellierungstendenzen festgestellt werden 
(SCHENK, 2001). Im Kern ist das Dilemma der Kulturlandschaftsentwicklung auf 
Problemstellungen zwischen Gemeinwohlansprüchen und den mit ihrem Güter-
charakter zusammenhängenden spezifischen institutionellen Regelungen und 
Steuerungsmöglichkeiten zurückzuführen (vgl. GAILING/RÖHRING, 2008a).  
Kulturlandschaften erbringen Leistungen, die gemeinschaftlich in Anspruch 
genommen werden können: Sie bieten Erholungsmöglichkeiten, von ihnen gehen 
identitätsstiftende und imagebildende Wirkungen aus und sie bilden Grundlagen 
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zur Sicherung kultureller, landschaftlicher und biologischer Vielfalt. Daran wird 
deutlich, dass Kulturlandschaft vor allem ganzheitlich wirkt, denn ihr Wert besteht – 
so auch nach dem Europäischen Raumentwicklungskonzept (EUREK) – "in der 
gesamten Zusammensetzung und nicht in einzelnen Elementen" (EUROPÄISCHE 
KOMMISSION,  1999, S. 80). Dennoch beeinflussen die einzelnen heterogenen 
Elemente die Kulturlandschaft in ihrer Gesamtheit wesentlich. Dabei ist zu 
berücksichtigen, dass sie jeweils mehrere Funktionen mit unterschiedlichen 
Gütereigenschaften und oft konkurrierenden Zielstellungen erfüllen. So steht die 
Landwirtschaft im Spannungsfeld zwischen der Erzeugung von landwirtschaftlichen 
Produkten als private Güter und den als Kuppelprodukt entstehenden Wirkungen 
auf die Kulturlandschaft (vgl. BAHNER, 1996 und HAMPICKE, 1996). Die Erholungs-
funktion einer Kulturlandschaft, die als reines öffentliches Gut verfügbar ist, 
kann durch einen zum Beispiel von Entwicklungen in anderen Sektoren ausgelösten 
Kulturlandschaftswandel, wie den zunehmenden Anbau von Biomasse als Mono-
kulturen zur Energieerzeugung den Charakter einer common pool resource annehmen 
und als solche der Gefahr der Beeinträchtigung ausgesetzt sein. Aus gütertheore-
tischer Perspektive handelt es sich daher bei Kulturlandschaften um ein Gemein-
schaftsgut, das in der Regel aus Mischformen von sogenannten common pool 
resources, privaten und öffentlichen Gütern sowie Klubgütern besteht.  
Die Kulturlandschaft entsteht und entwickelt sich demzufolge weitgehend durch 
externe Effekte oder als Nebenprodukt des Umgangs mit ihren vielfältigen 
Elementen und Bestandteilen. Die Kulturlandschaft ist daher "ein Residualprodukt 
einer Vielzahl von Handlungen, die jeweils eigene Zwecke verfolgen. In ihr schlagen 
sich die Ergebnisse von Arbeit, Verkehr, Wohnen, Freizeit, Tourismus, Konsum, 
Landschaftsplanung und Naturschutz nieder, doch ist ihre reale Gesamtheit von 
niemandem gewollt" (SIEFERLE, 2003, S. 74-75). Die Handlungsorientierungen 
der Akteure in Bezug auf den Umgang mit der Kulturlandschaft werden dabei 
durch die Wirkung formeller sektoraler Regelungen und ökonomischer Anreize 
sowie individueller Wertvorstellungen geleitet. Dadurch gewinnen unterschiedliche 
normativ geprägte Vorstellungen von Kulturlandschaft die jeweils auf spezifische 
Qualitäten gerichtet sind, als informelle Institutionen eine große Bedeutung. So 
haben Land- und Forstwirte ein stark nutzungsorientiertes Kulturlandschafts-
verständnis, während die historische Geographie und die Landschaftsästhetik in 
ihren traditionellen Sichtweisen auf eine "historisch gewachsene Kulturlandschaft" 
fokussiert sind (vgl. GAILING, 2008). 
Aufgrund der Multifunktionalität der Kulturlandschaft kann es kein eigenständiges 
Regelsystem geben, das auf ihre intendierte Entwicklung zur Umsetzung von 
fest definierten Gemeinwohlzielen gerichtet ist. Eine direkte Kulturlandschafts-
gestaltung ist ohnehin nur durch die gezielte Inwertsetzung von historischen und 
baulichen Relikten des industriellen Erbes, die Gestaltung von Landschaftsparken 
oder Maßnahmen zur Pflege und Entwicklung historischer Kulturlandschafts-




kulturlandschaftlichen Image- und Identitätsbildung möglich. Bei der Vermarktung 
kulturlandschaftlicher Qualitäten und Images, die an den spezifischen Allein-
stellungsmerkmalen einer Kulturlandschaft anknüpfen, können Probleme von 
"Trittbrettfahrerverhalten" auftreten, wenn regionale Akteure einerseits von der 
Qualität oder dem Image einer Kulturlandschaft profitieren, andererseits aber 
nicht zur Bewahrung dieser Qualität beitragen.  
Auch wenn heute die gesamte Landschaft in Mitteleuropa in dem Sinne als 
Kulturlandschaft bezeichnet wird, dass sie durch das Handeln des Menschen 
beeinflusst ist, unterscheiden sich die einzelnen Kulturlandschaften voneinander. 
Aufgrund der räumlichen Bindung ihrer Entstehung und ihrer raumkonstituierenden 
Wirkung (insbesondere als Identitätsraum) ist die Kulturlandschaft daher ein 
regionales Gemeinschaftsgut (vgl. RÖHRING, 2008). Daraus ergibt sich die Möglich-
keit, Kulturlandschaften als Raumbezug von Regionalisierungsprozessen zu nutzen 
und Handlungsräume zu konstituieren (vgl. GAILING/RÖHRING, 2008b).  
Allerdings ist es notwendig, bei der Formulierung von Gemeinwohlzielstellungen 
und ihrer Operationalisierung die Wirkungszusammenhänge der Entwicklung der 
Kulturlandschaft als regionales Gemeinschaftsgut und die sich daraus ergebenden 
Handlungsoptionen zu berücksichtigen. Im fünften Grundsatz der Novelle des 
Raumordnungsgesetzes von 2008 wird der Erhalt und die Entwicklung der 
Kulturlandschaften mit den "Zielen eines harmonischen Nebeneinanders, der 
Überwindung von Strukturproblemen und zur Schaffung neuer wirtschaftlicher und 
kultureller Konzeptionen" verbunden. Hinter derartigen Sätzen in programmatischen 
Dokumenten steht vielfach der Versuch einer konsensorientierten und legitimieren-
den Formulierung von Gemeinwohlzielstellungen. Ihre Operationalisierung erscheint 
jedoch angesichts der mit dem Gemeinschaftsgutcharakter von Kulturlandschaften 
verbundenen Problemstellungen schwierig. Dabei wird auch oft verdrängt, dass 
eine Konkurrenz der Werte typisch für politisch-planerische Entscheidungen im 
Umgang mit der Kulturlandschaft ist und Konflikte zwischen verschiedenen 
Ansprüchen an die Landschaftsnutzung die Regel sind.  
Dies wirft neue Fragen nach der Entwicklung von Zielstellungen für die Kultur-
landschaftsentwicklung sowie nach Möglichkeiten und Grenzen ihrer Beeinflussung 
auf, die einen ganzheitlichen Zugang zur Problemstellung erfordern und dem 
Gemeinschaftsgutcharakter der Kulturlandschaft gerecht werden. Die erläuterten 
güter- und institutionentheoretische Zusammenhänge der Kulturlandschaftsentwick-
lung  und die mit Kulturlandschaften verbundenen Gemeinwohlzielstellungen 
führen zu einem Gemeinschaftsgutproblem, das in einem Spannungsverhältnis 
zwischen der Heterogenität der institutionellen Zugänge zur Kulturlandschaft 
einerseits und der regionalen Steuerung ihrer gemeinwohlorientierten Nutzung als 
ganzheitlich wirkendes, regionales Entwicklungspotential andererseits besteht. Die 
institutionelle Herausforderung liegt hier in der Steuerung eines Gemeinschaftsguts, 
welches (im Gegensatz zu Wasser beziehungsweise Wasserinfrastrukturen) keine 
klare institutionelle Zuordnung genießt, sondern von dem Zusammenspiel sehr 
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unterschiedlicher Institutionensysteme geprägt ist, wie zum Beispiel jenen für 
Naturschutz, Landwirtschaft, Forstwirtschaft, Raumplanung und Tourismus. Das 
erschwert die Umsetzung neuerer raumplanerischer und regionalpolitischer Ziele 
für Kulturlandschaften als Impulsgeber für die Regionalentwicklung insbesondere 
dort, wo die Qualitäten und Eigenarten von Kulturlandschaften beeinträchtigt 
worden sind und/oder wo sie infolge des gesellschaftlichen Strukturwandels zu 
den (wenigen) Stärken einer Region gehören.  
In Berlin-Brandenburg sind zwei Ausprägungen dieses Gemeinschaftsgutproblems 
zu erkennen: Auf der einen Seite besteht ein Spannungsverhältnis zwischen den 
konkurrierenden und überlappenden Handlungsräumen von sektoralen Politiken 
und den Kulturlandschaften in ihren unscharfen natur-, kultur- beziehungsweise 
identitätsräumlichen Grenzen. Das räumliche misfit  zwischen politisch-
administrativem Territorium und gebietsübergreifenden Kulturlandschaften ist 
besonders in der Hauptstadtregion eine große Herausforderung für eine regionale 
Kulturlandschaftspolitik dar. Auf der anderen Seite besteht ein Spannungs-
verhältnis zwischen übergeordneten (und häufig selektiven) Steuerungsansätzen 
gerade der Landesregierungen und dem Handeln regionaler kulturlandschaftlicher 
Initiativen. Hier geht es um Fragen der multi-level-Governance im Umgang mit 
kulturlandschaftlichen Potentialen. Dieses Gemeinschaftsgutproblem soll am 
Beispiel von ausgewählten regionalen Entwicklungsansätzen der Landesplanung 
in Berlin-Brandenburg, des ländlichen Raumes und des Naturschutzes, die Aspekte 
der Kulturlandschaftsentwicklung einbeziehen, verdeutlicht werden (vgl. GAILING/ 
RÖHRING, 2009). 
Um die Vielfalt der Kulturlandschaften des gemeinsamen Planungsraumes 
Berlin-Brandenburg als regionales Potential zu erschließen, wurde 2007 im 
Rahmen der Neuaufstellung der Landesentwicklungsplanung ein Ansatz zur 
Etablierung kulturlandschaftlicher Handlungsräume entwickelt (MINISTERIUM FÜR 
INFRASTRUKTUR UND RAUMORDNUNG DES LANDES BRANDENBURG/SENATSVERWAL-
TUNG FÜR STADTENTWICKLUNG DES LANDES  BERLIN,  2007 und 2009). Dieser 
Ansatz, der am Integrationspotential der Kulturlandschaft anknüpft, soll auch 
einen Beitrag zum Umgang mit dem oben genannten Spannungsverhältnis zwischen 
den heterogenen Steuerungsansätzen und der Ganzheitlichkeit der Wirkung von 
Kulturlandschaft leisten. Seine Umsetzung, die nur auf der regionalen Ebene erfolgen 
kann, wird jedoch wesentlich von sektoralen Rahmenbedingungen beeinflusst, 
die auf der Landesebene ausgestaltet werden. Sie sind gegenwärtig in unterschied-
lichen regionalen Ansätzen verankert, wie am Beispiel der ländlichen Entwicklung 
und des Naturschutzes dargestellt werden soll. 
Die Programme der ländlichen Entwicklung (die bisherige EU-Gemeinschafts-
initiative LEADER, die heute in den ELER-Ansatz integriert ist sowie die Integrierte 
ländliche Entwicklung im Rahmen der Bund-Länder-Gemeinschaftsaufgabe) 
sind auf Gemeinwohlziele einer nachhaltigen Entwicklung der ländlichen Räume als 




positiven Entwicklung der Agrarstruktur, einer langfristigen Stärkung der 
wirtschaftlichen Leistungsfähigkeit und zur Schaffung von Arbeitsplätzen 
beitragen: "Ob bei der integrierten ländlichen Entwicklung, bei LEADER-Projekten 
oder bei der Unterstützung von Investitionsvorhaben, die Sicherung und Schaffung 
von Arbeitsplätzen stehen an erster Stelle, wenn dafür Fördermittel fließen 
sollen" (SCHULZE, 2008). Unter dieser Prämisse werden auch die Inwertsetzung 
des Natur- und Kulturerbes des ländlichen Raums sowie die Herstellung und 
Vermarktung regionaler Produkte als Entwicklungspotentiale gesehen. Durch 
die Instrumente der ländlichen Entwicklung wurden auf regionaler Ebene in 
einem auf der Partizipation regionaler Akteure beruhenden prozeduralen Prozess der 
Erarbeitung von regionalen Zielvorstellungen Kooperations- und Vernetzungsprozesse 
sowie neue Governanceansätze initiiert. Diese Governanceansätze sind durch 
den Zugang zu finanziellen Ressourcen in das Mehrebenensystem der ländlichen 
Entwicklung eingebunden. Die damit gegebenen Möglichkeiten regionaler Akteure, 
kulturlandschaftliche Handlungsräume mit integrierten Gemeinwohlzielstellungen 
herauszubilden, werden allerdings eingeschränkt. Ursachen dafür sind eine unzu-
reichende institutionelle Integration der Instrumente zur Entwicklung des ländlichen 
Raumes und dadurch eine unzureichende Berücksichtigung der Komplexität und 
der Verflechtungen kulturlandschaftlicher Entwicklungsziele sowie die Ausrichtung 
der Handlungsräume auf die Landkreise als Förderkulisse, die außerdem stark 
an die jeweiligen Förderperioden gebunden sind. So hatten sich im Rahmen von 
LEADER+ Lokale Aktionsgruppen im Zusammenhang mit Naturparken gebildet. 
Mit der neuen Förderperiode 2007-2013 wurden diese kulturlandschaftlichen 
Raumbezüge weitgehend zugunsten der Landkreise aufgegeben.  
Unterschiedliche Raumbezüge von Handlungsräumen führen zu Problemen von 
"Spatial fit". So beispielsweise gegenüber dem Naturschutz mit seinen langfristig 
etablierten Großschutzgebieten als Handlungsräume. Die auf den "Schutz der Natur, 
der Umwelt und der gewachsenen Kulturlandschaft" gerichteten Gemeinwohlziele 
des Naturschutzes fanden 1992 Eingang in die neue Verfassung des Landes 
Brandenburg. Seitdem haben sich jedoch die institutionellen Rahmenbedingungen 
durch Deregulierung und Verwaltungsreformen verändert, so dass eine Anpassung 
der Gemeinwohlziele, weg von ökologischen Kernzielen mit der Dominanz des 
Arten- und Biotopschutzes und hin zu Aufgaben der Regionalentwicklung, der 
Strukturpolitik und der ökonomischen Wertschöpfung erkennbar wurde (vgl. 
GAILING/RÖHRING, 2009). Großschutzgebiete werden daher inzwischen als 
"Modellregionen für Schutz und Nutzung Brandenburger Landschaften" bezeichnet. 
Damit verbunden war die Entwicklung neuer Wertschöpfungspartnerschaften 
zwischen Naturschützern und ökonomisch orientierten Akteuren sowie die 
Herausbildung neuer institutioneller Arrangements zur touristischen Entwicklung 
und Vermarktung regionaler Produkte. Obwohl dadurch eine stärkere Annäherung 
der Entwicklungsziele der ländlichen Entwicklung und des Naturschutz und die 
Herausbildung von Synergien verbunden sind, bleiben traditionelle Konfliktpotenziale 
erhalten. Das betrifft heute insbesondere die Umsetzung der FFH-Richtlinie als 
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Mehrebenenproblem der Realisierung von EU-Politik. Durch konkurrierende 
sektorale und regionale Gemeinwohlziele entstehen "Problems of institutional 
interplay" die nicht nur in Flächennutzungskonflikten, sondern auch in der 
Konkurrenz um Identitäten und Images sichtbar werden. 
Die Umsetzung integrierter Ansätze der Kulturlandschaftsentwicklung und der 
Etablierung kulturlandschaftlicher Handlungsräume auf regionaler Ebene erfordert 
jedoch eine Koordinierung der Ressortaktivitäten auf Landesebene. Dazu sind 
eine Abstimmung sektoraler Gemeinwohlziele und ihre Verankerung in den 
institutionellen Rahmenbedingungen sowie finanzielle Anreize als Impulse für 
regionale Management und Projektaktivitäten erforderlich. Probleme ergeben 
sich vor allem aus Unterschieden hinsichtlich der Ausstattung mit finanziellen 
Ressourcen und der Pfadabhängigkeit institutioneller Strukturen. So verfügt beispiels-
weise die ländliche Entwicklungspolitik über relativ umfangreiche finanzielle 
Mittel zur Umsetzung ihrer sektoralen Gemeinwohlziele. Dagegen bestehen im 
Naturschutz mit den Großschutzgebieten institutionell abgesicherte stabile Hand-
lungsräume. Auf regionaler Ebene existieren darüber hinaus kulturlandschaftliche 
Netzwerke und Initiativen, die sich auf vielfältige Themenstellungen von der 
Lösung regionaler Probleme des Kulturlandschaftswandels über die touristische 
Vernetzung bis hin zur Erhaltung typischer Kulturlandschaftselemente richten. 
Je nach ihrer Stabilität, ihrem Zugang zu Ressourcen und ihrer Akzeptanz in der 
Region sind kulturlandschaftliche Netzwerke in der Lage, selbst Handlungsräume zu 
konstituieren. Sie stehen dabei in einem Spannungsfeld zwischen ihren spezifischen 
regionalen Zielen und Ansprüchen und den Spielräumen, die ihnen Regelungen 
auf Landes-, Bundes- und europäischer Ebene für die Realisierung eröffnen.  
Angesichts der Vielfalt an Gemeinwohlbelangen und den spezifischen Gemeinschafts-
gutproblemen stellt sich im gesellschaftlichen Umgang mit der Kulturlandschaft 
in jedem zeiträumlichen Kontext neu die Frage, wie eine prozedurale Aufstellung 
und Institutionalisierung von Gemeinwohlzielen erfolgen kann und wie dabei die 
Interplay-Probleme zwischen den Institutionensystemen angesichts der ungleichen 
Ausstattung mit Ressourcen, Macht und institutionellen Strukturen gelöst werden 
können. Die Komplexität kulturlandschaftlicher Gemeinwohlbezüge deutet auf ein 
Dilemma kulturlandschaftlicher Governance hin: Einerseits bietet der Kulturland-
schaftsbegriff umfassende Integrationschancen, andererseits droht eine Überforderung 
und Instrumentalisierung regionaler Akteure, die das Management der heterogenen 
Bezüge ohne staatliche institutionelle Unterstützung und ohne eine ausreichende 
eigene Machtbasis nur schwerlich leisten können. 
3.3 Vergleich  von  Wasserinfrastrukturen und Kulturlandschaften  
Die Gemeinsamkeit von Wasserinfrastrukturen und Kulturlandschaften besteht 
darin, dass sie jeweils keinen eindeutigen Gütercharakter aufweisen. Während Wasser-
infrastrukturen in Verbindung mit der Ressource Wasser durch die Dualität von 
Netzwerkgut und Umweltgut sowie die damit verbundenen unterschiedlichen 




das Ergebnis des Umgangs mit vielfältigen öffentlichen und privaten Gütern. 
Daraus ergeben sich Konsequenzen für die Entwicklung von Gemeinwohlzielen, 
institutionellen Arrangements und integrierten Steuerungsansätzen sowie 
Herausforderungen für die intendierte Gestaltung von institutionellen Interplay-
Prozessen und damit verbundenen Konfliktpotenzialen. Abbildung 2 veranschaulicht 
zusammenfassend Gemeinschaftsgutcharakter, Gemeinwohlzielstellungen sowie 
damit zusammenhängende institutionelle Dimensionen und Steuerungsansätze 
der regionalen Gemeinschaftsgüter Wasserinfrastrukturen und Kulturlandschaften.  
Abbildung 2:  Wasserinfrastrukturen und Kulturlandschaften im Vergleich 
 Wasserinfrastrukturen  Kulturlandschaften 
Gegenstand 
(Gemeinschaftsgut) 
Umweltgut "Wasserhaushalt" und 
Netzwerkgut "Wasserinfrastruktur" 
Kulturlandschaft als ganzheit-
liches Konstrukt vielfältiger 
Elemente und Bestandteile; von der 
Wahrnehmung vor dem Hinter-
grund unterschiedlicher Kultur-
landschaftsverständnisse abhängig 
Gemeinschaftsgutcharakter  Netzwerkgut "Wasserinfrastruktur" 
als Clubgut und Umweltgut 
"Wasserhaushalt" als Common-
Pool-Resource  
Kulturlandschaft als heterogenes 
regionales Gemeinschaftsgut, 
bestehend aus vielfältigen 
öffentlichen und privaten Gütern 
Produktion/Reproduktion  Wasserinfrastruktur ein meritorisches 
Gut, private Bereitstellung im 
Auftrag des Staates 
Weitgehend als externer Effekt, 
intendierte Entwicklung nur 
begrenzt möglich 
Gemeinschaftsgutprobleme  Spannungsverhältnis zwischen Wasser-
infrastrukturen als Netzwerkgüter und 




der Heterogenität der 
institutionellen Zugänge und der 
Ganzheitlichkeit als regionales 
Entwicklungspotential 
Institutioneller Rahmen  Zwei Institutionensysteme mit 
unterschiedlichen Zielstellungen und 
Handlungslogiken  
Institutionelle Zersplitterung 
durch Heterogenität und 
Multifunktionalität (Problems of 
interplay); großer Einfluss 
informeller Institutionen 
Entwicklungsdynamik  Starkes Beharrungsvermögen  Anfällig für schleichenden Wandel 
Institutionenwandel  Bewusster Institutionenwandel mit 
intendierten aber auch nicht-
intendierten Effekten 
Spontaner, sektorspezifischer 
Institutionenwandel oft mit nicht-
intendierten Effekten 




Kulturlandschaft als abstraktes 
Gemeinwohlziel; Vielfalt sektoraler 
und regionaler kulturland-
schaftsbezogener Gemeinwohlziele 
Steuerungsprobleme  Koordination der unterschiedlichen 
Steuerungs- und Handlungslogiken 
von Umwelt- und Netzwerkgütern 
Sicherung der Multifunktionalität 
durch aktiven Umgang mit der 
institutionellen Heterogenität 
durch Governanceansätze 
Raumbezüge  Infrastrukturnetze, 
Flusseinzugsgebiete, 
Gebietskörperschaften  
Identitätsbasierte Raumbezüge als 
Anknüpfungspunkt für 
Handlungsräume; Probleme der 
Überlagerung mit anderen 
Raumkonstrukten (Problems of fit) 
Quelle: Eigene  Darstellung. 
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4 ERKENNTNISSE ÜBER DIE ANWENDUNG VON 
GEMEINSCHAFTSGÜTER- UND GEMEINWOHLKONZEPTE AUF 
WASSERINFRASTRUKTUREN UND KULTURLANDSCHAFTEN  
Abschließend sollen aus der Untersuchung der Zusammenhänge zwischen Gemein-
schaftsgutproblemen und der Formulierung und Umsetzung von Gemeinwohlziel-
stellungen in Bezug auf die regionalen Gemeinschaftsgüter Wasserinfrastrukturen 
und Kulturlandschaften zusammenfassende Erkenntnisse über den Erklärungsgehalt 
beider Ansätze für institutionentheoretische Problemstellungen der Raumentwicklung 
gezogen werden. Aktuelle Debatten über den Umgang mit Wasserressourcen und 
die künftige Bereitstellung von Wasserinfrastrukturen sowie die Erschließung der 
Potentiale von Kulturlandschaften für eine qualitative Regionalentwicklung machen 
die Defizite sowohl hinsichtlich einer integrierten Herangehensweise als auch bei der 
Berücksichtigung der spezifischen Eigenschaften dieser regionalen Gemeinschafts-
güter bei der Formulierung von Gemeinwohlzielen und der Gestaltung institutioneller 
Arrangements deutlich.  
Der Gemeinschaftsgutansatz bietet mit seinem bewährten analytischen Gerüst 
der Güterkategorisierung anhand nutzungsbezogener Merkmale nach Rivalität 
und Ausschließbarkeit und die damit verbundene Komplexitätsreduzierung sowie 
der Wirkung externer Effekte die Möglichkeit, grundlegende Probleme des 
Akteursverhaltens zu identifizieren. Darüber hinaus führt die sozialwissenschaftliche 
Öffnung des Gemeinschaftsgutansatzes durch die Einbeziehung von Prozessen 
der sozialen Konstruktion von Gemeinschaftsgütern zu neuen Erkenntnissen, auch 
wenn dadurch insbesondere bei regionalen Gemeinschaftsgütern die physischen 
Gütereigenschaften nicht völlig ausgeblendet werden können. Auf diese Weise wird 
die Gemeinschaftsgutforschung anschlussfähig für normativ geladene Gemeinwohl-
debatten. Aus der Analyse der Eigenschaften einzelner Güter und ihrer sozialen 
Konstruktion lassen sich Gestaltungsoptionen für institutionelle Regelungen ableiten. 
So verlangen technische Infrastruktursysteme als Netzwerkgüter, die der Verteilung 
von Umweltgütern dienen, besondere Institutionen und Governanceformen, die 
dieser Doppelfunktion Rechnung tragen. Bei Kulturlandschaften liegt der Schwer-
punkt angesichts der Heterogenität der institutionellen Zugänge auf Regelungen, 
welche die vielfältigen (negativen wie positiven) externen Effekte beeinflussen 
und dabei an den identitätsstiftenden und imagebildenden Potentialen anknüpfen.  
Der Gemeinwohlansatz bietet sozialwissenschaftlich fundierte Orientierungen 
für raum- und fachplanerische beziehungsweise regionalpolitische Ziel- und 
Steuerungsdiskussionen im Umgang mit regionalen Gemeinschaftsgütern. Für 
die gegenwärtigen Debatten über die Zukunft der Daseinsvorsorge, die sich 
stark auf Formen der infrastrukturellen Bereitstellung (zum Beispiel öffentlich 
versus privat) beziehen, liefert sie damit wichtige Anregungen für die entscheidende 
Frage, welchen öffentlichen – und vor allem regionalpolitischen – Zielen 




auch für Kulturlandschaften sind, wenn auch in unterschiedlichem Maße Ökonomi-
sierungsprozesse des Gemeinwohls sichtbar. Bei Kulturlandschaften kann der 
Gemeinwohlansatz auch dazu beitragen, die Pluralität und Konkurrenz von 
"öffentlichen Interessen" besser zu verstehen. Dabei plädiert die neuere Forschung 
gegen ein zu rigides, substantialistisches und für ein offenes, prozedurales 
Verständnis von Gemeinwohl. Der Gemeinwohlansatz sollte dabei die Wertepluralität 
und die Überlagerung unterschiedlicher Ansprüche berücksichtigen, die sich aus 
den unterschiedlichen Gütern und Güterfunktionen in ihrem Zusammenhang und 
in ihren Wechselwirkungen ergeben. Die Einbeziehung von Gemeinschaftsgut-
eigenschaften in Gemeinwohldiskursen kann dazu beitragen, der Gefahr einer 
"rhetorischen Leere" bei der Bestimmung des Gemeinwohlbegriffs zu entgehen 
und zur Herausbildung wirksamer institutioneller Arrangements beitragen.  
Die mit Wasserinfrastrukturen und Kulturlandschaften verbundenen Gemeinschafts-
gutprobleme im Spannungsfeld von Umweltgut und Netzwerkgut bzw. zwischen 
heterogenem Gemeinschaftsgut und ganzheitlicher Wirkung sind auf ihren 
dualen bzw. heterogenen Gütercharakter zurückzuführen. Darin liegt auch eine 
wesentliche Ursache für die bestehenden Integrationsdefizite hinsichtlich der 
Gemeinwohldiskurse beider Gemeinschaftsgüter. Der jeweilige Gütercharakter 
prägt auch die auf die Regelung des Umgangs mit Wasserressourcen und 
Wasserinfrastruktur sowie mit den einzelnen Elementen und Bestandteilen der 
Kulturlandschaft gerichteten sektoralen Institutionensysteme. Damit sind unter-
schiedliche institutionelle Kulturen in Bezug auf die Wirkungskraft formeller 
Institutionen, die Bedeutung von Hierarchien, die Ausstattung mit Ressourcen, 
die Wirkung ökonomischer (marktlicher) Anreize sowie den Einfluss informeller 
Institutionen verbunden. Daraus resultieren unterschiedliche Machtkonstellationen 
und Handlungslogiken, die eine institutionelle Integration und die Zusammenführung 
von Gemeinwohldiskursen erschweren. Diese Integrationsleistung zu vollbringen 
ist eine wesentliche Herausforderung für künftige prozedurale partizipative 
Gemeinwohldiskurse.  
Sowohl am Beispiel von Wasserinfrastrukturen als auch Kulturlandschaften ist 
deutlich geworden, dass historische Persistenzen und Wandlungsprozesse von 
physischen Strukturen, institutionellen Arrangements und Gemeinwohlvorstellungen 
sowohl in ihrem zeitlichen als auch räumlichen Kontext berücksichtigt werden 
müssen. Durch die Raumbezüge regionaler Gemeinschaftsgüter haben sich 
funktionale Handlungsräume infrastruktureller Ver- und Entsorgung oder kulturland-
schaftliche Handlungsräume herausgebildet, die an identitätstiftenden Potenzialen 
anknüpfen. Diese raumkonstituierende Wirkung regionaler Gemeinschaftsgütern 
steht im Spannungsfeld zur wachsenden Bedeutung der europäischen Ebene für die 
Festlegung von Rahmenbedingungen zur Formulierung von Gemeinwohlziel-
stellungen. Das betrifft insbesondere die Institutionensysteme, die stark durch 
formelle Institutionen geprägt oder vom Ressourcentransfer abhängig sind. Wasser-
ressourcen und -infrastrukturen sind davon stärker betroffen, als das eher schwach 
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institutionalisierte Gemeinschaftsgut Kulturlandschaft, das allerdings durch 
europäische Regelungen beispielsweise im Bereich der Agrarpolitik indirekt 
beeinflusst wird. Damit ist auch eine Europäisierung von Gemeinwohlbestimmungen 
verbunden. Dennoch bleiben im Zuge der räumlichen Rekonfiguration staatlichen 
Handelns viele historisch gewachsene Regelungsformen bestehen. Teilweise bieten 
sich neue Einflussmöglichkeiten auf regionaler und kommunaler Ebene zur Berück-
sichtigung von regional spezifischen – sozialökonomischen, politischen, technischen 
und ökologischen – Kontextbedingungen.  
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EXPLAINING TOP-DOWN INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN:  






The paper develops an understanding of the social construction of the scale 
based on the Distributional Theory of Institutional Change and examines the re-
scaling of water governance in Portugal. This rescaling is considered as intentional 
formal institutional change. The central water authority and multisectoral decon-
centrated administrations have lost competencies in favour of newly constituted 
water administrations. The level of water governance shifted from administrative 
districts to hydrographic regions. The central state and the Ministry of the Environ-
ment played a significant role in this process. The paper analyses determinants 
of institutional change and concluded that time preferences, mental models of 
associated networks, credibility and transaction and transition costs of governance 
affected the timing and content of the reform.  
1 INTRODUCTION 
Since the adoption of the WATER FRAMEWORK DIRECTIVE (WFD) (2000), water 
management has been and continues to be significantly restructured in Europe, 
providing an important driver for institutional change. In this context, the paper 
presents research on one of the issues raised by the WFD: "the right geographical 
scale …for water management" (CEC, 2007). The WFD organizes water management 
according to River Basin Districts, which mostly coincide with hydrogeographic 
boundaries, although the scale of the administrative bodies managing the districts 
are not stipulated. The Commission recognises differences in national legal and 
institutional frameworks, noting that "In particular countries with a federal 
structure, water management falls at least partly under the competence of sub-
national or regional authorities." (CEC, 2007, p. 16). MOSS (2004) has assessed 
the German case, for which he found "minimal change to existing institutional 
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arrangements", concluding that "The problem of spatial fit between the River Basin 
Districts and political territories of water management in Germany has been 
resolved in favour of the existing structures" (MOSS, 2004, p. 91). Water authorities 
of the German Länder will retain their legislative and executive powers over water 
management in accordance with the federal structure of government in Germany. 
In another federal country, Spain, river basin management has been increasingly 
passed to the subnational level of the elected communidades, sometimes even 
breaking up River Basin Districts into the competency of several communidades. 
Thus, in Spain, what we term "re-scaling" occurred. 
In line with HOWITT (2003, p. 151) we view scale as having three dimensions: 
size, level and relation. Re-scaling then implies a horizontal element, i.e. changes in 
the size of the area covered by a uniform institutional structure or by a physical 
infrastructure, a vertical element, i.e. the level within a vertically nested set of 
jurisdictions with which the respective institutional/ physical infrastructure is 
associated, and a relational element, i.e. changes in the vertical and horizontal 
interlinkages to other institutional/ physical structures and the environment (nested 
sets of rules (OSTROM et al., 2007)). In this paper we want to specifically reconstruct 
and theorize about why re-scaling of water governance happened in the case of 
Portugal, thereby contributing to an understanding of the social construction of scale 
(re-scaling) of resource governance (BRENNER, 2004, p. 96). Citing SWYNGEDOUW 
(2007 or 1990), HOWITT (2003) argues that scale needs to be grasped through 
empirical practices rather than through theory and finds it paradoxical to theorize 
scale independent from geographical context (HOWITT,  2003, p. 151). We 
conceptualise re-scaling as intentional formal institutional change, develop a 
heuristic framework based on the Distributive Theory of Institutional Change for 
explaining re-scaling of water governance in Portugal and examine its value 
for explaining the institutional change observed. We define governance as "the 
establishment, reaffirmation or change of institutions to resolve conflicts [or to 
coordinate] over environmental resources" (PAAVOLA, 2007, p. 94). Re-scaling 
implies change in the scale associated with governance. It comprises what 
Paavola named "generic governance functions", i. e. "1) exclusion of unauthorized 
users; 2) regulation of authorized resource uses and distribution of their benefits; 
3) provision and the recovery of its costs; 4) monitoring; 5) enforcement; 6) conflict 
resolution and collective choice" (PAAVOLA, 2007, p. 94). An understanding of 
state agency is key, referring to the role of levels of government and key actors 
in shaping policy outcomes. In a unitary state like Portugal, where sectoral 
political leadership plays a significant role such an understanding needs to include 
motivations of key actors (in this case the minister), a factor which has not received 
much attention in theories of institutional change and debates on re-scaling. 
The paper is structured as follows: firstly, we introduce concepts of scale and 
present an overview of the Distributional Theory of Institutional Change. Secondly, 
we outline the development of the scalar organisation of the water administration 
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in Portugal, followed, thirdly, by a detailed analysis of the question of what 
triggered re-scaling of water governance in Portugal. Finally, we interpret our 
findings in the context of re-scaling of water governance in other European 
Member states. 
Qualitative data for the empirical study has been gathered from a literature review 
which included peer reviewed articles, as well as extensive use of official govern-
ment reports and newspaper articles. These data sources have been verified by a 
number of key interviews which were conducted across a range of sectors, and 
in both academic and policy circles. 
2 SCALE, RE-SCALING, AND THEORIES OF INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 
Critical geographers highlight that re-scaling strategies, i.e. the social construction 
of scale, can be constitutive of multiple ends. Thus, scale is not an ontologically 
given category (MARSTON, 2000, p. 220) but seen as "political" involving shifts 
in the relationships between state and society (GUALINI, 2006, p. 885). Theories 
of this process stress the centrality of state agency to resolve contradictions and 
crises in the territorial regulation of development processes (idem p. 886). By 
the same token, re-scaling has significant implications for resource management. 
A number of scholars analyse scale against a normative background of match or 
misfist between social and ecological systems (e. g. CASH, 2006). LEE (1993) 
contends that where "human responsibility does not match the spatial, temporal, or 
functional scale of natural phenomena, unsustainable use of resources is likely, and 
it will persist until mismatch of scales is cured" (LEE, 1993 quoted in FOLKE et al., 
2007). Re-scaling redefines how resource management relates to the three problems 
of "fit", "scale" and "vertical and horizontal interplay" (YOUNG, 2002) for resource 
management. 
YOUNG (2002) highlights the numerous implications of re-scaling. Shifts in scale 
imply variations in the number of actors involved, contexts, logics of action 
selection, the relationships of power among them, perception of environmental 
problems, uncertainty of system’s behaviour, financing mechanisms and accounta-
bility . Furthermore, the forces that drive actors’ behaviour at different levels and 
their social context vary, their complexity varies, and actors at different levels apply 
different "logics of action selection" because of different contexts (YOUNG, 2002, 
p. 140ff). Last but not least, economies of scale and scope (FRITSCH et al., 2005; 
VARIAN,  2003) are important concepts often used to justify physical and 
institutional upscaling. 
Our focus with regards to re-scaling is the spatial scale associated with the 
regulation of natural resource use (PAAVOLA, 2007), and how the spatial scales 
of jurisdictions that adopt certain operational governance functions have been 
constructed. The spatial scales of governance functions are defined as levels, 
which have been "socially constructed" and labelled (e.g. regional, national, local). 
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In this paper we concentrate on changes in the social setting deciding over the 
level of governance and only address indirect human drivers that affect properties 
of transactions in passing. 
The concept of the river basin as the "natural" unit for water management has 
been criticised by human geographers working on scale issues. They point out that it 
is presented as a clear-cut and uncontroversial concept which has become a globally 
hegemonic, practically uncontested, discourse (MOLLE, 2009; WARNER et al., 2008; 
MOLLE, 2007; MOSS, 2004; MOSTERT, 2008). By presenting it as "natural", as 
most experts and administrators in the field in Portugal have also done, debate is 
closed concerning the scale at which water management is implemented, and the 
inherently political nature of the choices being made are concealed (WARNER et al., 
2008, p. 123-124) . In fact, re-organising water management to fit ecosystem 
boundaries is not obvious, as discrete river basins are often hard to define in bio-
physical terms and difficulties of institutional mismatch may emerge in relation 
to other spatially organised political units (MOSS, 2004; MOSTERT, 2008). Thus, 
we can say that proactive intention of certain actors is necessarily one important 
factor for explaining the way organisational and political economic tradeoffs between 
different scalar arrangements of water governance are decided.  
Authors make a distinction between economic or efficiency oriented and distri-
butional theories of institutional change. Capturing the essence of Distributional 
Theories of Institutional Change, THEESFELD (2005) explains that they describe 
"the process of institutional change …through differentially resourceful actors 
that negotiate about institutional change in view of their interests." KNIGHT (1992) 
specifies institutions as "sets of rules that structure social interactions in particular 
ways". These rules "(1) provide information about how people are expected to 
act in particular situations, (2) can be recognized by those who are members of 
the relevant group as the rules to which others conform, and (3) structure the 
strategic choices of actors in such a way as to produce equilibrium outcomes" 
(KNIGHT, 1992, p. 54). Institutions affect the payoffs from alternative strategic 
behaviour as they provide the information that structures strategic action and lowers 
uncertainty about the strategic action of actors leading to shared expectations. It 
entails an equilibrium which institutionalizes "a common way of doing things" 
(KNIGHT, 1995, p. 96). Often, these interactions are characterized by conflict. 
Institutions, and their development, is thus "not best explained as a pareto-superior 
response to collective goals or benefits but, rather, as a by-product of conflicts 
over distributional gains" (KNIGHT, 1992, p. 20). 
Knight pays particular attention to power relationships affecting institutions. He 
defines power as "the ability to affect one’s feasible set (of choices)…[A] 
change in the informal rules of a society can be generated by changes in either 
the distributional consequences of those rules or the relative bargaining power of the 
actors" (KNIGHT, 1992, p. 145). In the case of emergence of institutions, coordinated 
action provides an added value, which is subject to distribution. Alternatively, a 
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previously agreed equilibrium situation may be re-negotiated as the bargaining 
situation has changed. For the purpose of understanding institutional change, we 
specify a heuristic based on THEESFELD (2005), SCHLÜTER (2001) and KNIGHT 
(1992) to assess these changes in bargaining power or distributional outcome. 
Actors differ in their means and incentives (ends/expected benefit) to change 
institutional arrangements, and therefore shape the changes in the agreed institutional 
equilibrium. 
As we deal with change of formal institutions of water governance in Portugal 
we have to address the role of the state and the specificities of its relations to 
actors involved in the legislative process. Most commonly, the Distributional Theory 
of Institutional Change addresses changes in informal, decentralised institutional 
arrangements. Often institutionalist theories emphasise that the state provides for 
services in exchange for which actors pay taxes (NORTH, 1988). The state is 
defined as "an organisation that disposes of the …monopoly of violence which 
extends across a territory whose borders are defined by its taxing authority" 
(own translation of NORTH, 1988, p. 21). The state will try to maximize its income 
but is constrained by the opportunity costs of citizens because rivals may emerge 
that can provide the same services, i. e. property rights and their implemention 
through governance. Knight highlights two aspects of the role of the state in 
negotiations which we want consider: a) that it "expands the number of ways in 
which the two aspects of the institutionalization process, the creation and the 
social recognition of a new rule, can be accomplished" (KNIGHT, 1992, p. 189), 
and b) "state actors, either administrative officials or political representatives, 
have their own interests… the direct interest [material benefits] in the benefits 
accruing to those actors who serve as external enforcers and the indirect [political] 
interests in the effects of the distributional consequences of formal institutions 
on the long-term interests of the state" (KNIGHT, 1992, p. 190). Based on the 
empirical material we considered conventional public choice view of state action 
as insufficient to explain re-scaling. First, those directly involved into the decision, 
government ministers and high-level bureaucrats had no direct or indirect benefit 
from the administrative reform besides gains in idealist terms. In fact, we would 
argue that, on the contrary, the majority of actors expected to lose from the 
introduction of Regional Hydrographic Administrations (Administrações Regionais 
Hidrograficas – ARHs). As we will also describe below none of the established 
administrations or politicians gained in prestige, monetary terms or power resources 
because of the decision to re-scale water governance and the minister voluntarily 
stepped down after the legislature when re-scaling was decided. Second, the issue 
can be considered to be perceived as one of internal state organisation in which 
citizens did not have much interest. The 90 % Parliamentarian vote in favour of 
the overall reform of the law, of which re-scaling was an important part, illustrates 
that parties did not expect to derive political gain from this reform. For these 
reasons, in this paper we chose to develop and examine a heuristic derived from 
Knight's distributional theory of institutional change to explain re-scaling instead 
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of relying for example on a conceptualisation based on public choice theory, 
which would principally stress the role of personal gains of politicians, parties or 
bureaucrats. Instead, the framework we developed based on the distributional 
theory of institutional change allows us to analyze the detailed, contingent changes 
in power resources and actor orientations that we found to be responsible for re-
scaling of water governance in Portugal. Thus, in addition we detail other relevant 
components of state involvement, specifically positional and sanction power, and 
pertinent mental models
1 of the key actors, especially the minister, acting on 
behalf of the state.  
3 CASE STUDY BACKGROUND: WATER GOVERNANCE IN 
PORTUGAL 
Continental Portugal has historically been politically centralised, a tendency that 
was reinforced under the dictatorship (1926-1974). Following the fall of the 
dictatorship in 1974, significant powers were devolved and local authorities were 
strengthened. In 1979 five Regional Coordination Commissions (Commissão 
Coordenadora Regional – CCR) were established (North, Centre, Lisbon and the 
Tagus Valley, Alentejo and the Algarve) with the purpose of coordinating regional 
planning and intersectoral cooperation. Since the beginning of the nineties the 
central government ministries generally have representatives at this level. However, 
at a decision-making level the country remains highly centralised (SOROMENHO-
MARQUES, 2004). 
Until the transposition of the EU WFD into national law in 2005, Portuguese 
water law was somewhat fragmented (CUNHA SERRA, 2003). During the dictatorship 
period, water management was centralised and followed what has elsewhere 
been called the "hydraulic paradigm": utilising water for economic development, 
specifically irrigation in agriculture, with an emphasis on infrastructures for 
surface water provision, state managerialism, and with little consideration for 
the environment (SAURÍ and DEL MORAL, 2001 for the case of Spain). From the 
late 1970s onwards significant infrastructure investments were launched, and 
this was accelerated by entry to the EU in 1986. EU Directives were transposed 
into national law, and large amounts of funding were directed to agriculture and 
water infrastructures for domestic water supply and sanitation. A slightly more 
holistic approach to water management was adopted in this period (CORREIA, 1999), 
and environmental issues became a concern. The concept of river basin management 
was sidelined in favour of concentrating on achieving compliance with 
European water supply and sanitation standards (I 5; THIEL, 2009). 
                                                            
1  Mental models are "the internal representations that individual cognitive systems create to 
interpret the environment and the institutions are the external (to the mind) mechanisms 
individuals create to structure and order the environment. Some types of mental models are 
shared intersubjectively." (DENZAU and NORTH, 1994)  
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Until 1994 at the "deconcentrated" level of administration, water was managed by 
the five Regional Coordination Commissions within their geographical administrative 
boundaries. Short after the newly created Ministry of Environment started operating 
in 1993, environmental issues, including water, were separated from the Regional 
Coordination Commissions by the introduction of the Regional Directorates for 
Environment and Natural Resources (Direcção Regional Ambiente e Recursos 
Naturais – DRARNs – which had the same geographical boundaries as the Regional 
Coordination Commissions). Competencies for managing water resources were 
shared between the National Water Institute (INAG) and the five Regional 
Directorates for Environment and Natural Resources. In 1994 legislation was 
drawn up stipulting that water taxes were harmonized and levied at the decon-
centrated level. However, there was uncertainty on the part of users with respect 
to the sums to be paid (the tax values were not published), with the result that the 
new regime was difficult to implement and many users stopped paying altogether. 
Regional Directorates for Environment and Natural Resources were to undertake 
monitoring of water use, implementing and enforcing national legislation, issuing 
licenses, river basin planning for non-transboundary rivers, and impact assessments. 
INAG would plan and execute infrastructures works, river basin planning for 
transboundary rivers and overall supervision of the deconcentrated administrations. 
Despite reforms, interviewees referred to the deconcentrated bodies as "letter boxes" 
of the central level. Regional Directorates for Environment and Natural Resources 
complained about insufficient funds (from the Ministry of Environment) to carry 
out their functions. Resources for inspecting users were few, and penalties were 
low. It was acknowledged at all levels that, particularly concerning registration and 
monitoring of groundwater users, big implementation gaps existed (THIEL, 2009a). 
In 2002 environmental, land use and water management were again subsumed 
under the Regional Coordination Commissions, creating the CCDRs (Commissão 
Coordenadora dos Desenvolvimento Regional – Coordination Commissions for 
Regional Development). This development indicated the increasing competencies 
of the Ministry of Environment, and the intention to unite water and environmental 
management, economic development, land use management, and administrative 
support to municipalities. 
At the European level the WFD was adopted (during the Portuguese presidency) 
in 2000 (CEC, 2000), with a deadline for transposition of 2003. Its transposition 
in Portugal was significantly delayed because of extensive efforts to develop the 
law according the preferences of the various Minsters of the Environment in office. 
Following José Socrates, who held the position until 2003 and was a firm advocate 
of river basin planning
2, another three ministers held office over a period of two 
years. Altogether, the six versions of the legislation were developed by several 
expert commissions. When it was transposed in December 2005 as Lei da Àgua 
(Water Law), after adoption by the government it had a parliamentary majority 
                                                            
2  Jose Socrates later became Prime Minister in the Government which took power in 2005. 
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of 90 % while only a simple majority was required. The passing of the law 
followed the advent of a new government headed by José Socrates as Prime 
Minister. It was accompanied by a raft of legislations detailing its application. 
Of particular importance were the new economic and financial regime (TRH – 
Taxa de Recursos Hidricos), which regulated taxes for various activities and a 
law which defined public and private waters and user rights. 
The Water Law of 2005 aimed to: harmonise and update previous laws; transpose 
the WFD; and introduce new principles to the water sector. Its main terms related 
to the re-scaling of water governance through the introduction of Regional 
Hydrographic Administrations (ARHs). The ARHs assumed water competencies 
from the Coordination Commissions for Regional Development (CCDR) and took 
over important competencies from INAG. The ARHs are deconcentrated organs of 
the Ministry of the Environment and have a considerable degree of administrative 
and financial autonomy. They are intended to generate approximately two-thirds 
of their income by themselves. The ARHs are responsible for a range of activities, 
including the elaboration and execution of river basin management plans, the 
identification and monitoring of water resources, registration, licensing, enforcement 
of licenses, financing of water use, execution of certain works, Environmental 
Impact Assessments and ensuring public and stakeholder participation. The 
ARHs were established according to river basin areas, and are not territorially 
congruent with the CCDR (see Figure 1). The 15 river basins identified in mainland 
Portugal were grouped into 8 hydrographic regions, which are managed by 5 
administrative regions. The underlying logic of this process was not made transpa-
rent. Apparently, efforts were made to consider aquifers as well as surface water, 
and also the implications of boundaries for specific municipalities (I 8). The 
ARH administrative bodies – North, Centre, Lisbon and the Tagus Valley, Alentejo, 
and the Algarve – have their headquarters in the same town as the CCDR, and 
often in the same building. Thus, much of the administrative infrastructure remained 
the same, and many staff were transferred from the CCDR to the new ARH (and 
also from INAG in the case of ARH Tejo) (I 8). 
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Figure 1:  Timeline of restructuration of administrative structure below 
the central level in Portugal between 1990 – today 
 
INAG  and  the  CCDR  experienced  significant  changes  in  competencies  as  a 
result of the establishment of the Regional Hydrographic Administrations. INAG 
(now designated as the National Authority for Water) lost several responsibilities, 
and now focuses on coordination. It retains responsibility for national level planning, 
coordination and regulation, and for international cooperation: it approves River 
Basin Plans, checks that environmental objectives are met, and, in theory, ensures 
that measures across river basin regions are coordinated. The CCDR lost all 
competencies for the water sector, but are still responsible for guaranteeing environ-
mental protection of water from a land management perspective. 
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Figure 2:  Boundaries of Administrations of Hydrographic Regions (ARH) 
and deconcentrated central administrations (CCDRs) 
 
Source: BRITO et al., 2008. 
Notes:  Shades of grey: Delimitations of 5 River Basin Authorities;  
Lines: Delimitations of CCDRs/ areas of 5 deconcentrated central administrations (CCDRs). 
4 CHANGES IN POWER RESOURCES AND THE ASSESSMENT OF RE-SCALING OF 
WATER GOVERNANCE IN PORTUGAL 
Following Knight, we argue that institutional "development and change are functions 
of the distributional conflict over substantive social outcomes ..."(KNIGHT, 1992, 
p. 210). KNIGHT (1992), SCHLÜTER (2001) and THEESFELD (2005) developed a 
heuristic of the most significant variables shaping the pathways of institutional 
change. We adapted this set of factors based on our empirical work on re-scaling 
of water governance in Portugal. It testifies that the state has a pre-eminent role 
in changes in governance, because of its pre-eminent positional power, its role in 
actor networks and the way it provides a focal point for discussion and decision 
making. Considering this we developed the following heuristic to determine changes 
in bargaining power and distributional outcome that drove institutional change 
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between 2005 and 2008: a) dynamic considerations (time preference), b) determinants 
of credibile commitment (exit costs, uncertainty, positional and sanction power), 
c) legitimising network (information, skills and mental models) and d) transaction 
and transition costs, and their distribution. Both bargaining power and distributional 
outcome of bargaining are altered. The choice situation we identified was between 
remaining with the existing scalar organisation of water governance, or re-scaling it. 
As re-scaling did, in fact, occur, we try to uncover which drivers disrupted the 
previously agreed equilibrium as a consequence of (perceived) changes in the 
asymmetry of bargaining powers and/or distributional outcomes of alternative 
institutional arrangements. 
Re-scaling of water management in Portugal occurred via a regular legislative 
process. The Ministry of Environment was in charge of managing the legislative 
proposal, other Ministries were consulted where appropriate, and eventually all 
ministers forming the government had to agree on the joint government proposal 
(I  7). The government proposal was then submitted to a parliamentary vote. 
Simultaneously, politics of consultation, participation and lobbying took place 
involving, for example, the National Water Council (Conselho Nacional de Àgua – 
CNA), and sectoral interests which interacted directly with the relevant ministries 
(for example, energy and industry interests engaged with the Ministry of Economy). 
Nevertheless, several commentators considered that time and opportunity for 
consultation and participation were minimal (I 8). The opinions of associations of 
specific users such as the municipalities, or the Confederation of Farmers, were 
solicited (I 5,6,7,9,10,11). Politicians had direct influence on decision making, 
while water users and lobbyists had an indirect influence, as did public bodies whose 
competencies were reorganised as a result of the re-scaling. The main organisations 
directly affected by changes in water management were part of the Ministry of 
Environment. 
5 DYNAMIC CONSIDERATIONS 
Knight suggests that changes in time preferences of actors shape agreement on 
institutional arrangements. Patience can make actors hold out on arrangements; 
impatient actors will tend to prefer current gains over future (potentially higher) 
gains (THEESFELD, 2005, p. 75). Relative changes and differences in time preference 
between negotiating actors therefore affect the strategies and expectations of actors. 
It seems that contingent, dynamic considerations and time preference had a signify-
cant effect on the adoption of the Water Law and subsequent re-scaling of water 
management and added to state actors' credibility (dealt with in the next section). In 
2005, the socialist party had just come into power with an absolute majority and 
with a four year term of office ahead of it. It was necessary to embark on the re-
shaping of water governance promptly, as it required long term political commitment. 
Furthermore, there had been repeated work on this issue in the preceding years, 
led by different ministers. The underlying reason for continued work on this issue 
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was the need to transpose and implement the European WFD (CEC, 2000), i.e. 
the development of River Basin Plans, cost recovery, registration, monitoring 
requirements and participation (MAOTDR, 2007). In order to avoid the threat of 
penalties and associated negative consequences for the reputation of Portugal, the 
transposition of the WFD – through either substantial modification of existing law, 
or through entirely new water legislation – was necessary. Re-scaling would 
therefore be linked to a general overhaul of water legislation and competencies. 
The WFD set deadlines and therefore altered time preferences: River Basin Plans 
were to be adopted by 2009. In addition, according to various accounts, the existing 
water governance arrangement was performing poorly in relation to monitoring, 
evaluation and improvement of the quality and quantity status of water bodies 
(MAOTDR, 2008). This combination of factors explain the timing, although not 
the content, of the reform. As one senior government official put it, the WFD did 
not make river basin administrations compulsory, but it did "create an environment 
in which Portugal was able to draw on historical memories of river basin 
management... because of the WFD, we arrived at [the current] model." (I5). 
Nevertheless, in theory such a situation of urgency should have tended towards 
maintenance of the status quo because those in charge had shorter time preferences – 
and were therefore in a weaker position – than those in favour of maintaining the 
existing system. A modification of the existing law, to meet the tight deadlines of the 
WFD within the existing administrative set-up rather than an overhaul of compe-
tencies and their spatial delimitation could have been expected. Nonetheless, the 
existing constellation and especially the ideology of the legitimizing network of 
experts that the new minister was part of favoured a more radical change of water 
governance. 
6 DETERMINANTS OF CREDIBLE COMMITMENT 
Changes in the degree of credibility of commitment to either of the alternative 
institutional arrangements (equilibria) concerning re-scaling provide a crucial 
explanation in our case. We consider credible commitment as a situation in which 
there is certainty that a promise will be followed by action. It results in a higher 
likelihood that one actor will be convinced to accept the commitment of another 
actor (KNIGHT, 1995, p. 108-109 quoted by THEESFELD, 2005, p. 75). In our case 
several variables underline the credibility of state actors: exit costs, levels of 
certainty, and positional and sanction powers. a) Exit costs relate to bargaining 
power; "An actor with realistic exit options can survive several rounds in the 
bargaining game by having low costs of non-coordination. " (KNIGHT, 1995, p. 118 
quoted by THEESFELD, 2005, p. 75). Thus, an expectation of high exit costs by 
certain actors made adherence to the corresponding strategies less likely. b) 
Changes to the degree of uncertainty of implications of alternative arrangements 
are potential drivers of institutional change. We consider two interrelated sources of 
uncertainty: first, political consequences, and second, substantive consequences, 
Bogen50-BExplaining top-down institutional design 
 
97
in terms of the performance of water management. High political and substantive 
exit costs increase credible commitments of actors. Furthermore, credibility depends 
on whether an actor has the means to implement his commitments. Thus, c) changes 
in positional and sanction power play a significant role. Power assigned to a 
position, as opposed to emerging from characteristics of an individual, arises from a 
strategic position that offers an actor access to important information, controlling 
power over assets, or the opportunity to carry out credible threats (SHLEIFER and 
TREISMANN, 1998, p. 20, quoted by THEESFELD, 2005, p. 77). We consider it jointly 
with sanction power which enables actors to push their alternatives. It ensures 
commitment in a twofold way by reducing the expected benefits of non-compliance 
(with coordination) and making compliance a more beneficial long-term strategy 
(KNIGHT, 1992, p. 179). At first sight exit costs from the abolishment of water 
management seems to be unlikely. However, political and substantive exit costs 
and options do exist as the negotiations on re-scaling and the economic-financial 
regime need to be viewed jointly. We need to consider political exit costs of non-
agreement on the economic-financial regime and changes in substantial exit 
costs of implementation failure. Furthermore, the degree of certainty of either to 
occur and changes in capacities of actors to impose preferred options are also 
related. 
Together with the dynamic considerations made above, changes in exit costs, 
certainty about them, and changes in sanction power explain why a decision was 
taken at this moment in time, as well as the content of the reform. The European 
Commission threatened to take Portugal to court for its failure to transpose the 
WFD on time, and that way increased Portuguese certainty on the political and 
financial costs of non-transposition. Furthermore, recent decisions by the European 
court and penalties that were handed out to other member states increased certainty 
about opportunity costs of substantive non-compliance. With the election of an 
absolute majority credibility of the socialist government to carry out the institutional 
reform of the water sector increased significantly. The Ministry of Environment 
obtained additional political influence in relation to other actors (such as the farming 
sector, energy companies or municipalities) through obtaining competency over 
European funds and regional development. One informant from the Ministry 
stated that competency for regional development "although it is less talked about, 
added an enormous [political] weight to the Ministry of Environment because 
the overall management of community funds passed to us, and so we are now 
perceived not just as an organ who discusses in theory how water ought to be 
organised, but as actually going to the field and putting millions of euros into 
projects" (I5). Additionally, heightened urgency, for reasons explained above, 
and exit costs of non-implementation of the economic/financial regime made the 
government commitment to take action on water governance more credible. The 
conviction spread that reform of the sector was imminent. 
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With regard to the content of the reform, credibility of the Ministry of Environment 
and therefore also the government furthermore depended on internal support, 
particularly from the Coordination Commissions for Regional Development and 
INAG. The positional power of the minister in charge of both these entities 
overcame their opposition at relative low bargaining costs. Both the agricultural 
sector (I 11, 5, 6) and municipalities (I 5, 9, 10) initially opposed the economic-
financial regime. However, the minister's superior sanctioning power and range 
of competencies vis à vis these actors specifically in the water domain overcame 
their opposition. 
7 LEGITIMIZING NETWORK MEMBERSHIP 
Other factors which explain the key role of the Minister include access to 
information, knowledge and opinions, the organisation of "ideological support" 
for the Minister's position, and his membership in networks of knowledge at the 
time of the reform. Network members have a bargaining advantage due to 
superior information access. Further, "Information is a further key power resource" 
(KNIGHT, 1992, p. 41 quoted by THEESFELD, 2005, p. 76). "… [I]nfluencing actors’ 
alternatives, hiding institutional alternatives, or adding new alternatives is only 
possible in a situation of information asymmetry" (KNIGHT, 1992, p. 46). We found 
that in our case study changes in the information on alternatives was widely available 
after many years of discussion of institutional alternatives, and so this factor was 
not decisive. Furthermore, THEESFELD (2005, p. 77) considers soft (personal skills) 
and hard skills (education and experience (SCHLÜTER, 2001) 
In addition, formal positional and sanction powers of the state actor made persuasive 
skills with regard to opposition at lower governmental levels dispensable. We 
therefore consider network membership the most relevant factor in this category. 
The personality of the Minister of the Environment who took office in 2004 made a 
significant difference to the content of the reform. The Minister was formerly an 
academic who had worked extensively on water and environmental issues in 
Portugal. At the end of the eighties he was the director of the National Water 
Administration, and had already expressed a preference for river basin management 
(THIEL, 2009a). He formed part of the group of national experts on water and 
was consulted on water issues. When the new minister took office, he also took 
operational charge of water policy (I 7). In comparison to previous ministers he 
had a clear advantage in relation to his understanding of the sector, which was 
backed up by an extensive network of experts and included support from the 
Prime Minister
3 (I 6). As one Ministry interviewee working on water reforms 
stated, "We have one great advantage, which is that the Minister's subject area is 
water, and he knows the sector very well... It is a great help, because he immediately 
                                                            
3  Who himself had been Minister for the Environment previously and who had attempted to 
issue the first Water Law 
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knows what the issues are, and this eases decision-making immensely" (I  ). 
River Basin Management had been advocated over a long period of time by the 
national professional association (Associacao Portuguesa dos Recursos Hidricos – 
APRH), of which the Minister was also a member (I 11). The reform therefore 
followed the predominant mental model of the professional network which 
secured widespread support, lowering bargaining costs to gain support by the sector. 
Initially, this idea was defended more in professional circles than in political 
ones. One opinion which was proffered was that the "political powers never regarded 
[river basin management] as a good idea, because it was subversive with regard to 
the existing system, but in professional communities the idea was always defended" 
(I 5). However, convergence of mental models among political parties, particularly 
with regard to water pricing, and agreement to enhance monitoring, participation 
and performance of water governance had been accomplished during negotiations on 
the previous six versions of the water law. Structuring the reform in accordance 
with the predominant mental models lowered bargaining costs. While, as a state 
actor the Minister apparently did not have any material benefits from this reform, he 
gained personal prestige by finally implementing the reform he fought for 
throughout a decade (I 4,5,6,7). Morever, we have to consider the political economy 
aspect expressed through political benefits from the reform of the water sector 
when we look at state involvement into decision making. Nevertheless, the vote 
on the reform in the Parliament makes this aspect of the reform appear irrelevant 
given that 90 % of the Members of Parliament supported the reform. 
8 DISTRIBUTION OF COSTS 
In this section we consider changes in the perception of transaction and transition 
costs of alternative institutional arrangements, their determinants and their distribution 
among actors in relation to the emergence of institutional change. They shaped 
the details of the reform and the spatial delimitation of the jurisdictions of each 
Regional Hydrographic Administration. Transaction costs affect the payoffs of 
cooperation, and, thus, change distributional consequences of bargaining outcomes 
(THEESFELD, 2005, p. 77). As they differ across actors, power asymmetries emerge. 
We would further add transition costs, "that is, the costs of decision making for insti-
tutional change and the costs of implementing institutional reforms" (CHALLEN, 2000, 
p.  7). Transition costs or operational transaction costs and their distribution 
depend on the assessed monitoring, enforcement, and operational adaptation 
costs of institutional alternatives, which in turn depend on technology of monitoring 
and enforcement and the specific provisions that are made. We need to ascertain 
whether technologies to enforce or monitor arrangements were adapted, or whether 
proposed arrangements were redesigned to redistribute costs. Moreover, costs 
may have changed as characteristics of the transactions changed (e. g. frequency, 
technology of water use, or exclusion technology) in the period before agreement 
on the Water Law. 
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Transaction and transition costs, and their distribution, played a decisive role in 
the agreement, specifically with regard to the reorganisations. In contrast, the 
characteristics of transactions and resources changed only in a marginal way
4 
and therefore does not have much of an explanatory role. The amount and 
distribution of transaction and transition costs became the most important obstacle 
to the reform of the water sector. The Ministry of Finance argued that the reform 
led to additional costs of creating new public entities (the Regional Hydrographic 
Administrations) at a time when there was a general drive to reduce public expen-
diture. The central government only wanted to "retain the fundamental attributes, 
but in principle [to] allow society to manage for itself the goods at its disposal in 
a simplified way, as long as it is in accordance with the law" (I 1). Thus, in order 
to overcome resistance of the Ministry of Finance, the Water Law was shaped in 
such a way that no additional costs emerged for the state. Effective implementation 
of water pricing as part of the Water Law became even more important in order 
to auto-finance the reform. It was intended that water users would pay for the 
reform through the new water tariffs. Nevertheless, this necessity would heighten 
transition costs (political costs of implementation) in the short term, which was 
accepted because of a shared understanding (mental models) on the need for pricing 
and supranational pressures. This distinction between short and long term costs 
is widely recognised. A member of a newly established ARH pointed out that, 
"...the problem is surviving this [initial implementation] phase; but if we manage 
to survive this we will have for the first time in the history of water resources [in 
Portugal] the necessary formalised means to ensure effective management of 
water resources" (I 3). New water bodies are to be self-financing, which increases 
incentives to become effective in raising water fees (a major aim of the legislation). 
In addition, a significant fund was established (50 % of all income of the ARHs) 
to redistribute financial resources between the "richer" and "poorer" ARHs, to 
cater for consistent water standards across Portugal (THIEL, 2009). Further measures 
were introduced with the aim to reduce the administrative burden for the state, 
make the new legislation acceptable to water users and minimize transition and 
transaction costs. The legislation allowed the ARHs to launch private enterprises 
in order to obtain further funds and to delegate competencies to private and public 
entities, shifting burdens to other actors. Second, the new delimitation of water 
administrations differs from previous territorial boundaries, specifically in relation to 
the most significant rivers for Portugal, the transboundary rivers, which would now 
only be administered by one entity, whereas previously, for example, the Tagus river 
was administered by three Coordination Commissions for Regional Development. 
They had to coordinate their strategies before entering into talks with upstream 
Spain (I 6). This national coordination on the level of the basin is now made 
redundant saving transaction costs (MINISTÉRIO DO AMBIENTE, 2008). Third, in 
                                                            
4  With the exception of the Algarve where water sources shifted from groundwater to 
surface waters (THIEL, 2009) and the installation of the Alqueva dam in Alentejo which is 
to provide surface waters for tourism and agricultural development.  
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order to economize on transaction and transition costs the Water Law put 
significant emphasis on technological change for implementing exclusion and 
monitoring, which also increased certainty of the substantive performance of water 
management and the degree of excludability of water use. Web-based applications 
are intended in order to lower operational transaction costs. Effective registration is 
required to ensure that the auto-financing regime of the administrations is successful. 
There are high expectations for the development of a GIS-based information 
database and technology to exclude and monitor water users, although similar 
previous attempts by INAG have apparently failed (I 4). Fourth, it is no coinci-
dence that the five ARHs, which manage one or several entire river basins, have 
been headquartered in the same locations as the CCDR. One interviewee put this 
particularly strongly, stating: "In my opinion, the main motive that [the ARH] exist 
in the format they have taken is because of the ease of passing to a new regime 
which is similar to the CCDR" (I12). Furthermore, transition costs would be 
minimized, as partially existing networks and coordination mechanisms between 
different resource regimes could be maintained. Fifth, in order to avoid inconsisten-
cies and duplication of efforts INAG adopts a coordinating role, and the Ministry 
continues to have the final word on water management (I 1,5,6). 
9 CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, we analysed re-scaling of water governance in Portugal as 
intentional institutional change with reliance on the Distributional Theory of 
Institutional Change and a heuristic to disentangle shifts in bargaining power and 
distributional outcomes. The case study proved the usefulness of this framework, 
which allows for factors such as perceptions and personal gain of actors, changes in 
actors' resources, and detailed implications of transaction costs for the design of 
the agreed institutions. The timing of the formal and substantive requirements of 
the WFD necessitated an urgent reformulation of the water sector in Portugal. In 
this context it is counter-intuitive that the decisive actors, principally the Minister, 
opted for a relatively radical reformulation of water governance in Portugal, involving 
re-scaling, shifts in competencies and transposition of requirements concerning 
cost recovery, monitoring and participation. This can be explained by the Minister's 
membership in a network of experts that had long favoured this approach. The 
strong mandate of the government, the expertise of the minister and his extensive 
competencies in relation to water users and related agencies, explains why he 
was able to implement the reform. Considerations of transaction and transition 
costs (also a main concern of the Ministry of Finance) directed certain aspects of 
the reform, such as the role of technological innovations, the need for registration, 
and the emphasis on cost recovery. Furthermore, the specific shape of the reform 
is not quite as revolutionary as it seems: measures such as delegation, management 
innovations, maintenance of existing physical infrastructure lowered transition 
and future transaction costs. They introduced a considerable measure of path 
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dependency. Transition costs were kept at relatively low level by maintaining 
the five administrative headquarters in the same locations as the Coordination 
Commissions for Regional Development. Moreover, we concluded that changes 
in characteristics of resources that provide water services, and of transactions or 
infrastructures organising them, were not significant for re-scaling of water 
services in Portugal. 
The possibilities of new redistribution funds and water taxes helped to overcome 
opposition by the Ministry of Finance and poorer regions of Portugal. Depending 
on the way redistribution will be carried out, it may be key to implementation 
success. Success of the new system will depend on implementation success in 
relation to licenses and cost recovery, and articulation with land use plans, munici-
palities and agriculture. Currently, the whole sector is going through a process of 
significant restructuring. In addition to setting up new agencies, reorganising new 
and old administrations, registering and charging for water uses, nationwide river 
basin planning is under way. It has also been argued that a cultural change is needed 
at the level of technical staff, in which actors depart from the dominant engineering 
view of water management (THIEL, 2009). 
Furthermore, integration at the level of surface waters came at the cost of potential 
incongruence with other environmental management activities, notably land use, 
as well as dividing up competencies for some significant groundwater reservoirs. 
Some dilemmas have been resolved through re-scaling according to "natural" 
river basin boundaries, but others have emerged. Several experts also highlighted 
that articulation with management of other resources is insufficient. This may be 
aggravated by the separation of water management from the Coordination 
Commissions for Regional Development. Thus, in relation to the interplay pheno-
menon, increasing transaction costs might emerge. Nevertheless, as the previous 
arrangement performed weakly in this respect (MINISTÉRIO DO AMBIENTE, 2008), 
improvements in this area are essential. Ample scope for future research is opened up 
regarding the performance and implications of the new water regime in Portugal. 
Some actors consider there to be a link between the delimitation of boundaries 
for water governance and the project of regionalisation of Portugal (I 5,10,11), 
which is defended by certain players and is foreseen in the constitution. Water is 
a "limiting production factor" of great public salience and ideological value, and 
is likely to be an important factor in territorial politics. In neighbouring Spain, 
which can be considered a federal state, a similar process of re-scaling is currently 
under way, implying decentralisation of responsibilities for "supraregional" rivers 
to the level of democratically elected comunidades. Explorative work shows that 
in this case re-scaling has to be viewed as part of constructing regions as arenas 
for dispute and identification around water as a critical production factor. Decentrali-
sation is part of a broader project pursued by the Spanish Communidade of 
Andalucia, for example, in order to strengthen the role of regional government 
vis à vis the central state. By defining management of supraregional rivers within 
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the boundaries of (administrative) communidades, the ecosystem oriented catchment 
approach is sidelined. Socially constructing a region around the management of 
its (scarce) waters seems to play an important role along with claims for material 
influence over resources at the level of communidades (I 13). It seems therefore 
that this ideological, socially constructed dimension of re-scaling plays a specific 
role for re-scaling of water management on the Iberian peninsula. Previous 
studies by THIEL (2009) on Portugal and SWYNGEDOUW (1999 and 2007) on the 
history of hydropolitics in Spain confirm this perspective for the role of scaling 
through physical infrastructures and the provision of water services. 
LIST OF INTERVIEWS/INFORMAL COMMUNICATION: 
I 1:  Ministerio do Ambiente, do Ordenamento do Territorio e do Desenvolvimento Regional – 
MAOTDR. 
I 2:  Administração Regional Hidrgrafica (ARH) ARH Lisboa e Vale do Tejo. 
I 3:  Administração Regional Hidrgrafica (ARH) ARH Alentejo. 
I 4:  Informal communication in Ministerio do Ambiente, do Ordenamento do Territorio e do 
Desenvolvimento Regional – MAOTDR, 13.5.2009. 
I 5:  Ministerio do Ambiente, do Ordenamento do Territorio e do Desenvolvimento Regional – 
MAOTDR, 15.5.2009. 
I 6:  Àguas de Portugal (AdP), 15.5.2009. 
I 7:  Informal communication in Ministerio do Ambiente, do Ordenamento do Territorio e do 
Desenvolvimento Regional – MAOTDR 14.5.2009. 
I 8:  Direccao Geral do Ordenamento de Territorio e do Desenvolvimento Urbano (DGOTDU – 
Ministerio do Ambiente, do Ordenamento do Territorio e do Desenvolvimento Regional – 
MAOTDR), 29.5.2009. 
I 9:  Associação Nacional de Municipios de Portugal (ANMP) 4.6.2009. 
I 10: Administração Regional Hidrgrafica (ARH) Norte 5.6.2009. 
I 11: Instituto Nacioal da Àgua (INAG) 16.6.2009. 
I 12: Liga para a Protecção da Natureza 06.10.2008. 
I 13: Universidade de Sevilla 13.7.2009. 
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A recent and widespread institutional change in local natural resource governance 
is triggered by decentralization as a deliberate process, and within this context, a 
transfer of property rights from central government to local resource users. Yet, 
despite the successes of many decentralization policies, there are several risks for 
unintended outcomes. One is the phenomenon of elite capture. Our paper investi-
gates elite capture in Albania’s Lake Ohrid fishing region. We aim to contribute to 
the state of knowledge on decentralization failures by identifying determinants 
for and effects of elite capture. Our empirical case shows how blueprint approaches 
for decentralized management and top-down implementation led to further 
empowerment of privileged locals, who realize personal gains at the expense of 
distributional inequity within the community. Specifically original insights are 
derived from our analysis of implications from the post-socialist context, such as 
the deteriorating effect on trust, otherwise a prerequisite for collective action. 
Key words: Decentralization,  institutional  change, local governance; elite 
capture, fishery, Albania. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
One of the most important issues in rural development and natural resource 
management is empowerment and entitlement of local resource users. In this 
context, the crucial question is how local actors can be enabled to stand up for 
their interests (KESBY, 2005). Decentralisation is considered an effective means 
to foster local participation in decision-making, or, at the very least, a better under-
standing of local needs and desires and the incorporation of these into government 
programs.  
We will draw our empirical evidence from post-socialist Albania. The communist 
regime collapsed in 1990 and the Republic of Albania was founded in 1991.  
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In 1992, the Democratic Party of Albania took control of the country through 
democratic elections, followed by deliberate programs of economic and democratic 
reforms. Yet, several political instabilities followed, such as the countrywide upspring 
in 1997
1. Still, since the late 1990’s, Albania has followed the international policy 
trend of decentralization, within which at least 60 countries claim to reform the 
management of their natural resources (AGRAWAL, 2001). In the early 2000, the 
Albanian government introduced a new governance system for fishing resources – 
a common-property resource regime – to involve locals in fishery management. 
Fishing, a major source of subsistence for many poor, rural households in 
Albania, has been drastically affected by the experienced political insecurity and 
institutional vacuum to which Albania was like many other post-socialist countries 
exposed to (LAWSON and SALTMASHE, 2000; HASHI and XHILLARI, 1999; SCHLEYER, 
2003; THEESFELD, 2008). Following this development, access to resources became 
unrestricted, making it impossible to overcome destructive patterns (OSTROM, 1990). 
At Lake Ohrid, a major watershed in the country’s South-East, fish stocks accordingly 
became severely overexploited ever since the shortfall of political rule in 1997, 
because the actual institution, i.e. the effective local rule, was an open access property 
regime (WATZIN, 2006). The Ohrid case has recently gained international notoriety 
for the impending extinction of the Ohrid trout (salmo letnica), a rare endemic 
specie which is of exceptional economic and ecologic importance to the region 
(ibid.). 
The decentralization reform in Albania’s fishery sector represents an intended 
institutional change as described in the editorial of this book. Yet, elite capture, 
the phenomenon described in the following, is rather an unintended outcome of 
this institutional change (KINGSTON and CABALLERO, 2009). The aim of this study 
is to analyze causes and effects of elite capture by drawing onto the case of the 
Lake Ohrid fishery. We further aim to identify post-socialist particularities, 
which facilitate the occurrence of elite capture. The next section briefly explains 
why decentralization plays a crucial role especially in previously centralized natural 
resource governance systems like those to be found in post-socialist societies. 
Chapter 3 introduces one frequent implication of that policy choice, namely the 
phenomenon of elite capture. In Chapter 4, we describe previous as well as recent 
institutional changes within the Lake Ohrid fishing sector. Chapter 5 provides 
mpirical evidence for the peculiarities of elite capture in the study area. Chapter 6 
summarizes and discusses those findings. Chapter 7 concludes with a set of policy 
recommendations on how to avoid elite capture in post-socialist natural resource 
management.  
                                                            
1  The 1997 unrest in Albania, also known as the Lottery Uprising, was an uprising sparked 
by Ponzi scheme failures. Albania descended into anarchy and violence in which the 
government was toppled and some 2,000 people were killed.
 The United Nations Security 
Council authorized a force of 7,000 on March 28 to direct relief efforts and to restore order 
in the country. 
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2 DECENTRALIZATION TO SOLVE COMMON-POOL RESOURCE 
DILEMMAS  
Fishing represents a classical common-pool resource dilemma, which is better 
described as an open access property regime (MUNRO, 2008; ACHESON and KNIGHT, 
2000). Previous conventional approaches to overcome such dilemmas included 
creating a system of private property rights or to rely on centralized government 
control. However, at least since the early 1980s, scholars have compiled mounting 
evidence of a variety of problems that may arise from these approaches (DASGUPTA, 
1982; RUNGE, 1986; OSTROM, 1990; BERKES and POMEROY, 1997; AGRAWAL 
and GIBSON, 1999).  
In fact, many voices propose local governance based on common property as a 
more suitable alternative (OSTROM, 1990; BROMLEY and FEENY, 1992; POMEROY, 
1995). Its promoters commonly point to positive effects of including local resource 
users and their experiences especially during the process of institutional change 
(OSTROM, 2005). Studies in the related context of fishery co-management for 
instance argue that local knowledge derived from life-long interaction with the 
natural system provides the intellectual inputs that remain absent in many centralized 
approaches (CHUENPADGEE and JENTOFT, 2007; JENTOFT et al., 1998; WILSON et al., 
2006). ANDERSSON and OSTROM (2008) argue that locals use their knowledge to 
craft better adapted and cheaper rules than any other governance scheme. The 
advantages of locally crafted rules outreach their functional suitability. Over and 
above, they are perceived as legitimate and will be strengthened by intrinsic 
motivation (FREY and OBERHOLZER-GEE, 1994; JENTOFT et. al., 1998; JENTOFT, 
1989). The costs of enforcing legitimate rules are lower than in the case of 
coercive rules that have been imposed by external forces. This is in fact exceedingly 
applicable within the context of institutional changes in post-socialist societies 
where local actors often see their preferences disregarded, and therefore contest 
legal acts by refraining to informal rules (SIKOR et al., 2009).  
In Albania’s political history as a post-socialist country, all natural resource mana-
gement was state managed and top-down implemented and enforced. A common 
path for the establishment of local governance schemes in previously centralized 
economic sectors are participatory decentralization policies (BLAIR, 2000). According 
to KNOX and MEINZEN-DICK (2001), decentralization
2 implies an authority and 
management transfer to lower levels of government. Often decentralization 
approaches are combined with devolution, i.e. the transfer of responsibility and 
authority over natural resources from the state to non-governmental bodies, 
                                                            
2  The transfer of power from central to local authorities has taken administrative and political 
forms. Administrative decentralization, or deconcentration, aims at helping ministries to 
read the preferences of local populations and to better mobilize local resources and human 
capital. Political or democratic decentralization integrates local populations into decision-
making through better representation by creating and empowering representative local 
governments (LARSON and RIBOT, 2004). 
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particularly user groups. The latter, is commonly expressed by a formal transfer 
of property rights, a crucial prerequisite for the inclusion of local actors, since it 
can provide reliable incentives regarding the distribution of benefits from resource 
utilization. We assume here that decentralization is one way to facilitate local 
resource users to more successfully govern their natural resource. We regard it as a 
way to solve the social dilemma common-pool resource users, such as fisherman, 
are trapped in.  
Yet, as will be discussed later, there are particular constraints when implementing 
decentralization aiming at participation and local self-governance in a post-
socialist country. One is the particular interdependency between abuse of power 
and decrease in trust that produces a downgrading effect on collective action 
(THEESFELD, 2009b). Another impediment is that participation in decision-making 
processes may require first of all social learning, particularly in societies where 
such kind of participations was not welcome by the past political regime. 
In a nested political system, formulating and designing decentralization policies, 
takes place at all government levels. Decentralization is seen as a process of 
transferring or devolving power and authority from large to small units of 
governance. Thus, the phenomenon of elite capture is not something restricted to the 
local level regarding actual resource transactions. Also, higher level governments are 
no unitary, neutral actors. Already the process of formulating a policy to benefit 
society is formulated by the groups in power in government according to their vision 
on society and their concept of benefit (MCGINN and STREET, 1986). Decentralization 
reforms show that policies often are subverted by divisions within the government 
that act in their own self-interest. Governments will try to decentralize only to 
the extent that the dominant group in the government believes that its interests 
(and those of other groups with whom it has formed an alliance) would be best 
served by decentralization (MCGINN and STREET, 1986). In the frame of this paper 
we will not deal with these higher levels of political decision making. Yet, we need 
to keep that in mind as it is going to give us some explanations why decentralization 
policies are sometimes not accompanied by additional reforms that would lead 
to facilitative governance structures to make decentralization more effective. 
Most theorists and policy makers justify decentralization on the grounds that the 
increased efficiency, equity, and inclusion that should arise from the devolution 
of power and responsibilities result in more sustainable management (LARSON 
and RIBOT, 2004). However, while decentralization promises benefits to those 
who are empowered, it likewise threatens central authorities and elites who fear 
a potential loss of influence, income, or patronage resources. In this situation, 
the strength and manifestations – or more specifically, local power relations – of 
elite actors are exceedingly important in shaping the actual degree of decentralization 
and its outcomes (LARSON and RIBOT, 2004; LARSON, 2003).  
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Reviews of decentralization policies, in the following understood as including 
devolution approaches, and community-based development policies, in particular, 
indicate that many have neither been effective at targeting the poor (BARDHAN, 
2002), nor have they increased the administrative efficiency or local participation 
(MCGINN and STREET, 1986). A major cause for this failure is the problem of 
elite capture (LANGE, 2010; AGARWAL, 2001; ANDERSSON and OSTROM, 2008; 
JOHNSON, 2001; BARDHAN, 2002; MANSURI and RAO, 2004; PLATTEAU and 
GASPART, 2003). 
3 THE PHENOMENON OF ELITE CAPTURE  
Elite capture is the tendency of local elites – that is, local individuals or groups 
with disproportionate access to social, political, and economic power – to dominate 
or capture participatory projects (BANERJEE et al., 2001; DASGUPTA and BEARD, 
2007; MANSURI and RAO, 2004; BARDHAN and MOOKHERJEE, 2006; MOHAN 
and STOKKE, 2000; LANGE, 2010). In the context of decentralization policies and 
the establishment of local governance, elite capture is frequently expressed by an 
interference with an equitable devolution of power. This interference may proceed 
until the initial purpose of decentralization is in fact twisted around, leaving 
those who deserve empowerment with even less, and those, already in power with 
additional benefits (LARSON, 2003). In other words, an increase in equity within 
a community will often be tantamount to a loss of influence, income, or patronage 
resources. 
Another reason lies with the fact that the devolution of power and responsibilities 
represents an opportunity to get hold of additional resources that suddenly become 
at disposal at local level. It has thus been observed that elite capture is typically 
expressed by a misappropriation or illegitimate re-distribution of money, positions, 
property rights and other resources (ANDERSSON and VAN LAERHOVEN, 2007; 
D’EXELLE and RIEDL, 2008; PLATTEAU, 2004). ANDERSSON and OSTROM (2008: 75) 
who term such settings "local tyrannies", stress that misappropriation is often based 
on a change of rules by the powerful and that local resource governance is then 
organized anything but democratically (ANDERSSON and OSTROM, 2008).  
We need to qualify the elite capture phenomenon at least once, in relation to the 
context of a weak state such as in post-socialist Albania. Patronage systems have 
a long tradition in Balkan states and from that respect they also have some positive 
aspects to be considered. The described phenomenon of elite capture in the fishery 
sector is just one element of a patronage system. It is a way societies deal with 
the absence of formal rules and governance structures. In that respect, it provides 
some stability through secure expectations on how transactions are going to happen. 
Yet, we focus in this paper implicitly on evaluation criteria of decentralization, 
such as ecological sustainability of the resource systems (overfishing), participation 
in economic development of all social groups, participation in rule making. Therefore, 
we judge the outcomes of elite capture as rather problematic. 
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3.1  Facilitative conditions  
Conditions that facilitate elite capture are manifold and related to exogenous 
nuisances and endogenous imperfections within the community (BERKES and 
POMEROY, 1997; PLATTEAU and ABRAHAM, 2002). Exogenous nuisances comprise 
failures by the government or other external actors in charge of the planning and 
implementation of decentralization and local resource governance (PLATTEAU, 
2004). The question arises whether elite capture occurs because a decentralization 
reform has not been backed up by appropriate institutions and governance structures 
that would allow for genuine participation. Governance structures are understood as 
the organizational solutions, necessary for making the new rules of the decentralized 
resource management system effective and guaranteeing rights and duties and 
their use in coordinating transactions (OSTROM, 1990).  
The creation of adapted rules and also the establishment of appropriate governance 
structures, like for instance participatory decision making arenas with local actors, 
are tasks which require time and resources. Government actors are frequently 
overburdened by these requirements, especially if the initiation of the envisioned 
institutional changes is not supported or demanded for by the local recipients. 
Although contradictory to the policy’s purpose, the external initiators may therefore 
be tempted to refrain to blue-print thinking and to skip the participatory process. To 
do so, however, entails a heightened risk for remaining ignorant of the community’s 
peculiarities including sources of inequality and foreseeable cases of domination 
and capture.  
Other exogenous conditions which again facilitate elite capture can occur during 
and after the phase of policy implementation. The actual transfer of property 
rights and often also of physical investments is usually channelled through a 
small number of community representatives and local elites will almost naturally 
be among this group (PLATTEAU, 2004). Opportunities for fraud arise whenever the 
external initiators lose track of what happens within the community (PLATTEAU and 
ABRAHAM, 2002). This is predominantly the case when the community represent-
tatives are the only actors the initiators have made contacts with. The community 
representatives will then use their position to filter inquiries regarding the 
whereabouts and use of the contributions (ibid.) – this argument is clearly connected 
to the earlier argument that insufficient participation can foster elite domination. 
In other cases, the external initiator may even lack the resources or the tenacity 
to follow up on the long term effects of the local re-distribution of power and 
resources. Here, there is undoubtedly even more freedom to dominate community-
level planning and corrupt the use of assets. Weaker community members who 
are excluded from communication with the external initiators often simply do 
not know that they are being cheated on.  
Endogenous imperfections are strongly determined by implications of heterogeneity 
within the local community and its effects on leadership and the willingness to 
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participate in collective action. Heterogeneity and leadership can result in capture 
when the powerful cannot be held accountable for their actions. Yet, some degree of 
elite domination may be inevitable in a community participation project, particularly 
in rural areas where the elites are often leaders who embody moral and political 
authority. However, due to the elites’ ability to communicate with outsiders, read 
project documents, keep accounts and records, and write proposals they are often 
the ones crafting the project rules. The process of rule making is in this context 
merely an opportunity for a powerful few to meet their preferences (SAVOIA et al., 
2010; THEESFELD, 2008). This in turn may discourage other community actors from 
participation. In that respect, decentralization can even aggravate the elite capture 
problem. The elite capture problem leads to the question: When is heterogeneity 
of actors good for collective action and when does it constrain true participation? 
3.2  The role of heterogeneity 
Heterogeneity and leadership may in turn be facilitative to a community participation 
project, particularly in rural areas where the elites comprises leaders who embody 
moral and political authority. In such cases elite capture is transparent to everybody, 
tolerated and even supported because the powerful are recognized as the only 
actors able to acquire external funding. The relationship between the powerful 
and the weak is here clientelistic, which implies that abuses are tolerated as long 
as the patron meets the client’s demands (PLATTEAU, 2004). 
The transition from positive to destructive leadership is, however, blurred 
(THEESFELD, 2009a). When scrutinizing the influence of participant’ heterogeneity, it 
is therefore sensible to differentiate the early stage in the collective action process 
from its later stages (OSTROM, 2007b). To facilitate initiatives, there must be 
some inequality of resource endowments; this enables actors to bear the cost of 
taking a leadership role (BALAND and PLATTEAU, 1995). Those with greater endow-
ments are often willing to bear a disproportionate share of the costs of organizing 
institutional arrangements to stimulate movement. VEDELD (2000) concludes that 
collective action is often enhanced by political elites and leaders, who are better 
endowed and wealthier than the average community members. The early participation 
of wealthy and knowledgeable participants may thus encourage trust.  
Manifold studies represent a continuum of opinions on the causality between 
heterogeneity and collective action (SAVOIA et al., 2010; THEESFELD, 2009a), 
including OLSON (1973), who argues that certain types of inequality will favour 
the provision of public goods. Likewise, WADE (1987) stresses the necessity to 
organize around existing structures of authority, with a major role played by 
elites. In fact, many cases indicate the positive effects of skilled and influential 
leaders in the course of self-organizing processes in ecosystem management 
(FOLKE et al., 2005; OLSSON et al., 2007; MEINZEN-DICK et al., 2002; JOHNSON, 
2001; CALVERT, 1992; and OLSSON et al., 2007). HURRELMANN et al. (2006) stress 
the role of appropriate mediating agencies, finding that particularly in post-socialist 
Bogen59-AInsa Theesfeld, Oscar Schmidt 
 
114 
countries with low social capital, well-educated and well-connected local leaders 
can initiate and maintain cooperation. Other authors qualify this viewpoint by 
arguing that the polarizing effect of heterogeneity depends on how collective action 
is organized (HECKATHORN, 1993). DAYTON-JOHNSON and BARDHAN (2002), for 
instance, show that the relationship between inequality and levels of collective 
action in conservation can be U-shaped in the fishery sector. Fishers who have 
outside earnings opportunities may believe that increased inequality has a negative 
effect on conservation. Again others have argued that distributional inequality 
especially in the later stages of cooperation may reduce trust and reputation and 
constrain the emergence of cooperation and, thus, imperil the success of decentre-
lization efforts (BARDHAN, 2000; BLOMQUIST et al., 2005; OSTROM, 2007b). 
LUTHANS et al. (1998) particularly ask why post-communist countries like Albania 
are susceptible to destructive leaders, even after the demise of communism. They 
conclude that the historical and cultural foundations are decisive when combined 
with current social and political crisis. Destructive leaders in these countries 
frequently use the persisting power of the former Communist party to manifest their 
own political survival. Although it is a group’ responsibility to solve its coordination 
problems, changing leaders is difficult and costly, thus, leaders always have some 
leeway for side payments and other private benefits (CALVERT, 1992).  
4 NATURAL RESOURCE GOVERNANCE BEFORE AND AFTER 
DECENTRALIZATION ATTEMPTS 
In the following, we explore and explain the implication of decentralization policies 
on the social and ecological systems of fish resources at Lake Ohrid. Our study 
is based on an analysis of primary data from a two-month field visit in 2008. The 
data was collected in three littoral communities in the Albanian County of Korçë: 
namely the villages of Hudenisht and Lin and the town of Pogradec. The two 
villages and the town of Pogradec were selected based on a prior explorative 
inquiry which indicated a range of advantages, including (1) the comparatively 
large size of their fishing communities and the diversified composition of their 
members, (2) their prominent role within the formal administrative framework 
and (3) their accessibility. The sites were repeatedly visited to meet interviewees 
and make on-site observations. A total sample of 25 semi-structured, open-ended 
interviews was conducted. Besides fishermen (18 interviews), representatives of 
associated economic sectors were interviewed (three interviews). Further interviews 
were conducted with fishing experts including staff members from the fishery 
administration and the World Bank (four interviews). Additional primary data 
were collected through informal conversation
3 and passive participant observation. 
 
                                                            
3  The technique of informal conversation resembles unstructured, open interviews. It evolves 
exclusively by chance and without a strict assignment of the interviewee and interviewer 
role (YIN, 1994).  
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Figure 2:  Case study region, Lake Ohrid in Albania 
 
Source: Adapted from UNEP (2000) and DIRECTORATE OF WATER AND FISHERIES RESOURCES 
(2005). 
4.1  Fishery management before the decentralization reform 
The Lake Ohrid fishery has seen various periods of fundamental institutional change. 
During Communist reign, from 1947 to 1991, fishing was the exclusive domain 
of the state. Private fishing was prohibited and decisions on withdrawal rates and 
maintenance were exclusively planned and organized by the central authorities. 
Those decisions were passed to local state enterprises for execution. At Lake Ohrid, 
the Pogradec Fishery Enterprise, a cooperative which comprised 40 fishermen, was 
assigned with these obligations. Harvest rates during this period were sufficiently 
low and stable to sustain the existing population. Any profits from selling the 
fish flowed back to the state budget and the cooperatives’ employees received fixed 
monthly salaries. Poaching – at least by external actors – was nonexistent because 
the lake was considered a top-security military zone wherein trespassers were 
immediately detected. 
This setting changed radically in the course of political transition. In 1992, state-
imposed restrictions quickly became ineffective. The state cooperative at Lake Ohrid 
was dissolved, and resource use was opened to private actors. Three years later, 
in 1995, Albania adopted its National Law on Fishing and Aquaculture, introducing 
a licensing system that allowed private entities to acquire formal property rights 
on the harvest of fish. Associated administrative responsibilities, like the issuing 
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of licenses and the surveillance and execution of regulations, were assigned to 
the new Directorate of Fisheries Policies (DoF) and its 14 regional divisions. 
The execution of fishery management at Lake Ohrid was consequently entrusted 
to the DoF’s divisional office at the city of Korçë. With the new management 
system in place a total of 120 fishermen were officially entitled to fish. Due to 
weak law enforcement, however, also an unknown number of poachers remained in 
business.  
Changes in the Lake Ohrid fishing sector happened not only due to a change in 
the composition of actors. Instead, raising income opportunities and rivalry in 
harvesting fishing stocks lead to an intensification of fishing patterns and harvest 
rates. In order to achieve higher revenues, fishermen started to adjust their fishing 
gear and to increase the number of workdays. This critical situation was further 
aggravated during the countrywide uprisings in 1997. As a consequence about 
350 additional illegal boats entered Lake Ohrid, severely increasing the number of 
actors exploiting the lake. Poaching and the disrespect of gear restrictions became 
daily routines and fish stocks declined even quicker, including the internationally 
known Ohrid trout (WATZIN, 2006). 
4.2  Fishery management after decentralization reform in 2002 
In the early 2000’s international donors began to push for nationwide measures 
against poaching and an improvement of the sector’s economic performance. 
The World Bank introduced a decentralization and devolution project – the Pilot 
Fishery Development Project (PFDP) – with the primary goal of introducing 
local governance for the country’s fishing grounds; Lake Ohrid was one of 14 
target areas for implementation (WORLD BANK, 2000). In 2002, the measures the 
PFDP had proposed received formal recognition by an amendment of the fishery 
legislation. Policy makers accordingly followed the Bank’s pledge for a legally 
binding recognition of local governance. However, this policy reform was based 
on coercive measures. To retain their fishing rights, local fishermen were obliged to 
organize in local Fishery Management Organisations (FMO). Fourteen local organi-
zations were established at various sites in the country, including Lake Ohrid. 
Each FMO was entrusted with management duties and exclusive fishing rights 
for a defined territory. All 14 organizations were created under the same statute, 
regardless of whether they were set up to deal with the high seas, the coast, or 
inland watersheds. The statute spelled out the FMOs’ organizational structure, 
defining membership rules, positions, and responsibilities; decision-making and 
conflict resolution procedures; and the distribution of contributions and pay-offs. 
The interviews indicate that this statute had been solely designed by an international 
consultancy firm. There was little if any participation by local stakeholders and 
local knowledge was disregarded in the final document.  
At Lake Ohrid, the Pogradec FMO was assigned as the sole entity holding fishing 
rights and management duties. The project chose a group of fishers as leaders in 
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an effort to include locals in the implementation process. It was hoped that those 
leaders would promote local governance within the community and serve as 
counterparts to the project. They were also appointed to leading positions on the 
organization’s Administrative Council, which gave them exclusive rights to 
elect a chairman; to call meetings; and to determine the use of member’s fees. 
Furthermore, they were made responsible for all communications and other inter-
actions with the fishery administration, market actors, or the PFDP. A project 
representative justified this procedure by stating that the chosen were both "skilled 
and influential" and "the only ones willing and prepared to take responsibilities". 
That the new leaders simultaneously belonged to the few fishermen who can 
afford the costly yet productive net fishing – the local administration estimates 
that this technique skims up to 80 % of the lake’s total production – was declared 
a "not intended coincidence" which "did not meet any local opposition". This 
"coincidence" however indicates a biased selection. 
The interviewee confirmed that the maximum number of ordinary members 
allowed to join the FMO was determined by the DoF and initially set at 140. 
These 140 included a large share of the 120 fishermen who had held licenses since 
the mid 1990s. The remaining licenses were distributed to newcomers. Strikingly, 
not only were these 140 ordinary FMO members appointed to lower positions 
within the organization; they were also economically less successful than those 
installed as leaders. 
We found that after the implementation of the decentralization reform, a large 
number of poachers had again remained in business and that the administration, 
like those of the past, declined to enforce penalties. In contrast to the aim of the 
intended institutional change, poaching was not eradicated – the local fishery 
inspector even described the situation as having "gotten worse" – and the FMO 
was by no means vested with the exclusive rights promised by the legislation.  
5 ELITE CAPTURE AT LAKE OHRID 
Seven years after the establishment of the Pogradec FMO at Lake Ohrid, the arbitrary 
condition characterized by licensed resource use, poaching, and insufficient law 
enforcement is aggravated. Overfishing has remained unchanged, a fact confirmed by 
stakeholders who frequently complain about the severe decline of productivity. 
Local governance is absent and fishery legislation non-compliance continues to 
be widespread. Poachers are truly an unchanged problem and many stakeholders 
blame this group for having caused the resource’s state. However, we provide 
evidence that the most severe problems are caused by the few influential actors 
who were initially chosen as FMO representatives. The privileged positions are a 
source to further reinforce their already disproportionate degree of economic and 
political power. This power is used for a well organized system of capture. 
Bogen61-AInsa Theesfeld, Oscar Schmidt 
 
118 
Our data indicate that elite capture mainly takes the form of a misuse of information 
and the redistribution of external funding. More concisely, elite actors abuse their 
authority to avoid sanctions, illegally support their kin, and construe the legal 
framework. The system of capture permits some to be beneficiaries while others 
suffer a considerable loss of utility and an interference with their rights. The demar-
cation between winners and losers does not follow the simple pattern of the wealthy 
and powerful characterized as winners and the poor and disempowered deemed 
losers. In contrast, we found that patronage allowed some actors who belong to 
the latter group to benefit as well. Participant observations accordingly showed 
that both FMO members and poachers are frequently supported by the elite. The 
beneficiaries are predominantly the elite’s family or clan members, close neighbours, 
and business partners. Actors who in contrast remain without any such support 
complained that their exclusion resulted from missing social ties. Thus, the 
determination of beneficiaries and losers is by social affiliation rather than legal 
entitlement or economic status. 
Elite members continuously misuse information. Notes on upcoming inspections 
or other measures are given to the FMO’s Administrative Council prior to their 
execution. This procedure is meant to foster participation and assistance, but is in 
fact used as an opportunity to cover up wrongdoings. Illegal nets are hauled in and 
hidden and unlicensed companions are informed to leave on time. Yet, even these 
measures of avoidance are unnecessary for the elite. For instance, in early 2006 
the DoF detected various cases of poaching by FMO members. Allowable mesh 
sizes and other gear restrictions had been ignored and undersized fish had been 
caught and sold en masse. Yet, while ordinary FMO members received fines and lost 
their licenses, no such sanctions were placed on the FMO leaders. These examples 
likewise show insufficient information spreading mechanisms, unreliable imple-
mentation of legislation and nonexistence of conflict resolution mechanisms. 
Such shortcomings in governance structures are often in line with the phenomenon 
of elite capture.  
Table 1, below, illustrates a striking incongruity between formal rules after the 
formal institutional change in 2002, i.e. the establishment of FMOs, and informal 
rules on various transactions in fishery. This incongruity indicates power abuse 
and elite capture. The informal rules that in fact organize the transactions and 
relationships in the fishery sector offer a variety of comparative advantages to 
the local elite and their kin. Instead of supporting the formal rules, these fishers 
therefore reinforce the informal set of rules and thereby their dominant position 
and profits. 
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Table 1:  Incongruent formal and informal rules  
Kind of rule  Formal rules 
x  Informal rules enforced through power 
abuse 





FMO members have the right to 
fish within all waters of the co-
management area. 
Fishing spots and coastal territories are 
distributed internally and in accordance  
with the power of each claimant. Those  
with the greatest influence also control the 
most productive spots. 
 
 
No person may undertake any 
fishing activities within the co-
management area unless he is  
an FMO member. 
Powerful actors allow accomplices without 
FMO membership to fish in the territories 
they control. 
2) Property rights 
assigned to 
licenses 
A single license holds validity 
for a captain, his boat and gear, 
and one assistant. 
Wealthy fishermen, like the FMO 
chairpersons, illegally employ groups of up 
to ten assistants to increase their revenues. 
3) Restrictions on 
species and sizes 
Catches must not include fish 
below a clearly defined 
minimum body size and age. 




There are clearly defined gear 
restrictions. 




There are clearly defined 
banning periods to secure fish 
reproduction. 
Banning periods are regularly disrespected. 
6) Monitoring and 
sanctioning 
The local DoF must perform 
regular monitoring rounds and 
sanction non-compliance by 
issuing fines and withdrawing 
licenses. 
Monitoring rounds occur irregularly due to 
limited financial and technical capacities. 
 
 
The FMO is given advance 
notice and is obliged to support 
the local DoF on monitoring 
rounds. 
FMO leaders use their information advantage 
to notify their kin whenever monitoring is 
about to happen. Fishermen who do not 
belong to this network do not receive notice 
and remain at risk. 
Sanctions are not enforced due to exceptions, 
infringement, and privileges for actors who 
network with the local administration. 
6) Distribution of 
licenses and fees 
The FMO is assigned to annually 
issue licenses and collect and 
administer membership fees. 
The DoF retained the determination of the 
licensing process. The FMO only distributes 
licenses. 
7) Establishment 
of a binding co-
management 
plan 
The FMO prepares and 
implements the co-management 
plan. 
The existing management plan has been 
drafted by international consultants without 
any participation by locals. 
8) Catch statistics/ 
reports to the 
DoF 
The FMO is obliged to collect 
catch statistics on a daily basis 
and to submit them to the DoF. 
Fishers do not reveal their productivity and 
the record remains incomplete. 
Note: 
x According to the National Law on Fishing and Aquaculture No. 7908 (1995); 
Amendment No. 8870 (2002); Regulation No.1, (1997) and Regulation No. 2, (2005) 
and FMO Statutes. 
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Table 1 indicates that those who are disadvantaged within the present system are 
not only excluded from the additional benefits that the elites capture by avoiding 
sanctions. In fact, a considerable number of benefits are captured at the expense 
of the disadvantaged actors’ property rights (see rule on "Access to fishing spots 
and withdrawal rights"). Another example is the fact that ordinary FMO 
members are frequently kept in the dark regarding the use of the organization’s 
budget. Fishers provided statements like, "What budget? I don’t know anything 
about money?" or "I just pay my fee, what they do with it I don’t know," 
obviously underscoring this finding. 
6 DISCUSSION 
Elite capture at Lake Ohrid leads to a range of consequences that affect collective 
action, and thus, the prospects for local governance.  
The Fishery Management Organisation (FMO) represents a "pseudo-association", 
existing only as a state imposed formal creation
4. Interview statements like, "In 
the future FMO members will be the first in line to receive money" indicate that 
licenses and membership are rather used as investments, which may become 
valuable with future engagement by international donors or an increased exertion 
of power by the government. PLATTEAU and GASPART (2003: 1688) argue likewise 
that many local leaders have "understood that the creation of a local NGO has 
become one of the best means of procuring funds from the international community". 
The pseudo-establishment leads to an even further reduction in the willingness 
to cooperate. This is partly due to comparative advantages that arise from lax 
law enforcement and the freedom to construe fishery rules. FMO members who 
are not affiliated with the leader’s network are equally reluctant to cooperate, 
but for different reasons. For those who have had negative experiences with the 
FMO leaders, collective action could cause them to be deprived of their property 
rights, to remain unheard, and to receive disproportionate benefits. Interviewees 
from this group frequently gave statements like, "I don’t trust the FMO"; "The 
big guys occupy all the good fishing spots and I am left with nothing"; or "They 
promised us so many things, but nothing was provided".  
There is an aggravating process between abuse of power, on the one side, and the 
empirically shown decreased trust and reputation, on the other, that constrains the 
development of collective action. Powerful actors, the FMO leaders misuse their 
positions and resource endowments for personal benefits. This, in turn, further 
reduces the level of trust, a prerequisite for cooperation, contributing to its further 
deterioration. These interdependencies are symptomatic for post-socialist countries 
(THEESFELD, 2009b). 
                                                            
4 T HEESFELD (2008) describes such kind of pseudo-associations for Bulgaria’s irrigation 
sector.  
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The way how the PFDP was initiated and implemented, including insufficient 
follow-up measures by authorities and inappropriate governance structures resulted 
in a further collapse of fish stocks. The introduction of local governance has been 
coercive and was never requested by locals. Therefore, it is not presumptuous to 
say that the PFDP was itself as much of a top-down measure as the purely state 
managed regime during socialism whose imperfections local resource governance 
is ideally meant to offset. The choice of a "once size fits all" statute for all 14 
organizations is only one out of a number of remarkable examples to support this 
argument. OSTROM (2007a) likewise expresses her concern against "one size fits 
all" approaches within the scope of managing very diversified and complex 
social-ecological systems, such as fishery.  
The PFDP solely established contacts with already advantaged actors, therefore 
excluding a large share of weaker members of the community. The fact that these 
very actors are today abusing their positions indicates that the PFDP simply 
skipped a genuine opportunity to empower weaker fishers. The project planners 
thus either overlooked the initial distribution of power and resources or ignored 
its potential consequences. Actual participation opportunities were missed during 
the phases of rule-making. This was the result of the PFDP choosing to use 
external consultants to create both the FMO’s statute and the co-management 
plan. Local knowledge and local needs were largely ignored, an assessment which 
is obvious when reading through the FMO’s present co-management plan. 
Albania’s disintegration of the old regime took place over a much longer period 
than in other Central and East European Countries, resulting in chaos and a 
political vacuum in which no systematic or effective policy could be formulated 
(HASHI and XHILLARI, 1999). First, the new government, committed to fundamental 
reforms necessary for a market economy, did not take power until after the 
second general election in March 1992 and second a political crisis resulting 
from the collapse of informal financial schemes brought the whole reform process, 
including the privatisation programme, to a halt in early 1997. Several political 
instabilities marked the further path of Albania towards democratisation, including 
decentralization attempts (LAWSON and SALTMASHE, 2000). Typical side-effects 
of such post-socialist instabilities are shortcomings in follow-up measures and 
accountability, a lack of sufficient back-up institutions at higher levels of social 
organization and prevailing governance structures that cannot guarantee the imple-
mentation of new formal rules. Local administrations are accordingly found to be 
remiss in fulfilling its responsibilities due a combination of apathy, pessimism, 
inconsistent behaviour, insufficient capacities, and even infringement. The same 
applies to the case study area, exemplified with statements such as, "This is Albania, 
there is no state!" or "The DOF’s inspector can’t do anything about poaching". 
To date there is no evidence for a stronger engagement by superior administrative 
organs at the national level. In other words, there is no higher level of power to 
hold accountable actors who do not fulfil their duties or who actively counteract 
Bogen63-AInsa Theesfeld, Oscar Schmidt 
 
122 
the law. Therefore, weaker locals cannot call on higher jurisdictional bodies to 
protect their property rights. This option is, however, essential for sustainable 
resource management and is part of a "facilitative political regime" (OSTROM, 
1990: 137; BLOMQUIST, 1992). 
7 RECOMMENDATION FOR DECENTRALIZATION IN POST-SOCIALIST 
NATURAL RESOURCE GOVERNANCE  
Although local governance can help overcome social dilemmas in natural resource 
management, there may also be severe drawbacks with decentralization policies, 
including capture by disproportionately influential actors. 
Of course decentralization and elite capture effects are interwoven and thus elite 
capture might occur because of the fact that the decentralisation is not properly 
implemented. Decentralization, comprising devolution approaches, has to go hand 
in hand with the establishment of a proper institutional environment, which means 
the provision of governance structures to make local natural resource governance 
effective.  
Without a facilitative political, administrative, jurisdictional and advisory system, 
the decentralization reform is exposed to the risk of elite capture. In Albania, 
provision of security was absent during the post-socialist period. Since the demise of 
communism, Albania is considered a weak state in which formal institutions have 
functioned poorly (LAWSON and SALTMASHE, 2000). A weak state is also often 
not able to provide the public goods, such as reliable jurisdictions, accessible 
conflict resolution mechanisms, locally adapted monitoring and sanctioning 
mechanisms, extension services and information spreading mechanisms. Also, due 
to the context of a weak state, there is low tax compliance, which in turn counteracts 
the ability of the state to provide public goods (LAWSON and SALTMASHE, 2000) 
including the provision of governance structures such as those mentioned above. 
The Albanian fishery case has shown that elite capture can evolve to become a 
problem with negative consequences as it simultaneously drives social inequality 
among local resource users and worsens environmental destruction. Sufficient 
strategies are needed to avoid this phenomenon. In line with MANSURI and RAO 
(2004), we therefore suggest introducing local governance in a context-specific 
manner with a long time horizon and careful, well-designed monitoring and 
evaluation systems. This contextual sensitivity is particularly important in post-
socialist societies because there is a need to account for lost trust in collective-
action-based governance resulting from communist experiences and the ensuing 
transition (SCHLEYER, 2009; THEESFELD, 2009b). Furthermore, awareness is needed 
that due to chaotic rules and a consequential need for security, societies in transition 
are exceedingly susceptible to destructive leadership (LUTHANS et al., 1998). 
The goal must be genuine empowerment that allows for a repetitive inclusion of 
all stakeholders within a community. This pledge implies more careful selection 
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of leaders in community based natural resource management. Selecting leaders 
who are well respected within the village community and have a good reputation 
may facilitate the establishment of norms of reciprocity that foster cooperation.  
The chances of finding such leaders are better if information asymmetry is reduced 
and if training is provided (NATH and INOUE, 2008). Sufficient monitoring and 
sanctioning rules are, however, required to hold these leaders accountable. 
Finally, LARSON and RIBOT (2004) point to the importance of a more sensible 
and equitable mode of devolution by proposing a public dialogue on public versus 
private powers and central versus local control. This is, in fact, exceedingly relevant 
in post-socialist societies that often lack a tradition of public discourse, particularly 
regarding methods of splitting property rights. 
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